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RÉSUMÉ 
La présente thèse se compose de trois chapitres qui portent sur .la gestion des risques 
financiers dans les entreprises non-financières. Les différents tests empiriques que nous y 
effectuons sont basés sur un large panel de 6,326 observations trimestrielles. Ce panel 
comporte des données détaillées concernant les positions de couverture d' un échantillon de 
150 compagnies pétrolières américaines et ce, entre 1998 et 201 O. 
Le premier chapitre contribue à la littérature en apportant des réponses à la question 
relative aux déterminants du choix des stratégies de couverture. Une telle question qui a été 
relativement abordée sur le plan théorique mais peu d' évidences empiriques sont fournies vu 
le manque de données détaillées sur la structure des stratégies de couverture ou les difficultés 
de les avoir. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats obtenus prouvent que le choix de la stratégie de 
couverture est influencé par les dépenses d' investissement et la corrélation entre ces dépenses 
et les flux monétaires générés par l'entreprise. 
Le choix de la stratégie est aussi très relié aux prix au comptant (spot) , à leur volatilité, 
ainsi qu 'aux prix anticipés. De surcroit, les contraintes financières jouent un rôle important 
dans la détermination de la nature de la couverture. Finalement, les caractéristiques de la 
production, telles que la diversification géographique et l' incertitude dans la production, 
influencent aussi le choix de la stratégie de la couverture. 
Le deuxième chapitre contribue à la littérature en donnant des premiers constats 
empiriques au regard du choix de la structure de maturité des positions de couverture. Les 
résultats montrent une relation non-monotone entre la maturité de la couverture et la 
probabilité de la détresse financière. Cette non-monotonicité existe aussi entre la maturité et 
les prix au comptant. 
Les résultats indiquent aussi que la maturité de la couverture est positivement reliée à 
l'incertitude dans la production, à la corrélation entre les prix de ventes et les quantités 
produites, et à la volatilité des prix au comptant du pétrole et du gaz. Les entreprises semblent 
encore aligner la maturité de leurs positions de couverture avec celles de leurs actifs (réserves 
de pétrole et de gaz) et dettes. 
L'aversion au risque du gestionnaire n'a pas un effet significatif sur le choix de la 
maturité. Finalement, le deuxième chapitre présente une première évidence empmque 
concernant l' impact de la maturité sur les rendements de l'action de l'entreprise. 
Le troisième chapitre réexamine l' hypothèse de la prime liée à la gestion des risques 
financiers. Une estimation en équations simu ltanées par la méthode des triples moindres 
carrés est utilisée pour pallier le problème d'endogénéité entre la décision de couverture et 
d'autres décisions financières de l'entreprise. Les résultats montrent que les entreprises, qui 
se couvrent contre les fluctuations des prix du pétrole et du gaz, réa lisent des prix de vente 
Xl 
sensiblement plus élevés qui vont rehausser les résultats comptables. De surcroit, la 
couverture est associée à une réduction du risque total et du risque spécifique de l' entreprise. 
Finalement, les entreprises qui gèrent leurs risques financiers accèdent à plus de financement 
externe mais non pas à moindre coût. 
Mots clés: Gestion des risques financi ers, choix des instruments dérivés, stratégie de 
couverture, maturité, rési liation prématurée, implications réelles, création de valeur, 
réduction de risque, industrie pétrolière et gazière. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of tl1ree essays on corporate risk management. ft uses a new hand-
collected dataset on the hedging activities of 150 US ail and gas producers during the period 
1998-201 O. 
The first chapter examines the determinants of hedging strategy choice. Severa! 
theoretical studies investigate this issue; however, little empirical evidence is given. In this 
regard, this chapter adds to the hedging literature by exploring the implications of sorne 
theoretical predictions related to derivative choice that have not been explored yet. We use 
different dynamic discrete choice frameworks with random effects to mitigate unobserved 
heterogeneity and state dependence. Our evidences suggest that hedging strategy is strongly 
influenced by investment opportunities, the correlation between generated cash flows and 
investment expenditures, oil and gas market conditions, financial constraints, production 
specificities (i.e. , production unce1iainty, production flex ibility, and price-quantity 
correlation), and managerial risk aversion. 
The second chapter investigates how firms design the maturity oftheir hedging programs, 
and the real effects of maturity choice on finn value and ri sk. This chapter contributes to the 
literature by providing first empirical evidences on the determinants of the hedging maturity 
structure. We then study the determinants of the maturity choice at the inception of hedging 
contracts and the motivations of the early termination of outstanding contracts. We fi nd that 
hedging maturity is influenced by investment opportunities, the correlation between 
generated cash flows and investment expenditures, oil and gas market conditions, production 
spec ificities (i.e. , production uncertainty and price-quantity correlation), and hedging contract 
features (i .e., strike priee and remaining maturity). 
Our results also indicate an interesting non-monotonie relationship between hedging 
maturity and measures of financial distress . Oil and gas producers tend to align their hedging 
maturity with expected !ife duration of ail and reserves and weighted-average maturity of 
debt. F ina lly, we show that longer hedging maturities could attenuate the sensitivity of stock 
returns to oil and gas priee fluctuations. 
rn the third chapter, we examine whether derivative use has real implications on firm 
value and risk. Previous hedging literature leads to fairly mixed and controversial results. 
Therefore, we revisit the hedging premium question for non-financial firms after controlling 
for potential shortcoming sources detected in previous studies. Particularly, we control for the 
endogeneity problem between derivative use decision and other firm 's financial policies. We 
also control for sample selection bias by selecting firms within the same industry. Other 
forms ofnon-financial hedging are further considered (i.e., operational hedging). 
xiii 
We find that oil and gas hedging allows firms to realize higher selling priees and higher 
accounting performance. More importantly, results show that fum 's tota l and idiosyncratic 
risks are s ignificantly reduced by oil and gas hedging. Finally, results indicate that hedg ing 
eases access to higher debt financ ing, however with no real effect s on debt cost. In sum, these 
real effects of hedging should lead to valuation gains for shareholders. 
Keywords: Risk management, derivative choice, hedging strategy, maturity choice, early 
termination, rea l implications, value creat ion, risk reduction, oi l and gas industry. 
INTRODUCTION 
Dans le monde sans friction de Modigliani et Miller (1958), la gestion des risques 
financiers s' avère infructueuse car elle ne génère pas une augmentation de la valeur pour 
l'entreprise. Toutefois, dans le monde réel imparfait, la gestion des risques au moyen 
d'instruments financiers dérivés devient de plus en plus répandue. En juin 2013 , la Banque 
des Règlements Internationaux (BRI) a publié des statistiques révélatrices qui montrent que 
les entreprises non-financières détenaient des montants notionnels de 10.6 trillions de dollars 
et de 35.8 trillions de dollars de produits financi ers dérivés sur les devises et les taux 
d' intérêt, respectivement. À cette même date, les contrats de gré à gré sur les matières 
premières avaient un encours notionnel d'environ 2 trillion s de dollars, l'or non compris. Au 
début du millénaire, ces chiffres étaient d' environ 2.8 trillions, 5.5 trillions et 0.3 trillions de 
dollars pour les produits financiers dérivés sur les devises, les taux d' intérêt et les matières 
premières. 
De surcroit, les études empiriques révèlent que les entreprises non-financières recourent 
davantage aux produits financiers dérivés pour couvrir leurs expos itions aux différents 
ri sques financiers (voir par exemple, Haushalter, 2000; Jin et Jorion, 2006 et Kumar et 
Rabinovitch, 2013 pour l' industrie pétrolière). Dans une perspective internationale, Bartram, 
Brown, et Fehle (2009) trouvent que 60% des 7,3 19 firmes étudiées, issues de 50 pays 
différents, utilisent des instruments financiers dér ivés sur des devises, des taux d'intérêt ou 
des matières premières. 
La présente thèse répond à deux questions relatives à la gestion des risques financiers par 
les entreprises non-financières. La première question portera sur l'architecture des 
programmes de couverture des nsques financiers et p lus spécifiquement sur (i) les 
déterminants du choix de la stratégie de couverture et (ii) les déterminants du choix de 
l' horizon de la couverture. Le premier volet re latif au choix des stratégies sera traité dans le 
premier chapitre. Le deuxième volet portant sur le choix de l' horizon de la couverture sera 
abordé dans le deux ième chapitre. La deuxième question qui fera l' objet du troisième 
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chapitre portera sur les implications réelles de la gestion des risques financiers sur la valeur et 
le risque de l'entreprise. Pour ce fa ire, les di fférents tests empiriques dans cette thèse sont 
basés sur des données détaillées concernant les pos itions de couverture d' un échantillon de 
150 compagnies pétrolières américaines durant la période allant de 1998 à 20 1 O. 
1- Les déterminants de la gest ion des risques financiers1 
Il importe, à ce niveau, de rappeler les déterminants et les motivations de la gestion des 
risques financiers au sein des entreprises non-financières pour mieux situer la thèse dans son 
contexte. La littérature financière se base sur l'existence des frictions (taxes, coOts d'agence, 
coOts de la détresse financière, l'asymétrie de l' information, ... ) dans le monde réel pour bâtir 
un cadre théorique des motivations de la gestion des risques financiers. Ces motivations 
pourront être c lassées en deux grandes catégories. La première catégorie considère la gestion 
des risques financiers comme étant un moyen de création et de max imisation de la valeur de 
l'entreprise, et la deuxième catégorie relie la gestion des risques à la max imisation de l'ut ilité 
des gestionnaires des entreprises. 
Les motivations liées à la maximisation de la va leur stipulent que la gestion des ri sques 
réduit la variabilité des flux monétaires et plus particul ièrement elle évite les grandes pertes. 
Par conséquent, la gestion des risqu es réduit les coOts anticipés de la détresse financière 
(Mayers et Smith, 1982; Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985 ; Stulz, 1996). La réduction de la 
probabilité de la détresse financière et des coOts qui lui sont rattachés permettra à l'entreprise 
d'accéder à un financement extérieur plus élevé et moins coOteux. L'augmentation de la 
capacité d'endettement de l' entreprise se traduira par une augmentation de la va leur de cel le-
ci et ce à travers: (i) Les économies d'impôts liées à la déductibilité des intérêts financiers 
(S mith et Stulz, 1985; Leland, 1998; Ross, 1996; Graham et Rogers, 2002). (ii) Une meilleure 
coordination entre le fi nancement et l'investissement ce qui permettrait d'éviter le problème 
du sous-investissement (Bessembinder, 1991 ; Froot, Scharfstein et Stein, 1993). 
1 Voir Aretz et Bartram (20 1 0). 
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La réduction de la variabilité des flux monétaires aidera encore l'entreprise à avoir les 
fonds internes nécessaires pour le financement des projets ayant des retombées financières 
positives. Les effets bénéfiques de la gestion des risques s'accentuent davantage dans le cas 
des entreprises ayant des opportunités d ' investissement substantielles et faisant face à un coût 
de financement externe élevé (Smith et Stulz, 1985; Froot, Scharfstein et Stein, 1993; Gay et 
Nam; 1998). 
La gestion des risques permet aussi de réduire les coûts reliés au problème d'agence. En 
effet, le gestionnaire avec des flux monétaires plus stables est moins enclin de se comporter 
d' une manière opportuni ste par le biais d' un transfert des risques (risk-shifting) qui va à 
l'encontre des intérêts des créanciers de l'entreprise. 
De même, la gest ion des risques augmente la valeur de l'entreprise en diminuant ses 
dettes sous forme de taxes à payer. Smith et Stulz (1985) démontrent qu'une entreprise, 
assujettie à un taux de taxation qui croît avec l' augmentation de ses résultats comptables 
(fonction de taxation convexe), pourra diminu er les taxes à payer par le biais de la gestion des 
risques financiers. En effet, la gestion des risques atténuera la variabilité des résultats 
comptables avant impôts diminuant ainsi les taxes dues. Par conséquent, l'allégement du 
fardeau fiscal à long terme permettra de rehausser la valeur de l'entreprise. Cet argument a 
été validé empiriquement dans les études subséquentes (Nance, Smith et Smithson, 1993; 
Graham ei Smiih, 1999; Graham et Rogers, 2002). 
Un deuxième courant, dans la littérature, relie la gestion des risques financiers au 
comportement des gestionnaires qui ont un penchant pour la maximisation de leur utilité. Les 
arguments avancés s'insèrent dans le cadre du problème principal-agent entre les 
gestionnaires et les actionnaires (Jensen et Meckling, 1976). En effet, l'ancienneté dans le 
travail, la réputation, l'expertise (ces facteurs représentent le capital humain du gestionnaire) 
et encore la détention directe des actions de l' entreprise font en sorte que la richesse 
personnelle du gestionnaire soit étroitement reliée à la valeur de l'entreprise. Tous ces 
facteurs combinés à l' incapacité du gestionnaire à diversifier sa richesse personnelle (carrière 
dans l' entreprise) l' incitent à entreprendre des activités de gestion des risques financ iers pour 
couvrir sa propre richesse et non pas pour maximiser celle des actionnaires. Pour pallier à ce 
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problème Stulz (1984) et Smith et Stulz (1985) suggèrent l' inclusion des options d'achat des 
actions de l'entreprise comme composante de la rémunération des gestionnaires. Les résultats 
empiriques concernant cet argument sont controversés. Par exemple, Tufano (1996) confirme 
cette hypothèse alors que Haushaltèr (2000) ne trouve pas une relation directe entre la gestion 
des risques et la valeur des actions détenues par le gestionnaire. 
2- Les déterminants du choix de la stratégie de couverture 
Comme déjà mentionné, une riche littérature a permis de mieux comprendre les 
motivations de la gestion des risques et ses vertus pour les entreprises non-financières. 
Cependant, une moindre attention a été accordée à la manière dont on doit gérer les risques 
financiers. En effet, à part les quelques travaux théoriques en rapport avec les déterminants 
du choix de la stratégie de couverture, on distingue une seule étude empirique menée par 
Adam (2009) pour le secteur de 1' or. Encore, les constats empiriques révèlent que les 
entreprises, dans le même secteur d ' activité, adoptent des stratégies de couverture différentes 
alors qu ' elles font face à la même source de risque. Ainsi, le premier chapitre de cette thèse 
aura comme objectif de combler le manque d' études empiriques en rapport avec les 
déterminants du choix de la stratégie de couverture. Plus particulièrement, nous vérifierons la 
validité empirique de certaines prédictions émanant des travaux théoriques. 
La littérature financière classifie les instruments financiers dérivés en deux grandes 
catégories: (i) les instruments dérivés qui ont un profil de gain (payojj) ayant une relation 
linéaire avec le prix de l' actif sous-jacent. Les contrats swap et les contrats à terme (de gré à 
gré ou les contrats futures) font partie de cette catégorie. L' initiation de ce genre 
d' instruments ne génère pas de paiement. La deuxième catégorie engl obe les instruments 
financiers dérivés dont le profil de gain a une relation non-linéaire avec le prix de l' actif 
sous-jacent. Ces instruments non-linéa ires englobent les options d'achat, les options de vente 
et d' autres produits avec une structure relativement plus complexes (les collars, les strangles, 
... ).Les instruments non-linéaires génèrent le paiement d' une prime à l' in it iation. 
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L 'analyse de la dynamique des stratégies de couverture adoptées par les entreprises dans 
notre échantillon révèle un constat très important relatif à la persistance dans les choix 
effectués par les gestionna ires. En effet, ces derniers ma intiennent leurs stratégies de 
couverture pour des périodes relativement longues. Ceci pose un défi au niveau de l' approche 
économétrique à adopter. Nous avons ainsi opté pour des méthodologies économétriques 
dynamiques dérivées des modèles appliqués aux choix discrets à savoir le modèle probit 
ordonné et le modèle logit multinomial. 
Nos tests empiriques révèlent que les stratégies non-linéaires sont positivement corrélées 
avec les opportunités d' investissement. En effet, les entreprises ayant des dépenses élevées en 
termes d' exploration et de développement des réserves de gaz et de pétro le font recours à 
plus de stratégies non-linaires. Ce constat corrobore la prédiction théorique de Froot, Stein, et 
Scharfstein (1993) et les résultats d' Adam (2009) pour le secteur de l'or. Dans ce même 
contexte, les résultats montrent qu ' une corrélation positive entre les dépenses en capita l et les 
flux monétaires générés incitera les entreprises à utiliser davantage les produits linéaires (les 
contrats swap). Les résultats démontrent auss i qu e les stratégies linéaires sont positivement 
corrélées avec les prix au comptant (spot) du pétro le et du gaz alors que les stratégies non-
linéaires sont plus liées au niveau de la vo latilité de ces prix au comptant et aux prix anticipés 
dans le futur . 
Les producteurs de pétrole et de gaz qui ont une plus grande diversification géographique 
dans leurs opérations de production font plus recours aux stratégies non-linéaires. Ce résultat 
est conforme à l' argument de la flexibilité de la production avancé par Moschini et Lapan 
(1992). La fl exibilité dans la production est considérée comme étant une opt ion réelle avec un 
payojj non-linéaire (convexe) nécessitant une stratégie non-l inéaire pour la couvrir. Une 
corrélation posit ive entre les prix de vente et les quantités produites encourage le recours aux 
stratégies linéaires comme stipulé dans la littérature (Brown et Toft, 2002; Gay, Nam, et 
Turac, 2002). De p lus, une plus grande incertitude dans les quantités produites mot ive le 
recours aux stratégies non-linéaires. L'incertitude dans la production accentue la convexité de 
l'expos it ion globale de l'entreprise, ce qui nécess ite le recours aux stratégies avec un payojj 
convexe tel que suggéré par Moschini et Lapan (1995) et Brown et Toft (2002). 
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Les résultats donnent une première évidence empirique de l' impact du problème de 
surinvestissement, tel que identifié par Morellec et Smith (2007), sur le choix de la stratégie 
de couverture. Lorsque la variabilité des flux monétaires générés par l' entreprise est grande, 
les stratégies linéaires permettront de mieux les stabiliser et réduire ainsi les flux monétaires 
disponibles aux gestionnaires. En concordance avec les prédictions de Smith et Stulz (1985), 
nos résultats démontrent qu ' un gestionnaire détenant une plus grande part d'actions de 
l' entreprise a tendance à recourir aux contrats swap. Au contraire, si le gestionnaire détenait 
plus d'options d'achat d'actions de l'entreprise, il aurait plus d ' incitation à utiliser des 
stratégies non-linéaires. Les entreprises qui ont un ratio d' endettement plus élevé, mais pas 
encore en détresse financière, ont tendance à utiliser les stratégies linéaires. Ces entreprises 
cherchent plus à stabiliser leurs revenus pour faire face aux paiements induits par leur 
endettement élevé. Par contre, les entreprises qui sont déjà en situation de détresse financière 
recourent davantage aux stratégies non-linéaires en guise de comportement de transfert de 
risque (risk-shifting) tel que identifié dans la littérature (Jensen et Meckling, 1976; Adler et 
Detemple, 1988). 
3- Les déterminants de l'horizon de la couverture 
Un autre volet de l' architecture ou du design de la stratégie de gestion des risques 
financiers a été largement ignoré dans la littérature qui se focalise plus sur les explications de 
l'étendue de la couverture et ses implications. Il s' agit du choix de l' horizon lors de 
l' initiation du programme de couverture, des ajustements à apporter par la suite, de la 
résiliation prématurée des contrats de couverture en place et le remplacement de ceux déjà 
expirés. La littérature théorique a ignoré tous ces aspects car elle tra ite des modèles statiques 
qui sont préconisés souvent sur une seule période de temps et qui assument que la déc ision de 
couverture est irréversible et sans coûts. 2 Les études empiriques ont aussi ignoré ce volet vu 
l' indigence des données pertinentes et les difficultés d 'y accéder. 
2 Par exemple les modèles développés par Smith et Stulz ( 1985), Froot, Scharfstein, et Stein (1993) et Adam 
(2002). 
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Récemment, Fehle et Tsyplakov (2005) ont comblé le manque de prédictions théoriques 
concernant la structure de maturité de la couverture. Ils ont bâti un modèle dynamique en 
temps continu dans lequel l' entreprise pourrait ajuster son ratio de couverture ainsi que la 
maturité des instruments qu'elle utilise en réponse aux fluctuations des prix de son produit. 
Leur modèle produit un certain nombre de nouvelles prédictions théoriques concernant le 
choix de la maturité à l' initiation de la couverture et les ajustements à apporter par la suite 
tels que la résiliation prématurée et le remplacement des positions expirées. 
Le deuxième chapitre de la thèse a pour objectif de combler le manque d' études 
empiriques relatives aux déterminants du choix de la maturité à l' initiation de la couverture 
ainsi que son évolution dans le temps. De surcroit, ce chapitre examine les implications 
réelles de la maturité de la couverture sur la valeur et le risque de l' entreprise. Pour ce faire, 
nous retiendrons les différentes prédictions théoriques émanant du modèle de Fehle et 
Tsyplakov (2005), ci-dessus mentionné, et nous les supplémentons par d'autres hypothèses 
relatives aux caractéristiques du programme d' investissement de l' entreprise, la maturité de 
ses actifs et dettes, les taxes, et l' aversion au risque du gestionnaire. 
Les résultats révèlent des effets opposés des caractéristiques du programme 
d' investissement sur la maturité de la couverture. En effet, les entreprises avec des grandes 
opportunités d'investissement font recours à des positions de couverture avec des longues 
maturités pour avoir une meilleure harmonisation entre les dépenses en capital et les flux 
monétaires générés à 1' interne. Cependant, une corrélation positive entre les dépenses 
d' investissement et les flux monétaires muni les entreprises d ' une diversification naturelle 
qui diminuera la probabilité d' un sous-financement et donc favorisera l' utilisation des 
positions de couverture plus courtes. 
Les tests empiriques démontrent aussi un constat très révélateur. Il s' agit de la re lation 
non-monotone (concave) entre la maturité de la couverture et la probabilité de la détresse 
fi nancière. Ce constat corrobore la prédict ion théorique de Fehle et Tsyplakov (2005) qu i 
stipule que les entreprises qui sont loin de la détresse financière et celles qui sont proches de 
la détresse fi nancière adopteront des stratégies de couverture de courte durée. Cependant, 
nous avons trouvé que les entreprises, qui sont déjà en détresse financière et qui encourent 
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des grandes pertes en termes de flux monétaires, font davantage recours aux options de vente 
avec des maturités plus longues pour se couvrir. Ce résultat contredit la prédiction théorique 
de Fehle et Tsyplakov (2005) mais il est justifié par un comp01tement de transfert de ri sque 
(risk-shifting). 
De surcroit, nos résultats indiquent qu'une plus grande incertitude dans la production 
incite les entreprises à utiliser des couvertures de longue maturité. Ce constat infirme la 
prédiction théorique de Brown et Toft (2002) affirmant que l' incertitude dans la production 
rend les entreprises réticentes à couvrir leurs expositions les plus lointaines. Comme attendu, 
une corrélation positive entre les prix au comptant et les quantités produites, favorise 
l' implémentation de couvertures avec de longues durées pour éviter les variations dans les 
flux monétaires. La maturité de la couverture semble auss i avoir une relation non-monotone 
avec les prix au comptant du pétrole et du gaz et elle est positivement corrélée avec la 
volatilité de ces prix au comptant. Ces deux derniers constats corroborent avec les prédictions 
de Fehle et Tsyplakov (2005). 
Les résultats indiquent encore que les entreprises ayant une plus grande convexité dans 
leur fonction de taxation utilisent davantage des couvertures de longue durée afin de profiter 
des économies d' impôts liées à la gestion des risques tel que stipulé dans la littérature 
(Graham et Smith, 1999; Graham et Rogers, 2002). Les résultats prouvent aussi que les 
entreprises alignent la maturité de leurs pos itions de couverture avec celles de leurs actifs (les 
réserves de pétrole et de gaz) et dettes. Finalement, ce deuxième chapitre documente une 
première évidence empirique de l' impact de la structure de maturité de la couverture sur la 
valeur et le risque de l' entreprise. À cet égard, nos résultats montrent que les couvertures 
avec de longues échéances sont capables d 'atténuer la sensibilité des rendements des actions 
aux fluctuations des prix du pétrole et du gaz. Cependant, l' effet sur la volatilité des 
rendements est statistiquement insignifiant. 
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4- Les implications réelles de la gestion des risques financiers 
Partant des imperfections qui entachent le monde réel, une large littérature s'est donné 
pour objectif de mettre en évidence les vertus et les bienfaits de la gestion des risques 
financiers pour les entreprises non-financières et, par conséquent, pour leurs actionnaires. 
Selon cette littérature, la gestion des risques contribue à la création de valeur, entre autres, en 
réduisant la probabilité de la détresse financière, en évitant le problème de sous-
investissement, en diminuant les taxes à payer, et en empêchant les problèmes d 'agence. 
Toutefois, les résultats et constats empiriques restent largement controversés et non 
concluants. Par exemple, Allayannis et Weston (2001), Graham et Rogers (2002), Carter, 
Rogers, et S imkins (2006), Adam et Fernando (2006), et Bartram, Brown, et Conrad (20 Il) 
font partie d'un courant qui, dans la littérature, confirme l'hypothèse selon laquelle la gestion 
des risques est créatrice de valeur pour l'entreprise. Par contre, les résultats d'autres études 
empiriques menées par Hentschel et Kothari (2001), Guay et Kothari (2003), Jin et Jorion 
(2006), et Fauver et Naranjo (20 1 0) n'appuient pas cette hypothèse. 
Aretz et Bartram (2010) font une revue exhaustive de cette littérature et ils renvoient la 
contradiction entre les résultats empiriques, principalement, à un problème d'endogénéité 
entre la décision d' utiliser les instruments financiers dérivés en vue de faire de la couverture 
et autres décisions financières dans l'entreprise. De surcroit, selon ces auteurs, ce problème 
d'endogénéité se trouve aggravé par un autre problème fondamental d' identification où les 
déterminants de la décision de couverture sont en même temps des déterminants d'autres 
décisions financières . Encore, la gestion des risques est une stratégie multidimensionnelle qui 
incorpore d'autres aspects outre l'usage des instruments dérivés. En effet, la gestion 
opérationnelle des risques (operational hedge) est vue comme un moyen complémentaire de 
couverture qui pourrait expliquer les effets faibles de la gestion des risques par les 
instruments financiers dérivés (Guay et Kothari, 2003). Finalement, Aretz et Bartarm (20 1 0) 
mettent de l'avant une source supplémentaire de divergence et d 'ambigüité dans les résultats 
empiriques. 11 s'agit de la difficulté à identifier avec précision l'étendue de la couverture. 
Ceci est dû essentiellement au fait que les entreprises utilisent plutôt des portefeuilles 
d'instruments diff~rents (hedging mix) que des instruments individuels. 
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Partant de tous ces constats, le troisième chapitre vise à rev isiter la question de la prime 
liée à la gestion des ri squ es financ iers tout en prenant en compte les différentes sources de 
divergence susment ionnées. Pour surmonter le problème d' endogénéité, nous considérons les 
effets de rétroaction mutuelle entre la déc is ion de couverture et les autres déc isions 
fi nancières dans l' entreprise. Nous utiliserons a insi l' approche des triples moindres carrés 
(Three-Stage Least Squares, 3-SLS) pour l' estimation des équations simultanées. La méthode 
des triples moindres carrés a l'avantage essentiel de considérer la corrélation entre les rés idus 
des équations estimées, par conséquent, e lle conduit à des est imations plus effi c ientes. De 
surcroit, le bia is de sé lection est minimisé dans nos tests empiriques car les entreprises , dans 
notre échantillon, appartiennent à la même industrie, e lles sont exposées à la même source de 
risque (les prix du pétrole et du gaz) et elles différent considérablement en termes de 
comportements de couverture tel que suggéré par Jin et Jorion (2006) . Encore, nous prenons 
en considération l' ex istence de la gestion d' autres risqu es financ iers (le taux d ' intérêt et le 
taux de change) et la diversification géographique comme moyen de couverture 
opérationnelle. Finalement, les tests sont réa lisés en utilisant l' étendu e g loba l du portefeuill e 
de couverture a insi que par instrument (contrats swap, options de vente, et les costless 
col/ars). 
Dans l'ensemble, les résultats obtenus montrent que la couverture a des effets positifs sur 
les prix de vente, ce qui se traduira par une amélioration dans les rendements des actifs 
(return on asset) et des capitaux propres (return on equity ). En outre, la couverture réduit 
sensiblement le risque total et le risque idiosyncrat ique de l' entreprise. Ces résultats 
corroborent ceux rapportés par Guay (1 999) et Bartram, Fehle, et Conrad (2011 ). À l' instar 
d' Adam (2009), la couverture n'entraîne pas une augmentation du coût des capitaux propres 
car elle n ' augmente pas le risque systématique (coeffic ient beta) de l'entreprise. Fi na lement, 
la couverture semble augmenter la capacité d' endettement de l'entrepr ise tel que prôné par la 
littérature (Stulz, 1984; Smith et Stu lz, 1985; Stulz, 1996; Garham et Rogers, 2002). 
Cependant, dans notre échantillon, la couverture s'avère sans impact rée l sur le coût de la 
dette pour les entreprises . Ceci contred it les récents résu ltats rapportés par Campello, Lin, 
Ma, et Zou (20 Il ) pour le cas de la couverture des taux d ' intérêt et des taux de cha nge, et 
Ku mar et Rabonovitch (20 13) pour la couverture des prix du pétrole et du gaz. Ku mar et 
Il 
Rabonovitch (2013) n' ont pas pris en considération le problème d'endogénéité dans leur 
régression. 
Le reste de la thèse est divisé de la façon suivante: un premier chapitre qui explore les 
déterminants du choix de la stratégie de couverture. Le second examine les déterminants du 
choix de la maturité de la couverture ainsi que ses implications réelles sur la valeur et le 
risque de l' entreprise. Le troisième chapitre revisite la question de la prime associée à la 
gestion des risques financiers pour les entreprises non-financières. Finalement, une dernière 
partie est consacrée à la synthèse des résultats et à la conclusion. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the determinants of hedging strategy choice. We introduce 
different dynamic discrete choice frameworks with random effects to mitigate unobserved 
heterogeneity and state dependence. Using a new dataset on the hedging activities of 150 US 
oïl and gas producers, we find strong evidence that hedging strategy is influenced by 
investment opportunities, the correlation between generated cash flows and investment 
expenditure, oïl and gas market conditions, financial constraints, and oil and gas production 
specificities (i.e., production uncertainty, production flexibility, and price-quantity 
correlation). 
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1.1 Introduction 
To date, seant empirical research has attempted to explore how hedging programs are 
structured by non-financial firms ( e.g. , Tu fano, 1996; Géczy, Minton, and Schrand, 1997; 
Brown, 2001; Adam, 2009). The goal ofthis study is to add to the literature by shedding light 
on how firms hedge risks. We a Iso study the determinants and consequences of their choices. 
We answer the following question: What are the determinants of hedging strategy choice? It 
is important to understand why firms within the same industry and with the same risk 
exposure vastly differ in terms of their hedging strategy. Differences in firms ' hedging 
practices seem to come from differences in firm-specific characteristics rather than 
differences in their underlying risk exposures. Therefore, explaining how firms structure their 
hedging portfolios and measuring their related economie effects should provide a better 
understanding of how hedging affects corporate risk and value. 
This study contributes to the literature on corporate hedging in severa! ways. We use an 
extensive and new hand-collected dataset on the risk management activities of 150 US oil 
and gas producers with quarterly observations over the period 1998 to 201 O. Our data, 
collected from publicly disclosed information, avoid the non-response bias associated with 
questionnaires and provide detailed information about hedging activities. Moreover, unlike 
previous studies on risk management in the oil and gas industry, our dataset is quarierly 
rather than annual and covers a far longer period. In addition, we study the hedging activities 
of both commodities, oil and gas, separately, which gives deeper insight into oil and gas 
producers ' hedging dynamics. Finally, our study period coïncides with the app lication of the 
new derivative accounting standard (Financial Accounting Standards Board 133) in the 
Un ited States, which is expected to influence corporate risk management starting from 1998: 
Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston (1 998) fi nd that 80% of the Wharion Survey respondents 
expressed concern regarding the accounting treatment of derivatives. 
16 
[n addition, we innovate in terms of the econometrie methodology to better capture 
hedging dynamism and improve the re liability of the statistical inference of our findings. We 
consider derivative choice as a multi-state process and examine the effects of finn- specifie 
characteristics and o il and gas market conditions on the choice of hedging strategy. To 
allev iate the effects of unobserved individual heterogeneity and state dependence3, we use 
dynamic discrete cho ice methodologies with random effects that account for the initia l 
condition problem. We thus distinguish the effects of past hedging strategy choice and 
observable and unobservable firm characteristics on current hedging behav ior. We use a 
dynamic generalized random effects ordered probit madel to analyze why firms chose linear 
or non-linear instruments. This madel explores the determinants of hedging strategies based 
on one instrument only ( i.e., swap contracts only, put options only, costless collars only). In 
addition, we use a dynamic random effects mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) to explore the 
determinants of hedging strategies based on a combination of two or more instruments (i .e., 
hedging portfo lios). For the multinomial mixed logit, we chose swap contracts as our base 
outcome, which allows us to determine why firms chose hedging portfo lios with payoffs 
departing from strict linearity. 
Our comprehensive dataset a llows us to reliably test the empirica l relevance of some 
theoretical arguments and predictions related to derivative cho ice that have not been explored 
yet. In particular, we test the implications of the prediction of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 
( 1993) related to the impact of the corre lation between interna lly generated cash flows and 
investment opportunities. Further, our dataset allows us to verify the implications of 
production characteristics (i .e ., production fl ex ibility and quantity-price correlation) as 
suggested by Moschini and Lapan (1992), Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay, Nam, and Turac 
(2002, 2003). We a lso test the empirica l releva nee of the overinvestment problem ( i. e., free 
cash flow agency problem) as theorized by Morellec and Smith (2007) and ident ified 
empirically by Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2009), namely that large profitable firms with 
few investment opportunities face overinvestment problems. We test the real imp lication of 
manageria l risk avers ion and tax function convexity on derivative choice. We rev is it other 
predictions explored by Adam (2009). In particular, we investigate the effects of production 
3 The current state depends on last period 's state, even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. 
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uncertainty, financial constraints, oil and gas market conditions, and industrial diversification 
on derivative choice. Finally, we investigate the impacts of the existence of other hedgeable 
risks- that is, interest rate (IR), foreign exchange (FX) and basis risks . 
Our results reveal significant state dependence effects in the hedging strategy that should 
be accounted for when studying firms ' risk management behaviors. Accounting for this state 
dependence allows us to better distinguish the effects of observable and unobservable 
characteristics on hedging preferences. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Froot, 
Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), we find that positive correlation between internally generated 
cash flows and investment expenditures motivates oil and gas producers to rely more on 
hedging strategies with linear-like payoffs (i.e., swap contracts only, costless collars only or a 
mixture of swaps and collars) and to avoid put options. This positive correlation provides oil 
and gas producers with a natural hedge (i.e. , natural diversification) and linear strategies 
could provide value-maximizing hedges. 
Results further indicate that oil and gas producers with higher geographical dispersion in 
their production activities tend to use put options only or sometimes a mixture of swaps and 
collars, and to avoid swap contracts only. This finding corroborates the production flex ibility 
argument of Moschini and Lapan (1992), in that the finn is able to alter its production 
parameters after observing the future priee of the output. The geographical dispersion allows 
producers to shift their production operations between different locations with different cast 
structure and operational characteristics. This operational tlex ibility could be seen as a real 
option with convex payoffs requiring non-linear hedging strategies. Results further show that 
when gas production and gas spot priees are positively correlated, gas producers tend to 
hedge more with swaps only to stabilize firm ' s cash tlows because quantities and priees are 
moving in the same direction. This empirical evidence supports the theoretical prediction by 
Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay, Nam, and Turac (2002, 2003). 
Multivariate results also give empirical evidence of the role of the overinvestment 
problem arising from the free cash flow agency theory (e.g. , Jensen, 1986). Overinvestment 
is positively related to the use of swap contracts only or collars only and negatively related to 
put options only. This finding is consistent with the theoretica l prediction of Morellec and 
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Smith (2007). More linear instruments stabilize generated cash flows and prevent the 
managerial affinity to overinvest. However, the impact of overinvestment problem on put 
options combined with swaps is mixed. In sum, these results give the first direct evidence of 
the real implications of the overinvestment problem on hedging behavior. 
Regarding managerial risk aversion, we find that managerial option-holding is positively 
related to the use of put options (only or in combination with swaps), and managerial 
stockholding is positively associated with swap contracts. These latter findings corroborate 
the theoretical predictions ( e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985) and show that a manager with higher 
stockholding seeks complete insulation offirm value from the source of ris k. On the contrary, 
higher option-holding motivates managers to accept more variability in firm value. 
Interestingly, we find that costless collars are positively related to both managerial 
stockholding and option-holding. Results pertaining to tax function convexity are mixed. As 
predicted, oil and gas producers with more tax loss carryforwards tend to use put options only 
or collars only and to avoid swaps only. Tax Joss carryforwards seem to motivate firms to 
tolerate more variability in their pre-tax incomes because they could use this tax shield to 
decrease their future tax liabilities. 
Oil and gas producers that are more leveraged but not yet close to financial distress tend 
to use more swap contracts to ensure predetermined revenues. More solvent producers 
generally use collars only and avoid swaps only. In line with the risk-shifting theory, 
producers close to financial distress use put options only or hedging portfolios with non-
linear payoffs (swaps in combination with put and/or collars). We also find that investment 
opportunities are positively related to hedging strategies with non-linear payoffs. This result 
is consistent with the argument of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and the empirical 
finding of Adam (2009) that firms with larger investment programs tend to use non-linear 
strategies to preserve any upside potential and ensure sufficient internai financing of future 
investment expenditures. The results further emphasize the real implications of market 
conditions on derivative choice and show that put options and costless collars are positively 
related to priee volatility and anticipated priees, and swap contracts are positively related to 
spot priees. 
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As predicted, our results suggest that production uncerta inty is pos itive ly related to the 
use of non-linear hedging strategies because this uncerta inty adds more convex ity to the 
firm 's tota l exposure (e.g., Moschini and Lapan, 1995; Brown and Toft, 2002). Results 
related to the variability in production costs are significant and mixed. With regard to the 
existence of additional hedgeable risks, we find that FX risk is s ignificant ly related to the use 
of put options only or collars in combination with swaps. Bas is risk is more related to swaps 
only. Interest rate risk has significant but mixed impacts. Consistent with Adam (2009), we 
fi nd that more focused o il and gas producers tend to use more non-linear strateg ies. Fina lly, 
we test the robustness of the results using continuous measures of instrument intensity ( i.e., 
der ivative nationa l position scaled by the aggregate hedging portfo lio) and fi nd similar 
results. 
The remainder of the paper is div ided into fi ve sections. Section 1 rev iews the ex isting 
theoretical and empirical studies and states our hypotheses. Section II describes our data and 
dependent var iables. Section III presents the retai ned econometrie methodologies . Section IV 
reports our results, discussions, and robustness checks. Section V concludes the paper. 
1.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
In this section, we review the related literature, develop our testable hypotheses, and 
discuss the construction of independent variables . 
1.2. 1 Sensit ivity of Firm 's Revenues and Investment Costs to the Risk Exposure 
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) argue that when revenues and investment costs have 
similar sensitivities to changes in the underlying risk factor, linear strategies alone can 
provide value-maximizing hedges. Otherwise, firms should use non- linear strategies to 
achieve more optimal hedging strategies. In the oil and gas industry, contemporaneous oil 
and gas priees determi ne the cash flows generated from operations. These priees also dictate 
future rents associated with the exploration, development, and acquisition of oil and gas 
reserves. We therefore posit: 
- - -------------- - ----- -- - - - - ------
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HYPOTHESIS 1: When revenues and investment costs have equal sensitivities ta 
commodity priee movements, ail and gas producers are more likely ta use linear hedging 
strategies. Otherwise, non-linear strategies may be required ta achieve optimal hedge. 
To test the empirical relevance of this hypothesis, we simply calculate the correlation 
coefficients between firm ' s revenues and investment costs4. Firm ' s revenues are measured by 
free cash flow before capital expenditures, as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989)5. These free cash 
flows are not contaminated by the monetary effects of hedging because these effects are 
reported in comprehensive income as suggested by the new derivative accounting standard 
FASB 133 effective s ince 1998. Investment costs are measured by the ratio of the cost 
incurred over net property, plant, and equipment at the beginning ofthe quarter. In the oil and 
gas industry, the cost incurred includes the total costs of oi 1 and gas property acquisition, 
exploration, and development. For each finn, these correlation coefficients are calculated by 
taking ali the observations available unti 1 the current quarter. 
1.2.2 Production Function Characteristics 
Moschini and Lapan ( 1992) conclude that wh en the firm has sufficient production 
flexibility (in the sense that it is able to change its production parameters after observing the 
future priee of the output, and assuming that this future priee is unbiased), it should make use 
of options by shorting a put and cali option with the same strike priee and maturity (i.e., 
shorting a straddle position). In contrast, when ali the production parameters are fixed ex-ante 
(before observ ing the future priee of the output), there is no production flex ibility and options 
w ill be useless. Generally, oil and gas firms operate in different regions of the world, with 
operating costs varying significantly between regions due to variations in domestic factors 
costs ( i.e., salary, royalties, taxes, transportation costs ... ). This geographical dispersion of oil 
and gas reserves could be seen as production flexib il ity because fi nns can adjust their 
4 As robustness checks, we fo llow Tufano ( 1996) and estimate these sensiti viti es in a more direct manner that will 
be discussed later. 
5 Lehn and Poul sen ( 1989) calculate fi·ee cash fl ow before investment expenditures as operating income before 
depreciation Jess total income taxes plus changes in the deferred taxes from the previous quarter to the cw-rent 
quarter Jess gross interest ex penses on short- and long-term debt Jess the total amou nt of preferred di vidends Jess 
the total dollar amount of dividends declared on common stock. 
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production capacity in each geographie location with different production costs in relation to 
the anticipated commodity priees to preserve their profit margins. This operative flexibility is 
thus a real option that has a convex payoff by definition and requires non-linear instruments 
to be hedged. Renee we propose: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Oil and gas producers with higher production jlexibility (i.e., 
geographical diversification of ail and gas production) are more likely to use non-linear 
instruments. 
We measure the geographical diversity of oïl or gas production as one mmus the 
Herfindahl index. A higher value implies that the oïl or gas production has greater 
geographical dispersion and hence the finn has more production flexibility (see Table 1.1 for 
more details) . 
Moreover, the theoretical works of Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay, Nam, and Turac 
(2002, 2003) emphasize that the impact of priee risk and production uncertainty on derivative 
choice is closely related to the leve) of the correlation between the output quantities and 
current priees. In fact, a positive correlation will increase the volatility of revenues because 
quantities and priees are moving in the same direction. A negative correlation will reduce 
variability in revenues and produce a natural hedge for the firm, but overhedging (i.e., when 
the sold quantities under forward/futures contracts are higher than produced quantities, and 
priees are rising) is then more likely to happen and hence non-linear instruments are more 
advantageous. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Oi/ and gas producers with a negative quantity- price correlation are 
more likely to use non-linear instruments because overhedging is more likely. Converse/y, 
firms with a positive quantity- price correlation are more likely to use linear instruments to 
reduce the volatility ojtheir revenues. 
We calculate the correlation coefficient between quantities of daily oil (gas) production 
and oil (gas) spot priees. For each finn, the correlation coefficients are constructed with ali 
the observations of daily production and spot priees avai lable until the current quarter. 
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1.2.3 Overinvestment Problem 
Morellec and Smith (2007) show that the firm 's hedging policy is derived not only by th e 
underinvestment incentives arising from shareholder--debtholder conflict but a lso by the 
overinvestment incentives ari sing from shareholder- manager conflict. The overinvestment 
problem is due to the managerial tendency to overinvest because managers der ive private 
benefits from the investment. This problem is more observable in the case of fi rms with 
larger free cash flows and fewer investment opportunities. Morell ec and Smith's (2007) 
argument is consistent with the empirical ev idence reported by Bartram, Brown, and Fehle 
(2009), that large profitable firms with fewer growth options tend to hedge more, a findin g 
that runs counter to the financial distress and under investment hypotheses. To reduce the 
costs of both overinvestment and underinvestment, Morellec and Smith (2007) suggest that 
the opti mal hedging policy must reduce free cash fl ow volatility. Hence we posit: 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Oil and gas producers with large free cash jlows and fewer 
investment opportunities are more likely ta use linear instruments because of the ir capability 
ta decrease free cash flow volatility to avoid the overinvestment problem. 
The over investment problem is measured by a binary variable that takes the va lue of one 
when the ratio of free cash flows scaled by the book va lue of tota l assets and investment 
opportunities are, respect ively, above and below the industry' s median and zero otherwise. 
1.2.4 Compensation Policy and Ownership Structure 
In a value-maximizing framework, Stulz (1984) points out the crucial rote of managerial 
compensation contracts in optimal hedging po licies. ln a subsequent seminal work, Smith and 
Stulz (1985) show that if the manager's end-of-period utility is a concave function of the 
firm ' s end-of-period value, the optimal hedging policy involves complete insulation of the 
firm's value from underlying risks (if feasible). Accordingly, a risk-averse manager owning a 
significant fractio n of the firm ' s shares is unlike ly to hold a well-diversified portfolio and 
hence has more incentives to use linear hedging strategies. Linear strategies can better 
elimi nate the volatilities of the firm ' s payoffs that directly affect the manager' s wealth. 
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Smith and Stulz (1985) contend that if a manager's end-of-period utility is a convex 
function of a firm 's end-of-period value, the manager has Jess incentive to completely 
eliminate under ly ing risks. The more a compensation package inc ludes stock option grants, 
the more a manager ' s utility tends to be a convex function of firm va lue and hence the 
manager bas more motivatio n to use non-linear instruments that reduce rather than eliminate 
the volatility of the firm ' s payoffs . 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Oil and gas producers with large manager shareholding are more 
likely ta use linear instruments. Converse/y, ail and gas producers with large stock option 
compensation are more likely to use non-linear instruments. 
We focus on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation packages because the CEO 
plays a crucia l role in corporate hedg ing dec isions. We measure the manager' s fi nn-specifie 
wealth by the logarithm of one plus the market value of common shares he ld by the CEO at 
the end of each quarter. Following Tufano (1996), we use the logarithm specification to 
reflect the idea that manager ia l risk avers ion should decrease as fi nn -spec ifie wea lth 
increases. We also use the nu mber of options held by the firm' s CEO at the end of each 
quarter. To check whether the hedging strategy cho ice is due to poorly diversified risk-averse 
managers, Tufano (1996) controls for the ex istence of outside blockholders and argues that 
they should be well-diversified investors Jess interested in ri sk hedging. We subsequ ently 
control for the existence of outside blockho lders by using the percentage of common shares 
held by institutiona l investors. 
1.2.5 Tax Incentives 
The tax argument for corporate hedging was ana lyzed by Mayers and Smith (1982), 
Smith and Stu lz (1 985), and Graham and Smith (1999) among others. The latter show that, in 
the presence of a convex tax function, hedging reduces the variability of pre-tax finn va lues 
and reduces the expected corporate tax liab il ity. As for the choice of what derivative 
instruments to use, we expect firms with a convex tax function to use linear instruments 
because oftheir ability to eliminate the volatility ofpre-tax incomes and we predict: 
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HYPOTHESIS 6: Oil and gas producers in the convex tax region are more likely to use 
linear instruments and those with more tax loss carryforwards are likely to use non-linear 
instruments more often. 
Because the sample consists of US firms, we compute a proxy for tax funct ion convex ity 
based on the simulation procedure proposed by Graham and Smith (1999) to measure the 
expected percentage of tax savings arising from a 5% reduction in the volatility of pre-tax 
income. This measure is already applied in some empirical research, as in the work of 
Campello et al. (20 11) and Dionne and Tri ki (20 13 ). We also use the book value of tax loss 
carryforwards scaled by the book value of total assets to controL for any disincentive to 
stabilize the pre-tax income because firms could use this tax shield to minimize their future 
tax liabilities. Graham and Rogers (2002) argue that tax loss carryforwards are uncorrelated 
with tax function convexity. We therefore predict that firms with higher tax loss 
carryforwards tend to use non-linear hedging strategies. 
1.2.6 Control Variables 
We include the following control variables, as in Adam (2009). 
1 .2.6.1 Financial Constraints 
In Jensen and Meckling's ( 1976) risk shifting (or asset substitution) approach, the 
convexity of shareho1ders' utility motivates them to increase risk when the firm nears 
bankruptcy. It is then expected that highly distressed firms have more incentives to use non-
1inear hedging strategies that increase rather than eliminate the firm's payoff vo lati lity. Adam 
(2002) extends the work of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) to an inter-temporal setting 
and argues that hedging strategy depends on the firm ' s credit risk premium. When this 
premium is relatively low, the finn buys put options to avert a shortfall in future cash flows 
to fund its future investment programs. Firms with large credit risk premiums tend to hedge 
with concave strategies that invo1ve selling cal i options. In intermediate cases between those 
two situations, Adam (2002) confirms that hedging portfolios will contain both convex and 
-- - - ---- - - -- -- -- -- -- ------------, 
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concave strategies (i.e., costless collars). He also asserts that unlevered firms with low Ievels 
of non-hedgeable risks are more likely to use linear hedging strategies, as suggested by Adler 
and Detemple (1 988). Altogether, we predict that oil and gas producers that are either far 
from financial distress or deep in financial distress are more likely to use non-linear hedging 
strategies, while producers between those two extremes tend to use linear instruments and 
costless collars. 
We construct the following three variables as proxies for financial distress. (1) Following 
Drucker and Puri (2009) and Campello et al. (2011), we implement the distance to default 
(DTD) as a measure of the future likelihood of default. The DTD is a market-based measure 
originating from Merton's (1974) approach and used by Moody ' s KMV, as described by 
Crosbie and Bohn (2003) (see Table 1.1 for more details). (2) Leverage is measured as the 
ratio of long-term debt in current liabilities plus one-half of long-term debt over the book 
value of total assets . (3) Financial constraint is measured by a binary variable that takes the 
value of one when both the leverage ratio and quick ratio are, respectively, above and below 
the industry's median and zero otherwise, in line with Dionne and Garand (2003). 
1.2.6.2 Investment Expenditures 
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) argue that when future capital expenditures are a 
non-linear function of sorne hedgeable risk, then a non-linear strategy is required. Adam 
(2009) studies the options used in gold-mining firms and maintains that firms facing large 
capital expenditures that are a non-linear function of gold priees are more likely to use an 
insurance strategy (i.e., buying put options). lt is expected that o il and gas producers with 
larger investment opportunities are more likely to use non-linear hedging strategies because 
they face non-linear capital expenditures that depend on oil and gas priees. In addition, non-
linear instruments allow for future upside benefits. 
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We measure future investment opportunities with the following two proxies: 1) the ratio 
of the cost incurred over net property, plant, and equipment at the beginning of the quarter 
and 2) the quantity of proved undeveloped reserves for oil and gas, respectively. 6 These 
reserves could be seen as unexercised real options (Grullon, Lyandres, and Zhdanov, 2012) 
because oil and gas producers have the option but not an obligation to produce their 
undeveloped reserves after paying development costs. 
1.2.6.3 Oil and Gas Market Conditions 
Dolde (1993), Stulz (1996), and Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston (1998), in their surveys of 
corporate risk management practices, argue that managers incorporate their market views of 
future priee movements by frequently altering either the s ize or the timing of their hedging 
positions. Stulz (1996) reports strong evidence of this view, which he refers to as speculative 
hedging. Empirically, Brown (2001) finds that the convexity of the hedging portfolios tends 
to be lower when the exchange rate volatility is higher relative to the FX exposures for near-
term horizons, and it will be higher when the forward exchange rate is anticipated to be 
higher. Adam (2009) concludes that the option position is negatively related to gold spot 
priee and uncorrelated with gold priee volatility and gold basis (i .e. , the difference between 
the forward and spot priees of gold). Accounting for oil and gas production unce11ainties (i.e., 
quantity risk), we expect that the non-linearity of the hedging strategy will be positively 
related to oil and gas priee volatility and anticipated priees, and negatively related to oil and 
gas spot priees. 
We extract the oil and gas spot pnces observed at the end of each quarter from the 
Bloomberg Financial Markets database. We use the West Texas lntermediate crude oil (WTl) 
index as a proxy for oi l spot priees. For natural gas spot priees, we use the average index 
established by the Bloomberg Financial. Markets database from different location indices 
(Gulf Coast, Henry Hub, Rocky Mountaù1s, etc.). We calcu late the volati li ty of o it and gas 
6 Undeveloped reserves are expected to be recovered ( 1) from new wells on undri lled acreage, (2) from deepening 
ex isting wells to a diffe rent reservoir, or (3) where a re latively large expenditure is required to (a) recomplete an 
existing weil or (b) install production or transportation facilities for primary or improved recovery projects 
(World Petroleum Council). 
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for each quarter as the standard deviation of daily spot priees within the quarter. For future oïl 
and gas priees, we use (i) the Bloomberg NYMEX Crude Oil 12-Month Strip futures priee, 
and (ii) the Bloomberg NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas 12-Month Strip futures priee. These 
two indices are established by the Bloomberg Financial Markets database as the arithmetic 
averages of oi 1 (gas) futures contra ct priees over the next 12 months. 
1.2.6.4 Additiona l Risks 
Moschini and Lapan (1995), Franke, Stapleton, and Subrahmanyam ( 1998), Brown and 
Toft (2002), and Gay, Nam, and Turac (2002, 2003) predict that when a finn is facing 
increasing non-hedgeable risks, its total exposure becomes non-linear and optima l hedging 
should be non-linear. Adler and Detemple (1988) show in a portfolio context that borrowing 
or short selling constraints can create non-linear exposures and bence non-linear instruments 
are required to implement optimal hedging. lndeed, Brown and Toft (2002) show that in the 
presence of hedgeable risks that are not hedged for some reason, firms are more likely to use 
non-linear instruments. Empirically, Brown (200 1) finds no significant relation between FX 
exposure volatility and the use of non-linear strateg ies and Adam (2009) asserts that gold . 
production risk does not appear to motivate the use of options. 
Firms operat ing in the petroleum industry face severa! risks in add ition to oï l and gas 
priee risks. Some of these additional risks are non-hedgeable with current marketable 
derivative instruments. These include quantity risk caused by uncertainties in the quantities 
produced and production cost risk due to variabi lity in production costs. Additional risks-
FX risk, IR ri sk, and bas is risk-could be hedged with marketable derivatives . Therefore, we 
predict that oil and gas producers facing additional hedgeable and non-hedgeable risks have 
more incentive to use non- linear instruments because their total exposure becomes non-
linear. 
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Production uncertainty is measured by the coefficient of variation of the time series of 
daily production for oil and gas, respectively. The production cost risk is measured by the 
coefficient of variation of cash costs given by the barrel of oil equivalent (BOE). 7 For each 
firm, we calculate these coefficients of variation based on available observations until the 
current quarter. The FX risk, IR risk, and basis risk are measured by dummy variab les, where 
each dummy variable takes the value of one if the finn hedges the given risk and zero 
otherwise. 
1.2.6.5 Industrial Diversification 
Another aspect of production flexibility cornes from the complementary nature of oil and 
gas operations. Hence, firms operating in both the oil and gas segments could be seen as 
practicing industrial diversification. We construct two additional indices measuring the 
fraction of revenues derived from oil and gas production separately. These indices allow us to 
distinguish between producers operating primarily in the oil segment and those operating 
primarily in the gas segment. 
Table 1.1 summarizes the definitions, construction, and · data sources of the variables . 
Table A.l.l (Appendix) summarizes the theoretical predictions arising from the literature 
review and illustrates their expected empirical implications, which we investigate for each of 
the hedging strategies adopted by oil and gas producers. 
7 The lifting costs per BOE are given on an annual basis. We repeat the annual observations fo r each quarter of 
the same fi scal year. Oil and gas producers typically quote production in BOEs. Naturally, one barrel of oil = 1 
BOE. For natural gas production, 6,000 cu bi c feet (Met) of gas is counted as one BOE. 
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1.3 Data and Dependent Variables 
1.3. 1 Data Construction 
The oil and gas industry is an excellent laboratory to test the different corporate ri sk 
management motivations and implications, for severa! reasons. First, firms in this industry 
share homogeneous risk exposures (i.e., fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas priees). 
Hence, diversity in the hedging strategies implemented should not come from differences in 
risk exposure, but is more likely to result from differences in finn characteristics. Second, the 
existence of financial derivatives on crude oil and na tura! gas off ers these firms severa! priee 
hedging methods. Futures contracts and options in oil and gas are traded in the NYMEX and 
forward contracts and swaps are traded in the over-the-counter market. Third, improvements 
in accounting disclosure related to oil- and gas-producing activities have made operational 
data available, pertaining to exploration, production and reserve quantities, cash costs, and so 
on. 
A first list of 413 US oil and gas producers with the pnmary Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code 131 J& was extracted from Bloomberg. Only firms that met the 
following criteria were retained: They have at !east five years of historical data on oil and gas 
reserves during the period 1998 to 2010, the 10-K and 10-Q reports are avai1able from the 
EDGAR website, and the firm is covered by COMPUST AT. The filtering process produced a 
final sample of 150 firms with an unbalanced panel of 6,326 finn- quarter observations. To 
our know1edge, this sample is the most recent and the largest in the empirica1 literature on 
risk management in the oil and gas industry. 9 
8 The SIC code 13 11 , Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas, comprises companies primarily involved in the 
operation ofproperties for the recovery ofhydrocarbon liquids and natural gas. 
9 Jin and Jorion (2006) study a sample of 119 US oil and gas producers with 330 firm-year observations over the 
period 1998 to 2001. Haushalter (2000) uses a sample of 100 U.S oil and gas producers with 292 firm- year 
observations over the period 1992 to 1994. Haushalter, Heron, and Lie (2002) use a sample of 68 US oi l 
producers with !55 firm-year observations over the period 1992 to 1994. 
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Data on these firms ' financial and operational characteristics were gathered from severa) 
sources. Data regarding financial characteristics were taken from the COMPUST AT 
quarterly dataset held by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Other items related to 
institutional and managerial shareholdings and option holdings are from the Thomson 
Reuters dataset maintained by WRDS. Data related to oi 1 and gas producers ' reserves, 
production quantities, cash costs, geographical dispersion, exploration, development, and 
property acquisitions were taken from Bloomberg's annual dataset and verified and 
supplemented by hand-collecting data directly from 1 0-K an11Ual reports. Quarterly data 
about oil and gas producers ' hedging activities were hand-collected from l 0-K and 1 0-Q 
reports. 
1.3.2 Dependent Variables: Construction and Characteristics 
Table 1.2 breaks down the sample of 6,326 firm-quarters into observations with and 
without gas and/or oil hedging. Oil and gas producers report hedging activities for 3,489 
firm- quarters, which represents almost 55% of the whole panel. Out of these 3,489 firm-
quarters, 2,255 report hedging activities for both oil and gas, almost 64.63% of the hedging 
subsample. Firm-qum1ers with only gas hedging represent 25.27% of the hedging subsample, 
with 882 observations. Finally, there are 352 firm-quarters with only oil hedging, or 10% of 
the hedging subsample. 
Table 1.2 Distribution ofhedging deci sions by firm- quarter 
Gas hedgers 
Non-gas hedgers 
Total 
Note: 
Hedging activity: Firm-quarter 
Oit hedgers Non-oit hedgers 
2,255 882 
352 2,837 
2,607 3,719 
Total 
3,137 
3,189 
6,326 
This table breaks down the total sample of 6,326 firm-quarters into observations with and without oil 
hedging and with and without gas hedgi ng. 
To analyze the hedging behavior of oil and gas producers in greater depth, we collected 
information about the nature of hedging instruments already in use. Essential ly, the hedging 
instruments consist of swap contracts; put options, costless collars, forward or futures 
------ --------
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contracts, and three-way col lars. Table 1.3 presents a breakdown of the frequency of use for 
each hedging instrument. The most common hedging vehicles are swap contracts, with 
45.58% (45.25%) of use in gas (oit) hedging. The second most frequently used instrument is 
the costless collar, with 37.19% (37.11%) for gas (oil) hedging. Next are put options, with 
10.55% for gas hedging and 11.85% for oil hedging. The least used instruments are forward 
or futures contracts, with only 3.25% (2.78%) for gas (oil) hedging, and three-way collars, 
with only 3.42% (3.02%) for gas (oil) hedging. These observations show that oil and gas 
producers adopt quite similar strategies in their oil and gas hedging and that they prefer more 
swap contracts and costless collars. 
Financial instrument 
Swap contracts 
Put options 
Costless collars 
Forwards or futures 
Three-way collars 
Total 
Note: 
Table 1.3 Hedging instruments used by oil and gas producers 
Gas hedging 
Number of 
firm--quarters 
2,255 
522 
1,840 
161 
169 
4,947 
Percentage of use 
45.58% 
10.55% 
37.19% 
3.25% 
3.42% 
100% 
Oil hedging 
Number of 
firm--quruters 
1,7 11 
448 
1,403 
105 
114 
3,781 
Percentage of use 
45.25% 
11.85% 
37. 11 % 
2.78% 
3.02% 
100% 
This table reports the different types of financial instruments used by the sample lirms that report oit and gas 
hedging activities in a given firm- quarter observation. The values for each instrument indicate the number of 
firm-quarters and the fraction (in percentage) of use. 
We now analyze hedging strategies and, to save space, we skip observations related to 
forward/futures contracts, which account for only 3.25% of gas hedging activity and 2.78% 
of oil hedging activity. We also omit observations related to three-way collars, because they 
are used in only 3.42% of cases for gas hedging activity and 3.02% for oil hedging. Tab le 1.4 
shows that two major hedging behaviors are adopted by oil and gas hedgers: the use of only 
one hedging instrument and the use of more than one hedging instrument simultaneously to 
form hedging portfolios with different payoff structures. Table 1.4 illustrates that swap 
contracts are used separately 45% of the time, with put options 6% of the time, cost less 
collars 41% of the time, and put options and costless col lars simultaneously 8% of the ti me. 
Put options are employed separately 29% of the ti me, with swap contracts 24% of the ti me, 
costless collars 14% of the time, and simultaneous swaps and collars 33% of the time. In 
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addition, costless co llars are used separately 36% of the time, with swaps 50% of the time, 
put options 4% of the time, and simu ltaneous swaps and puts 10% of the time. 
Number of firm- quarters 
Swap contracts 
Put options 
Costless coll ars 
Number of firm- quarters 
Swap contracts 
Put options 
Costless collars 
Note: 
Table 1.4 Hedging strategies adopted by oil and gas producers 
Panel A: Gas hcdging strategies 
Swap onl y Put only Collar onl y Swap+put Swap+collar Put+collar Swap+put+coll ar 
932 126 582 137 999 72 187 
Percenta e of use 
41.33% 6.08% 44 .3 0% 8.29% 
24.14% 26.25% 13.79% 35 .82% 
3 1.63% 54.29% 3.9 1% 10. 16% 
Panel B: Oil hedging strategies 
Swap only Put only Collar only Swap+put Swap+collar Put+collar Swap+put+collar 
849 150 577 99 627 63 136 
Percentage of use 
49.62% 5.79% 36.65% 7.95% 
33.48% 22. 10% 14.06% 30.36% 
4 1.1 3% 44.69% 4.49% 9.69% 
Thi s table reports the hedging strategies adopted by the sample firm s. An oil and gas producer can use one or 
more instruments simultaneously. Overall, we distinguish seven hedging strategies: swap contracts only, put 
options on ly, costless coll ars on ly, swaps and puts, swaps and coll ars, puts and coll ars, and swaps, put, and collars 
for oil hedgers and gas hedgers, respectively. The value for each strategy represents the number of firm--quarter 
observations in which a firm reports the use of th at strategy. The percentage of use for each instrument represents 
the number of firm- quatters of use of a given strate gy scaled by the total number of firm-quarters of use of that 
instrument as given in Table 1.3. 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show how these hedging strategies evolve over time and high lights 
some important facts. Use of swaps only declines starting 1999, particularly for gas hedging. 
The decrease in swap use seems to be compensated by an increase in col lars use separately or 
in combination with swaps. The use of put options only or in combination with swaps is 
stable over ti me, in particu lar for gas hedging. Turning to the distribution of notional quantity 
for each hedging portfolio (i.e., a comb ination of instruments), we find significant variations 
in the time-series distribution of notional quantities between instruments. 
-·-------------------
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Figure 1.2 Frequency of use by hedging strategy over 1998-20 10 for oil hedging 
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1.3.3 Econometrie Methodologies 
The transition probabilities reported in Table A.1 .2 show extreme state dependence in the 
derivative choice for the sample hedgers. The elements of Table A. l .2 cou ld be interpreted as 
conditional probabilities under the Markov mode!. The magnitude of the diagonal elements 
clearly shows the persistence or state dependence in hedging strategy choice. Persistence in 
hedging behavior arises from two main sources. One possibility is that persistence is caused 
by unobserved decision-maker-specific preferences for derivatives that are time invariant, 
which creates unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity (i .e., spurious state 
dependence, as noted by Heckman, 1981 ). Alternatively, persistence can be due to 
unobserved but time-variant characteristics of hedging strategies, which creates true state 
dependence. These unobserved time-variant characteristics could be transaction costs, 
liquidity risk, counterparty risk, and accounting concerns associated with different hedging 
instruments. 
To disentangle the effects of unobserved individual heterogeneity and state dependence, 
we employ severa! dynamic discrete choice frameworks with random effects, retaining a 
first-order Markov process (i.e., including the first lagged dependent variable) and accounting 
for the initial condition problem. We consider derivative choice as multi-state process and 
examine the effects of investment opportunities, taxes, agency costs, distress costs, 
managerial risk aversion, overinvestment, production function characteristics, and market 
conditions on the choice of hedging strategy. Estimat ing these econometrie dynamic settings 
allows us to distinguish the effects of past hedging strategy choice and observable and 
unobservable firm characteristics on current hedging behavior. 
To control for the possibility of sample selection bias, the estimation of ali our models is 
derived in the context of two-step Heckman regress ion with select ion. This procedure 
captures the sequent ia l decis ions of o il and gas producers: a first decision to hedge or not and 
a second dec ision about the nature of the hedging strategy. In the first step, we follow the 
literature and mode! hedging activity as a function of variables that are proposed to be 
determinants of the hedging decis ion: tax incentives, leverage, liquidity, cash costs, book 
value of convertible debt, frrm market value (size), sales (market risk exposure), and oïl and 
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gas reserve quantities (substitute to hedging). Table A.1 .3 reports the estimation results of the 
fir st step, which allow us to obtain the estimated inverse Mills ratio for the second step. We 
observe that a lmost ali variables are statistica lly significant a nd with appropriate s igns, 
cons istent w ith the previous literature on the decis ion to hedge (Tufano, 1996; Graham and 
Rogers, 2002; Campel la et al, 2011 ; Dionne and Triki, 20 13). 
1.3.4 Dynamic Generali zed Ordered Spec ification for Hedging Instrument C hoice 
This mode! is used for hedg ing strategies based on one instrument only, as identified in 
Table 1.4 (i. e., swap contracts only, put options only, and costless co llars only). We inc lude 
the first lagged value of the dependent variable to account for this state dependence in 
hedging strategy choice. This mode! is fl ex ible a nd relaxes the s ing le index or para lle l-line 
assumption (i.e., same coeffi cient vector for a li categories of the dependent va riable) by 
making thresho ld parameters a linear function of the covariates (M adda la, 1983 ; Terza, 
1985). We arder hedging instruments in terms of their payoff non-linearity as fo llows: ( 1) put 
options only, (2) costless collars only, and (3) swaps only. T he starting po int for the 
econometrie mode! is an unobserved latent dependent va riable hti,t) that describes the cho ice 
of hedging instrument, given that poss ible choices are ~,t = {1,2,3}. The reduced form of 
the estimated mode! is 
1(, =J3x;,, + ph,,,_1 +&;,, + u; (i = 1, . . ..,N:t = 1, . . .,7;) , (1 ) 
where X is a set of observed exogenous variables related to investment program 
1,1 
specificit ies, taxes, fi nancial distress costs, manageria l r isk avers ion, overinvestment 
problem, production function characteristics, and market conditions, which may be associated 
with the hedging strategy choice of firm i at time t. In addition, X ;,, includes the inverse 
Mi lis ratio from the first step of the Heckman regression with sample selection . u; is firm-
specifie factor that is time invariant and thus represents unobserved individual heterogeneity; 
and e;,, is the idiosyncratic error term that is assumed to be strictly exogenous, normally 
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distributed, and uncorrelated across firms and time. h;,,_1 is the observed instrument choice in 
the previous period that allows state dependence to be captured. 
To overcome the initial condition problem, we parameterize the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity u; as in the work of Wooldridge (2002): 
(2) 
where h;,o is the first observation of hedging strategy choice for firm i. X; and is a set of 
means over the sample period of the exogenous variables of firm i (i.e. , X ); and vi is 
1,1 
assumed to be distributed as N( 0, aJJ and in dependent of the exogenous variables, the initial 
condition, and the error term ( Ei,t). Because the latent outcome h;~ , is not observed, only an 
indicator of the hedging instrument in which the latent variable fa ll s is observed : 
h . if l..* 1 ~,1 = j J-Lj - 1 <,~,!~ ~-~y., (3) 
where the fl.J with j = {1, 2,3} are the threshold parameters . We allow these threshold 
parameters to be a linear function of the observable characteristics x i,l' hi,l-1 ' hi,O' and X;. 
The conditional probability of observing each category j = {1 , 2 ,3} is then given by an 
augmented generalized ordered probit with random effects including the lagged dependent 
variable and the initial observation. This approach, as for Williams (2006), leads to the 
estimat ion of J - 1 (J is the number of categories) dynamic random effects probit models. 
The first mode! contrasts category 1 with categories 2, .. . , J ; the second mode! contrasts 
categories 1 and 2 with categories 3, ... , J. The mode! J - 1 does the sa me regarding 
categories 1, ... , J -1 versus category J. For each mode! among the J - l dynam ic random 
effects probit mode ls, the current and lower-coded categories are recorded to 0 ( i. e. , reference 
group) and higher categories are recorded to 1. Therefore, pos itive coeffi cients mean that 
higher values on the explanatory variable are mor~ related to higher categories than the 
40 
current one. N egative coefficients indicate that higher values on the explanatory variable are 
more related to the current or lower-coded category. This mode! could be estimated by 
Gauss-Hermite quadrature10 (see Boes, 2007 for more detail). 
1.3 .5 Dynamic Multinomial Specification for Hedging Portfolio Choice 
Here we focus our attention on hedging portfolio choice (i.e., si multaneously using more 
than one instrument). Table 1.4 reveals that these hedgi ng portfolios are constructed ma inly 
from combinations of swap contracts with put options and/or cost less co l lars. The transition 
probabilities reported in Table A.1.2 indicate higher persistence in these hedgi ng portfolio?, 
which motivates the use of a dynamic multinomial choice framework. Our econometrie 
framework ta~es the form of a dynamic MMNL with random coefficients and correlated 
random effects. 
We allow random effects to be correlated with the firm 's time-variant characteristics. 
This specification is Jess restrictive than in a standard random effects mode! because it does 
not exhibit the restrictive assumption of independence from in·elevant a lternatives and is 
more consistent with the random utility maxi mization assumption. The mixed Iogit also 
effectively captures random taste variation and habit formation. The utility for firm i from 
choosing hedg ing portfolio j at ti met, ui,t,j ' is given b/ 1: 
Ui,tJ = Xi,tf3j + Li,t-tJ<fJj + Ei.t,j +uiJ (i = l, ... ,N; t = 1, ... , Ti;J = l, ... ,j), (4) 
w here X is a set of observed exogenous variables related to hedging portfolio choice as 
1,/ 
in equation(!) with unknown weight j31 , and Li,t-l ,j is a binary dummy variable indicating 
lagged hedging portfolio choice with parameter cp1 , with Li,t- l ,j = 1 if firm i chooses 
hedging portfolio j at time t - 1 and Li,t-lJ = 0 otherwise. Oi l and gas producers have a set 
of four a lternative hedging portfolios : swap contracts only (i = 1) , which is our base 
10 The mode! is estimated using a STATA user-written program regoprob2 developed by Pfarr, Schmid, and 
Schneider (20 1 0) based on Gauss-Hermite quadrature. 
11 The notation in this section is la rgely adapted fi·om Zucchelli , Harris, and Xueyan (2012). 
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outcome in the mode!; swap contracts combined with put options (J = 2) ; swap contracts 
combined with costless col lars (i = 3); and swap contracts combined with put options and 
costless collars (i = 4). Here u i ,J represents firm i and alternative j specifie factors that are 
ti me invariant (i.e., unobserved heterogeneity). ui = ( ui,ll ui,Z1 ui,3 ) are modeled as random 
effects by assuming that they come from a trivariate normal distribution. The term Ei,t,J is an 
idiosyncratic error term that is assumed to be independent from everything else in the mode! ; 
it follows a Gumbel distribution. 
Assume that at each ti me period (t > 1) a firm chooses the hedging portfolio associated 
with the highest leve! ofutility. Then, Lu,J = 1 if Uu,J > Ui,t,k for allk -:~= J(k = l, ... ,J). 
Hence, the probability of making choice j at time t > 1 conditional on X ;,,, Li,t-l,J , and u i,J 
takes the following logit form: 
exp(X· {J ·+L · "'" ·+u · ·) p . . = P(L . = liX· ~L · · ~U · 1 ... ~U · ) = t,t 1 t,t- t,J"' l t.; 1 
t ,t ,J t ,t ,) t,t t,t-l ,J t,l t,J 2/ exp(x. /3 +L . _ '" +u . ) k=l l , t k l , t l,k'f'k l,k (5) 
For identification purposes, ali coefficients for the first category (i = 1) and its 
unobserved heterogeneity are set to zero (i.e. , hedging with swap contracts only). We assume 
that the individual unobserved heterogeneity for the remaining three hedging portfolios 
follows a trivariate normal distribution with zero mean and a variance-covariance matrix 
with non-zero correlation across unobserved heterogeneity for alternative hedging portfolios . 
Train (2009) suggests approximating the sample likelihood (SL) for the multinomial logit 
with random effects using simulated maximum likelihood methods. 12 To account for the 
initia l condition problem, we parameterize the distribution of the individual unobserved 
heterogeneity for each finn as a function of the means of the exogenous variables over the 
sample period and the hedging portfolio choice in the initial period. 
12 The mode! is estimated us ing a user-written STATA program mixlogit by Arne Risa Hole (2007) that 
implements simulation using Halton sequences. We use 200 Halton draws. 
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1.4 Results and Discussion 
1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables 
Descriptive statistics are computed for the pooled dataset. Table 1.5 presents summary 
statistics for the financial and operational characteristics of the 150 US oil and gas producers 
in the sample. The findings suggest that US oil and gas producers are intensive hedgers . ln 
fact, the hedging indicator variables show that gas hedging occurred in 49 .5 8% of the firm-
quarters in the sample and oïl hedging occurred in 41.21% of the firm- quarters . In addition, 
IR, FX, and basis risk hedging occurred, respectively, in 17.18%, 4.5%, and 9.48% of the 
firm-quarters. 
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Table 1.5 Summary stati stics for frrm fmancial and operational characteri sti cs 
Variables Obs Mean Median 151 quartil e 3' quartil e STD 
Variables that proxy for hedg ing activity 
GAS_HEDG 6,326 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 0 .500 
OIL_HEDG 6,326 0.4 12 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.492 
BASIS_HEDG 6,326 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.293 
IR HEDG 6,326 0. 172 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 .3 77 
FX_HEDG 6,326 0.045 0.000 0 000 0.000 0 .207 
Variables that proxy for underinvestment cos ts 
INV_OPP 6,006 0.224 0.075 0.04 1 0.129 3.6 19 
UND_OIL 6,326 95 .153 2. 109 0.11 8 19.106 450.444 
UND_ GAS 6,326 503 .63 1 31.799 2.742 193.048 2028 .157 
COR_IO_FCF 6,196 0 .055 0.046 -0.179 0.305 0 .3 83 
Variables !hat proxy for overinvestment 
OVER_INV 5,855 0.259 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.438 
Variables th at proxy for ta x advantage 
TLCF 6,066 0 .134 0.000 0 000 0.064 0.438 
TAX SAVE 6,160 0.052 0.048 0.029 0.070 0.05 1 
Variables that proxy for fi nanc ia l distress costs 
DTD 5,686 2.234 2.052 1323 2.862 1.36 1 
LEV 6,063 0. 158 0. 142 0.053 0.220 0.153 
CONSTRAINT 6060 032 1 0.000 0 000 1.000 0.467 
CASH_COST 6,24 1 9.860 7.527 4.684 12.230 8.44 1 
Variables that proxy for managc r ia l r isk aver sion 
MV CS CEO 6,326 28.983 1.125 0.000 11 .563 152.159 
OPT_CEO 6,326 174.3 86 0.000 0.000 120 .000 681.760 
Variables th at proxy for information asymmetry 
%_CS_INST 6,326 0372 0.299 0 000 0.742 0.353 
Variables that proxy for prod uction characteristics 
UNCER 0/L 6,058 0.4 16 0.3 13 0. 14 1 0.587 0.388 
PQ_COR_OIL 6, 11 9 0.229 0.455 -0.287 0.723 0 .587 
UNCER_GAS 6,078 0.408 0.303 0. 146 0.582 0.359 
COST_CV 6,167 0.292 0.252 0. 148 0.396 0.556 
PQ_COR_GAS 6, 11 2 0. 154 0.230 -0. 174 0.504 0.4 19 
OIL REV 6,204 0.35 1 0.273 0. 107 0.526 0.350 
GAS REV 6,204 0.5 19 0.566 0.242 0.785 03 11 
HERF GAS 6,180 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 0. 183 
HERF_OIL 6,178 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.233 
Variables that proxy for firm size 
MKT_ VA LUE 5,922 6,439.084 268.290 47.502 1,625.050 33 ,0 14.790 
SALES 6,326 1,379.558 22.07 1 2.762 162.7 17 7,77 1.860 
RES OIL 6,326 276.7 10 8.0 10 0.948 53.3 52 1,277 .726 
RES_GAS 6,326 1,504 .194 99.463 13.7 11 57 1.699 5,888.2 17 
Variables that proxy for hedging subst itutcs 
BVCD 6,065 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0. 102 
Q RATIO 6,069 1.555 0.275 0.079 0.850 5.334 
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Note: 
Thi s table provides financial and operational stati stics fo r the 150 US oil and gas producers fo r the period 1998 to 
20 10. The terms GAS_HEDG, OIL_HEDG, IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG, and BAS!S_HEDG are dummy vari ables for 
gas, oil , IR, FX, and basis risk hedging. Here TLCF stands for tax loss carry-forwards s scaled by the book value 
of tota l assets; TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax savings; LEV for the leverage ratio; DTD for the 
distance-to-default ; CASH_COST for the production cost per BOE; INV_OPP for in vestment opportunities; 
COR_IO_FCF for the correlation between fi·ee cash fl ows and investment opportuni ties; UND_OJL and 
UND_GAS for undeveloped proved oi t ( in millions of barrels) and gas ( in billions of cubic feet) reserves, 
respective! y; OVER _INV for the overinvestment problem; Of L _ REV and GAS_REV for fi·act ions of revenues fi·om 
oi t and gas production, respectively; HERF_OJL and HERF_GAS for the geographi cal dispersion of oit and gas 
production, respectively; UNCER_OIL and UNCER_GAS for the production uncertainty for oit and gas, 
respecti vely; PQ_COR_OIL and PQ_COR_GAS for the quantity- price correlation fo r oit and gas, respectively; 
SALES for sales; MKT_VA LUE for common shares market value (in millions of dollars); RES_OIL and RES_GAS 
for the total reserves of oit and gas, respectively; MV_CS_CEO for the market value of comm on shares held by the 
firm CEO (in millions of doll ars); OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the firm CEO (in 
thousands); %_CS_JNST for the percentage of common shares held by institutional investors; Q_RATIO for the 
quick rat io; BVCD for the book value of convertible debts scaled by the book value of total assets; and COST_ CV 
for the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per BQE. 
The measure of firms' investment progra ms shows that oil and gas producers are also 
intensive investors. On average, firms expend the equivalent of22.37% of the book value of 
their net prop~rty, plant, and equipment in exploration and reserve acquis ition and 
development. The correlation between interna i cash flows and investment opportunities has a 
mean (median) of 0.055 (0.046), with one-fourth of these firms havi ng a correlat ion less than 
-0.18 and another fourth with a correlation greater than 0.30. The tax preference item, 
measured by the ratio of the book value of TLCFs scaled by the book valu e of total assets, 
has a mean (median) of 13.42% (0.00%). The expected tax sav ing benefits of hedging have a 
mean (median) of 5.24% (4.80%), which is quite close to the findings of Graham and Smith 
(1999). 
The DTD of the sample has a mean (median) of 2.234 (2.052), which reflects little 
variation in the financial safety of the oil and gas producers in the sa mple. Those results are 
similar to statistics reported by Drucker and Puri (2009) and Campello et al. (20 11). Oil and 
gas producers maintain law leverage levels, with a mean (median) of 15.8% (14.2%). 
Overall, oil and gas producers maintain relative ly high cash balance levels (quick ratio) and 
have quite s imilar cash costs (lifting cast per BOE). The statistics also indicate that in 32% of 
the firm-quarters in our sample, producers are financ ially constrained, with a leverage ratio 
and quick ratio that are, respectively, above and below the industry' s median. Managers ' 
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stock and option ownership varies considerably, with a mean (median) of $28.983 million 
($1.125 million) for stockholding and 174,386 (0.000) options. Institutional ownership has a 
mean (median) of 37.17% (29.86%) and varies from no institutional ownership for the first 
quartile to higher than 74% for the top quartile of the firm-quarters in the panel. The market 
value of firms ' outstanding common shares shows that the oil and gas industry mainly 
comprises relatively small firms and a few large producers. In addition, this market value 
varies strongly within the sample, with a mean (median) of $6.44 billion ($268 million). The 
same conclusion is validated by the means and medians of oil and gas sales and reserve 
quantities. 
The two Herfindahl indices, measunng the geographical dispersion of the daily 
production of oil and gas, respectively, indicate that oil- and gas-producing activities are 
largely concentrated in the same region. The mean Herfindahl index is 0.06 for daily oil 
production and 0.10 for daily gas production. The results further show that oil and gas 
producers derive almost 87% oftheir total revenues from oil and gas production. On average, 
gas production contributes to 52% of total revenue and oil production to 32%. Production 
uncertainty, measured by the coefficient of variation in daily production, has a mean 
(median) of 0.41 (0.31) for oïl and 0.41 (0 .30) for gas production. ln addition, the coefficient 
of variation of the cash cost per BOE has a mean (median) of 0.29 (0.25). This finding 
implies that oil and gas producers face higher additional risks related to input costs and 
output quantities. 
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1.4.2 Multivariate Results 13 
1.4.2.1 Hedging Instrument Choice 
In this section, we investigate the empirical relevance of our hypotheses for hedging 
strategies based on one instrument only, as identified in Table 1.4 (i .e., swap contracts only, 
put options only, and costless collars only). The three hedging instruments are classified in 
terms of their linearity as follows: 1) put options, 2) costless col lars, and 3) swap contracts. 
By nature, costless collars are situated between strict linear instruments (i.e. , swap contracts) 
and strict non-linear instruments (i.e., put options). We use the dynamic generalized random 
effects ordered probit in equation (1). Tables 1.6 and 1.7 report the regression results of this 
mode! for four specifications for oil and gas hedgers separately. For each specification, we 
report the estimations EQ 1 and EQ2, where EQ 1 estima tes put options versus swap contracts 
and costless collars and EQ2 estimates swap contracts versus put options and costless collars. 
The inspection of regressions reported in Tables 1 .6 and 1. 7 clearly demonstrates state 
dependence in derivative choice. Hence, the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable for 
ali the specifications are significant at the 1% leve!. Investigation of the coefficients of the 
initial observations further shows that this state dependence is more evident with significant . 
coefficients at conventional levels. These findin gs show that managers maintain almost 
invariable hedging strategies for subsequent periods and suggest that recognition of the state 
dependence phenomenon would provide insight into management behavior and refines the 
association between each hedging instrument and observed firm characteristics, market 
conditions, and measures of manager ial risk aversion. 
13 Appendix A discusses the results of our uni variate analysis. Tables A. l .4 to A. 1.7 report descripti ve statistics 
of the independent variables and test for differences between the means and medians of the relevant variables for 
gas and oi l hedgers separately. The univariate analysis is carried out by derivative instruments (Tables A .l.4 and 
A. 1.5) and by hedgi ng portfolios (Tables A. l .6 and A. l. 7). 
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Table 1.6 Hedging instrument choice by gas hedgers 
Model1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
lndependent variables EQ I EQ2 EQ I EQ2 EQ1 EQ2 EQ I EQ2 
CONSTANT -1.2893 -1 .8507** 2.5375* -3.44 19*** 1.7583* -1.3599*. 4.6938*** -0 .9407 
(1.461 ) (0.796) (1325) (0.852) (1.036) (0.676) ( 1.1 24) (0.834) 
LAG_LINEARJTY 0.9050*** 0.5 171*** 0.7999**. 0.5536**. 0.8237*** 0.524 1* •• 0.8176* •• 0.5656* •• 
(0.098) (0 .047) (0095) (0.050) (0096) (0.049) (0 092) (0.049) 
UNEAIUTY_O 0.4744*** 0.3447*** 0.2875**. 0.2460*** 0.23 16 0.178 1* 0.3004*** 0.2747*** 
(0.132) (0.070) (0. 104) (0.06 1) (0. 168) (0 105) (0.105) (0.067) 
COR_IO_FCF 0.8547*. 0.3906* 0.4023 0.5527* •• 0.9 114*** 0.28 10 0.49 13* 0.3787* 
(0.34 1) (0.203) (0.354) (0.205) (0.339) (02 14) (0283) (0.194) 
HERF_GAS -1.511 0* -1.2259 -1.1656 -1.5755 
(0.845) (1.209) (0880) ( 1.473) 
PQ_COR_GAS 0.4927* 0.1033 0.35 15 0.287 1 
(0.298) (0.213) (0.284) (0.2 11 ) 
OVER_INV 0.3928* 0.1315 0.1286 0.1932 
(0.238) (0. 148) (0.228) (0.147) 
OI'T_CEO -0.00 19 -0.0070*** -0.0078** -0.0056*** -0 .0046 -0 .0053*** -0 .0070** -0 .005 1*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0002) (0.003) (0.002) 
MV_CS_CEO 7.6396* 0.0335 14.2617** 0.7586 15.7783** 0.2278 13.4854** 13690 
(4.556) (0.816) (7. 154) (0.907) (7.945) (0.890) (6.313) (0.958) 
%_CS_INST 2.4206*** -0 .2793 2.5528*** -0.1002 
(0.578) (0.336) (0.629) (0.360) 
7AX_SAVE 2.7050 -3 .9638** 4.4549 -3.9816*** 
(4.009) (2 .002) (3 .688) (1.480) 
n eF -0.3503 -1 .2245** -0.082 1 -1.1772** 
(0.408) (0.542) (0.375) (0.54 1) 
U'V 0.6896 0.0879 1.5010 -0.1 194 
(0.974) (0.488) (0.969) (0.487) 
CONS771A INT -0.2590 -0. 11 84 -0.3311* -0 .0560 
(0.207) (0.132) (0.190) (0.125) 
DTD -0 .1458 -0 .1894*** -0.1075 -0 .1983* •• 
(0. 104) (0.059) (0.105) (0.062) 
INV_OPP 0.1880 -1 .7308*** -0 .2869 -1 .7637** * 
(0.642) (0 528) (0.708) (0.6 18) 
UND_GAS 0. 1043 -0 .1332 1.2887*. -0 .0904 
(0.254) (0. 11 5) (0.5 18) (0. 111 ) 
VOI._GAS -0.4262*** -0 .2 158** -0 .3275** -0 .2 768*** 
(0. 140) (0.098) (0. 128) (0. 100) 
FUJ'URE_GAS 0.0257 -0 .3946**. 0.05 13 -0.4428*** 
(0.085) (0 .062) (0.08 1) (0.062) 
SPOT_ GAS 0.0003 0.1799**. -0 .011 6 0.1992*** 
(0.065) (0 052) (0.064) (0.05 1) 
UNCDI_GAS -2 .8398*** -0 .9969** -3.2470*** -1.75 10*** 
(0.807) (0.419) (0848) (0.5 19) 
COST_CV 1.5396* 1.1404** 1.3530* 1.3005**. 1.462 1* 1.0445** 
(0.786) (0.462) (0.766) (0.488) (0.760) (0.4 78) 
OIL_HEDG 0.8 111 *** 0.0291 
(0.208) (0. 139) 
IR_HEDG -0.8 11 7*** -0.0132 
(0.252) (0.167) 
FX_HHDG -0.5379 0.2274 
(0 792) (0.565) 
BASIS_HEDG -0.1312 0.2792 
(0.454) (0.255) 
GAS REV -0 .9040 -1 .9288* •• 0.2793 -2 .1248*** 
(0.759) (0.573) (0.7 17) (0.567) 
/Mil GAS -0.3785 0.7645*** -0.2795 0.1406 -0 .3495 O. 7458* * 0.0165 0.1285 
(0.450) (0.276) (0.41 1) (0.27 1) (0.410) (0.296) (0.384) (0.203) 
Il ho 0.7364*** 0.8564*** 0.7452*** 0.8092*** 
(0028) (0 017) (0.027) (0.0 19) 
Observations 1,630 1,60 1 1,597 1,615 
Log-1ikelihood (LL) -69 1.9547 -642.5038 -673.5852 -663.3446 
LL constant on1y -938.0734 -948.0657 -897.586 1 -963. 1919 
Wald stat. 492.2374 611.1 238 448.0017 599.6946 
Si!J!lifi cance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Notes: 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the dynamic generali zed random effects ordered probit mode! for the 
hedging instrument choice for the subsample of gas hedgers. The dependent variables are the hedging instruments 
classified in terms of the linearity of the ir final payoffs: ( 1) put options only, (2) costless coll ars only, and (3) 
swap contracts only. The term LAG_LINEA RJTY is the lagged dependent variable; LINEA RITY_O is the initial 
condition; COR_/0 _FCF for the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportun ities; HERF_ GAS 
for the geographical di spersion of gas production; PQ_ COR_ GAS for the gas quantity- price correlation ; 
OVER_INV for overinvestment; OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the CEO; MV_CS_CEO for 
the market value of common shares held by the CEO; %_CS_INST for the percentage of comm on shares held by 
institutional investors; TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage oftax savings; TLCFstands for TLCFs scaled by 
the book value of total assets; LEV for the leverage ratio; CONSTRA INT for financia l constraints; DTD for the 
DTD; INV_OPP for investment opportunities; UND_GAS for undeveloped proved gas reserves; FUTURE_ GAS, 
SPOT_GAS, and VOL_GAS for gas future and spot priees and volati li ty, respectively; UNCER_GAS for gas 
production uncertainty; COST_CV for the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per BOE; 0/L_HEDG, 
JR_HEDG, FX_HEDG, and BASJS_HEDG are dummy vari ables for oi l, IR, FX, and basis ri sk hedging, 
respecti vely; GAS_REVfor revenues from gas production; and IMR_GAS for the inverse Mi li s ratio from the first-
step Heckman regression (Table A.l.3). The coefficients of the exogenous variables' means are not reported here 
for conci seness and are available upon request. Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts ***,** , and* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respecti vely. EQ I estimates put options (recorded to 0) 
versus collars and swaps (recorded to 1) and EQ2 estimates put options and collars (recorded to 0) versus swaps 
(recorded to 1 ). 
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Tabl,e 1.7 Hedging instrwnent choice by oil hedgers 
Model l Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Jndependent variables EQ I EQ2 EQ I EQ2 EQI EQ2 EQI EQ2 
CONSTANT 1.5749 1.6030* -1.8533 -0.3 196 0.2078 0.8690 -2 .2690* -0.7764 
( 1. 120) (0.958) ( 1.1 93) (0.896) (0.8 13) (0.630) ( 1 .255) (0.863) 
LAC LINEAIIJTY 0.8 1 05*** 0.4950**. 0.7590*** 0.5549* •• 0.7930*** 0.5448*** 0.8 104*** 0.52 18*** 
(0.084) (0.049) (0.084) (0.049) (0.084) (0.049) (0.083) (0.049) 
LINEA!I.JTY 0 -0.045 1 0. 1490** -0.009 1 0.22 1 0* •• 0.3347*** 0.6320*** 0.0037 0. 1660** . 
(0.087) (0.067) (0. 100) (0.077) (0.090) (0.080) (0.097) (0.070) 
CO!I._IO_FCF -0.4057 0.5639** -0.3 155 0.9665* * * -0.242 1 0.5257** -0.3260 0.6227*** 
(0.284) (0.249) (0.29 1) (0.240) (0.286) (0.248) (0.27 1) (0.226) 
HE!I.F_OIL -1.9644** -1.843 1*** - 1.5977 -2.0 155*** 
(0.844) (0.546) ( 1.04 1) (0.606) 
PQ_C0/1._0/L -0.2065 0. 1530 -0.43 15 0.0947 
(0.289) (0.182) (0.274) (0.18 1) 
OVE!I._JNV 0.4060** 0.0342 0.56 14*** 0.1 129 
(0.202) (0.1 51) (0.207) (0. 153) 
OPT_CEO 0.0066 0.0027 0.006 1 -0 0004 0.0099*. 0.0006 0 .0068 -0.00 12 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0003) (0.005) (0.003) 
MV_CS_CEO -0.0796 -0.5522 4.0040* 0.0796 -0 .2 164 -0.6244 2.3725 -0.0503 
( 1.784) (0.802) (2.3 12) (0.846) (2.0 10) (0.853) (1.960) (0.832) 
%_CS_INST 0. 1454 -0. 1763 0.2683 -0. 1662 
(0.522) (0.366) (0.54 1) (0.396) 
TAX_SAVE 16.3462*** -2.4470 14.6409*** -2 .1517 
(482 1) (1505) (4.68 1) (1.618) 
neF -0.6855 -2.8766* •• -0.8622 -2.2270*** 
(0.490) (0.683) (0.547) (0.7 11 ) 
LEV 0.3348 2.04 1 2*. -0.4624 2.5572* ** 
( 1.2 1 ! ) (0.808) (1. 17 1) (0.784) 
CONST!I.AINT -0.2526 0. 138 1 -0.2456 0.0 197 
(0.2 14) (0. 135) (0.203) (0. 134) 
DTD 0.2232** -0 .2352*** 0.2040*. -0.28 18*** 
(0.096) (0.066) (0.098) (0.07 1) 
INV_OI'P 0.12 16 -1 .28 14*** 0.1710 -1.3633* •• 
(0.579) (0.451) (0.536) (0.442) 
UND_OIL 1.0730 3.39 14* 4.8559** 1.38 11 
(2 .690) ( 1.925) (2.373) ( 1 .858) 
VOL_OIL -0.0250 -0.0522** -0 .0303 -0 .0237 
(0.03 1) (0.022) (0 032) (0.024) 
FUTU!I.E_OIL -0.1 159*** -0 .0 149 -0 . 11 75*** -0.057 1** 
(0.033) (0.023) (0.032) (0.023) 
SPOT_OIL 0.1 097**. 0.0 148 0.1094*** 0.0504** 
(0.033) (0.022) (0.03 1) (0.022) 
UNCEII_OIL -15 136** 0.6957* -2.3282*** 0.56 72 
(0.637) (0.380) (0.663) (0.408) 
COSTCV 3. 1899* •• -1.1 992* 1.0 124 -1.5153*** 3. 1940* •• -0.2282 
(0.936) (0.646) (0848) (0.523) (0 876) (0.637) 
CAS_JIEDC 0.8 166*** 0. 1904 
(0.252) (0 190) 
IR_HEDC 0.8970* •• 0.3789** 
(0.270) (0. 162) 
FX_HEDC -1 .108 1*** 0.5099 
(0.4 13) (0.37 1) 
BASIS_HEDC 0.0767 1.0981** * 
(0.333) (0. 195) 
0/L_/IEV -1.732 1** 1.3 136** -2.0957** 0.6999 
(0.784) (0.586) (0.819) (0.580) 
/M/1._0/L -1.1 546** 0.2843 -0 .5734 1.1021 *** -0 .8629 0.3470 -1.0220** 0.8544*** 
(0.5 12) (0.307) (0.576) (0.367) (0.54 1) (0.342) (0.404) (0.293) 
Il ho 0.7852**. 0.7754*** 0.7775* * * 0.7747*** 
(0.02 1) (0 027) (0024) (0.024) 
Observations 1,572 1,547 1,550 1,564 
Log-likelihood (LL) -685 .9948 -659.9249 -654 .5332 -660 .7962 
LL constant onl y -945.5503 -878.7359 -884.825 1 -894.4599 
Wald stat. 519. 11 09 437.6220 460.5838 467.3274 
Si!l!1ificance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Note: 
Thi s table reports the coefficient estimates of the dynamic generalized random effects ordered probit mode! for the 
hedging instrument choice for the subsample of oil hedgers. The dependent variables are the hedging instruments 
class ified in terms of the linearity of their final payoffs: (1) put options only, (2) costless coll ars only, and (3) 
swap contracts only. The term LAG_LINEA RITY is the lagged dependent variabl e; LINEA RITY_O is the initial 
condition ; COR_IO_FCF for the correlation between free cash flow s and investment opportuniti es; !-IERF_OIL 
for the geographi cal dispersion of oil production; PQ_COR_OIL for the oil quantity-pri ce correlation; OVER_INV 
for overinvestment; OPT_CEO fo r the number of stock options held by the CEO; MV_CS_CEO for the market 
value of common shares held by the CEO; %_CS_JNSTfor the percentage of common shares held by institutional 
investors; TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax savings; TLCF stands for TLCFs sca led by the book 
value of total assets; LEV for the leverage ratio; CONSTRAINT for financial constraints; DTD for the DTD; 
INV_OPP for investment opportunities; UND_OIL for undeveloped proved oil reserves; FUTURE_OIL , 
SPOT_OJL, and VOL_OIL for oil future and spot priees and volatility, respectively; UNCER_OJL for oil 
production uncertainty; COST_CV for the coefficient of vari ation of the cash cost per BOE; GAS_!-IEDG, 
JR_!-!EDG, FX_HEDG, and BASJS_!-IEDG are dummy vari ables for gas, IR, FX, and bas is ri sk hedging, 
respecti vely; 0/L_REV for revenues from oil production; and IMR_OJL for the inverse Mills rat io from the first-
step Heckman regression (Table A.l. 3). The coeffici ents of the exogenous variables' means are not reported here 
for conci seness and are available upon request. Standard errors are in pare ntheses. The superscripts *** , ** , and * 
indicate sign ificance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respecti vely. EQI estimates put options (recorded to 0) 
versus collars and swaps (recorded to 1) and EQ2 es ti mates put options and coll ars (recorded to 0) versus swaps 
( recorded to 1 ). 
Pertaining to the first hypothesis, the proxy COR _JO _FCF for the correlation between 
free cash flows and the firm ' s investment programs are significantly positively related to 
linear instruments, as predicted . For the subset of gas hedgers, COR _JO _FCF is related 
positively to swaps and collars. Particularly for oil hedgers, the association between this 
correlation and swaps is more evident. Overall, these findin gs empirically validate our 
Hypothesis 1 that firms with higher correlation between internai cash flows and future 
investment opportunities are more likely to use linear instruments because they benefit from a 
natural hedge and linear strategies suffice to provide value-maximizing hedges. 
Economically, it appears that oil and gas priees have a simultaneous positive impact on firm 's 
generated cash flows and rents associated with future investment expenditures, and provide 
producers with a natural diversification. 
In Iine with the production fl ex ibility argument ofMoschini and Lapan (1992), the results 
confirm our Hypothesis 2 and show that greater geographical diversificat ion in production 
activities is associated more with the use of non- linear instruments. We fi nd that geographical 
diversification in gas product ion (HERF_GAS) is more related to the use of put options and 
diversification in o il production (HERF_OIL) is assoc iated with the use of put options and 
costless collars. However, the impact of geographical diversification is economically and 
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statistically more significant for oil hedgers. Oil and gas producers seem to consider 
geographical dispersion in their production operations as a real option requiring that non-
linear instruments be used to hedge. Whereas Moschini and Lapan (1992) suggest that 
production flex ibility motivates firms to sell convexity (i.e., se lling put and cali opt ions), we 
find that it motivates firms to go long in put options. 
Results pertaining to the quantity- price correlation indicate that when gas product ion 
quantities and spot priees are positive ly correlated (PQ_ COR_ GAS), gas producers tend to 
hedge more with swaps and collars as predicted in Hypothesis 3. Desp ite its low stat ist ica l 
significance, this result is consistent with the conjectures of Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay, 
Nam, and Turac (2002, 2003) that when production quantity and spot priees are pos itively 
correlated, overhedging is less likely and linear instruments could achieve optimal hedging. 
Oil quantity-price correlation (PQ_COR_OIL) has no significant impact on hedging 
instrument choice. Although with similar production uncerta inties, o il hedgers and gas 
hedgers react differently to the price-quantity correlation. 
Overinvestment (OVER INV), a problem identified by Morellec and Smith (2007) and 
Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2009), seems to be largely supported by the multivariate results. 
Overinvestment is more likely for large, profitable firms that have fewer investment 
opportunities. Managers at these firms tend to overinvest because they derive private benefits 
from the investment. Overinvestment is s ignificantly positive ly related to swap contracts and 
costless collars for oil hedgers, in particular. Consistent with our Hypothesis 4, when 
overinvestment is more likely, firms tend to use more linear instruments and to avoid put 
options. In the context of shareholder-manager conflict, hedging with linear instruments 
allows firms to attenuate the variab ility in their generated cash flows , which would benefit 
the managers who tend to overinvest. To our knowledge, the overinvestment problem has not 
been empirica lly investigated in the corporate risk management context. 14 
14 As a robustness check, we proxy the overinvestment problem by creat ing a dummy var iable thal equals one for 
firms whose ratio offree cash flow to total assets is in the top quartile and zero otherwise. We interact and interact 
this dummy variable with investment opportuniti es and obtain the same results. 
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Regarding manageria l ri sk aversion, particularly for gas hedgers, the results show that a 
CEO with higher fi rm-specific wealth (MV_ CS_ CEG) tends to use swap contracts aùd 
collars, and to avoid put options, as predicted in Hypothes is 5. Results a lso suggest that CEO 
option holding (OPT_CEO) is significantly negative ly related to the use of swaps. 
Interestingly, we fi nd that manager ial stockho lding and option-ho ld ing are strongly pos it ive ly 
related to costless collars . A possibl e explanation for this fi nding is linked to the payoff 
structure of cost less col lars (i.e., buying put options and sel ling cali options, which creates a 
linear-like payoff structure). Overall , the latter findin gs are consistent with the literature 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985), in which a risk-averse manager with higher stockholding tends to 
use linear instruments and to avoid non- linear ones. Managers with a convex payoff ( i.e., 
higher option holding levels) will do the converse. The percentage of inst itutiona l 
shareholding (%_CS_ INST) is significant ly pos itive ly re lated to the use of swaps and co llars. 
This finding could be expla ined by the fact that institutional investors act like risk-averse 
managers and seek higher insulation offirm va lu e from the source of ri sk. 
The empirical implicat ions with respect to the convex ity of the tax funct ion (TAX_SAVE) 
are unclear. Although TAX_SAVE has a significant positive impact on the use of swap 
contracts and cost less co llars for oi l hedgers as predicted, it is more related to co llars and put 
options for gas hedgers. TLCF appears to be more assoc iated with the use of co llars and put 
options. Altogether, tax function convex ity and TLCF seem to be more related to the use of 
collars. 
The resul ts perta ining to financ ia l constraints show, particularly for o il hedgers, that swap 
contracts are positively related to leverage ratio (LEV) in a significant manner. In light of 
descriptive statistics (i.e., leverage ratio has a mean (median) of 15.8% ( 14.2%)). This finding 
corroborates the theoretical predictions of Adam (2002) and Adler and Detemple (1988) that 
linear instruments are optimal for average or no financial constraints. Results further show 
that more solvent oil and gas producers (i.e., with a higher DTD) tend to use costless collars. 
This finding indicates again that more leveraged firms tend to lock in predetermined 
revenues, while more solvent ones tolerate more variability in their future revenues by 
avoiding strict linear hedging strategies. In line with risk-shifting theory (Jensen and 
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Meckling (1976)), the results show that gas hedgers close to financial distress 
(CONSTRAINT) use more put options. 
Interestingly, the results emphasize the fact that investment opportunities (JNV_OPP) 
appear to be more associated with the use of costless collars and put options. Overall, these 
findings are consistent with Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein' s (1993) argument that firms with 
larger investment programs tend to use more non-linear instruments, a long with the empirica l 
findin gs of Gay and Nam (1998) and Adam (2002, 2009). Further, undeveloped proved oïl 
and gas reserves (UND_ GAS and UND_ OIL) seem to be more related to the use of swap 
contracts and costless collars. One explanation could be that because o ïl and gas producers 
already have larger undeveloped reserves, they face less pressure related to future 
deve lopment expenditures. 
The results pertaining to the impact of market conditions are highly cons istent w ith 
predictions. Accordingly, higher volatility (VOL_ GAS and VOL_OIL) and higher anticipated 
future priees (FUTURE_GAS and FUTURE_OJL) are related to the use, in particular, of put 
options and collars. These findings mean that in a higher vo lat ility environment or when 
priees are anticipated to be higher, oil and gas producers are more interested in mainta ining 
any potential upside ri sk than protecting downs ide risk. Our findings contradict those of 
Brown (200 1), who finds a negative assoc iation between vo latili ty and the convex ity of the 
hedging portfolio, and those of Adam (2009), who finds no significant relation between 
volatility and option use. As predicted, increas ing spot priees (SPOT_GAS and SPOT_OJL) 
motivate firms to use swap contracts to lock in predetermined higher priees because they are 
antic ipating that priees will decline in the future. These findings highlight the significant ro le 
of market cond itions in derivative choice, which may exp lain firm hedging behavior. 
Interesting ly, the assoc iation between higher production uncerta inty ( UNCER _GAS and 
UNCER_ OJL) and the use of put options is as predicted and is significant. 15 Overall, these 
findings contradict the empirical results of Brown (2001) and Adam (2009), who find no 
significant relation between firm ' s exposure fluctuation and option use, and corroborate the 
15 Mode! 1 in Table 1.11 illustrates an unexpected positi ve coeffi cient for oil production uncertainty and swap use, 
albeit with a lower significance leve!. 
54 
theoretical predictions of Moschini and Lapan (1995), Brown and Toft (2002), and Gay, 
Nam, and Turac (2002, 2003). The results further show that when o il and gas producers 
hedge s imultaneously both commodities and basis ri sk (GAS_HEDG, OIL_HEDG and 
BASJS_HEDG), they tend to use more swaps and. collars. A poss ible explanation for this 
finding could be that hedging the primary source of business risk (i .e., o il or gas priee risk) 
attenuates the non-linearity of the firm 's total exposure, which makes non-linear instruments 
Jess optima l. 
Regarding IR risk and production cost variability (COST_CV), the results are s ignifïcant 
and mixed. For oil hedgers, hedging FX risk is linked more to put options. Producers 
primarily engaged in gas production (i .e. , with a higher GAS_ RE V) tend to use more put 
options or collars. In addition; producers primarily engaged in oil production (i.e., w ith a 
higher OIL_REV) tend to use more put options. This result is consistent with the empirica l 
fïnd ing of Adam (2009), who confirms that more focused gold-mining fïrms are 30% more 
likely to use options strategies than divers ified firms are. 
1.4.2.2 Hedging Portfolio Choice 
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 report the estimation results of the determinants of hedging portfolio 
choice for many spec ifications of the dynamic random effects MMNL mode!. The estimation 
was carried out for the subset of oil hedgers and gas hedgers separately. Because the main 
focus here is on oil and gas producers ' rationales for choosing hedging portfolios with 
payoffs that depart fro m linearity to non-linearity (by combinations of swap contracts with 
put options and/or costless co llars), swap contracts are chosen as our base outcome and ail 
the results must be interpreted re lative to choosing swap contracts. However, the leve! of 
non- linearity depends on the percentage of the notiona l hedged quantity of each instrument 
forming the portfolio. Table A.l .8 summarizes those hedging portfo lios and breaks down the 
notional quantity hedged between the di fferent instruments. 
55 
Table 1.8 Hedging portfo lio choice by gas hedgers 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model4 
Dependant variables Swaps + Sll'tlps + Swaps + Swaps + 
Swaps + SW{IjJS ... Co/lars + Swaps + Swaps + Co/lars + Swaps + Swaps + Co/lars .,. Swaps + Swaps + Co/lars + 
Put options Col/ars Pllloptions Put options Co/lars Put options Put options Co/lars Put options Pu! options Co/lars Put options 
(1) (li) (lU) (IV} (V) (VI) (VIl) (VIII ) (IX) (X) (X l) (X li) 
COII_IO_FCF 0.1587 -0.4873 0.5000 0.4293 -0.2054 1.415 1" 0.2622 -0.3965 0.6820 0.3626 -0. 15 19 1.3 159" 
(0.798) (0.353) (0.659) (0.846) (0.353) (0.665) (0.807) (0.346) (0.636) (0.872) (0.350) (0.657) 
HE/IF_ GAS 5.6000 0.6124 3.8470 6.6783 0.3125 3.7546 
(5.830) (1.491) (3 .026) (5 .612) (1.498) (3.056) 
PQ_COR_GAS -0.241 1 -0.6961' -1.4700'* -0.2072 -0.7796** -1.5082** 
(0.819) (0.392) (0.716) (0.854) (0.396) (0.728) 
OVERJNV -1.5085** 0.0040 0.6479 - 1.6354** -0.0560 0.4625 
(0.690) (0.25 1) (0.480) (0.737) (0.248} (0.472) 
OP7~CEO -0.01 17 0.0009 0.0065' -0.0 140 0.0028 0.0003 -0.0128 0.0004 0.005 1 -0.0 14 1 0.003 1 0.0002 
(0.012) (0.002) (0.004) (0 0 13) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0 13) (0.002) (0.004) (0.0 13} (0.002) (0.002) 
MV_[S_CEO -4.0146 1.0181 -0.0421 -7.2996 1.3072 1.5 108 -5.2502 1.0619 0.295 1 -9.96 13 0.936 1 0.7024 
(7.073) (1.086) (3.629) (9.097) ( 1. 259) (3.059) (8. 163) (1. 104) (33 10) (11.096) ( 1. 264) (3 .270) 
%_CS_INST 0.5 147 1.4699** -0. 1865 0.5325 1.3982'' -0.3489 
(1.583) (0.59 1) (1.0 18) (1.630) (0.600) ( 1.013) 
7it>{_SAVE -11.3358 2.0227 -8.8088 -11.8664 2.0916 -7.6 186 
(13 .873) (1.387) (10.348) (14 .0 14) (1.409) (9.719) 
TLCF 0.5614 0.3886 0.9566 1.0216 0.348 1 1.6292 
(1.739) (0.954) (1.85 1) (1.919) (0.97 1) ( 1. 739) 
LEV -0.7111 -3.2276** -0.84 18 -1.0500 -3.2655** - 1. 5442 
(1.735) (1.350) (2.114) (1.789) (1.346) (2.243) 
CONSlïUINT 0.0067 0.6903''' -0.6279 0.0 198 0.6756''' -0.5603 
(0.566) (0.228} (0.389) (0.593) (0.230) (0.383) 
/)71) -0.2966 0.0443 -0.1564 -0.3682 0.0544 -0.0632 
(0.207) (0.089) (0.168) (0.23 1) (0.089) (0. 166} 
INV_OPI' 2.22 11 '' 1.8193'' 2.1679* 1.6198 1.9 128 0.88 11 
(1. 11 2) (0.788) (1.136) (1.380) (1.173) (0.930) 
UND_GAS -1.3290 0.0593 -0.1530 -1.226 1 0.0909 0.1699 
(1.271) (0. 153) (0.34 1} (1.952) (0.164) (0.340) 
VOL_GAS 0.4982 0.2629' 0.3655 0.527 1 0.3138** 0.3294 
(0.387) (0. 157) (0.298} (0.395) (0. 159) (0.300) 
FUTURE_ GAS 0.0064 0.2581" 0.2822 -0.0390 0.2500" 0.270 1 
(0.299) (0. 104) (0. 198) (0.3 16) (0. 104) (0. 19 1) 
SPOT_ GAS -0.0106 -0. 1080 -0.1661 0.0384 -0.0983 -0. 1576 
(0.244) (0.088) (0. 183) (0.256) (0.088) (0. 175) 
UNCER_GAS 1.1 570 1.8972*** 5.5793*** 0.8685 2.07 19*** 4.9724*** 
(1.776) (0.682) (1.406) (1.91 1) (0.756) ( 1.648) 
cosr_cv -3.9733' -0.7083 0.8668 -2.2789 -0.1849 1.2712 -2.79 16 -0.468 1 1.2027 
(2.095) (0. 757) (0.993} (1.586) (0.721) (0.991) (1.8 16} (0.720} (0.939) 
0/L_HE/JG -0. 1000 0.4263 1.2311** 
(0.590) (0.273) (0.562) 
1/I_HEDG 1. 13 10 0.3743 1. 1073" 
(0.915) (0.247) (0.478) 
FX_HEDG 0.3080 0.42 11 1.0414 
(2.064) (0.498) (0.863) 
BASJS_HEDG -2. 1393 0.0652 0.0929 
(1.422) (0.295) (0.586) 
GAS_REV 7.1128* .. 1.9334* 1.7740 9.0750'" 1.5953 2.7445 
(2.496) (0.987) (2.037) (3 .066) (1.058) (2.125) 
/Mil_ GAS 0.859 1 -0.8247 -0.6898 0.2 746 -0.6466 -1.3389 0.4013 - 1. 11 %** -0.277 1 0.1380 -0.6983 -1.6001 
( 1. 098) (0.514) (1.000) (1. 173) (0.610) (1.11 2) (1. 14 1) (0.568) (1.077) (1.240) (0.65 1} (1. 139) 
LAC 4.8491*** 3.8356*** 3.1484*** 4.2207*** 3.8633··· 3.2324 ... 4.6935* .. 3.8528* .. 3.0547* .. 4. 1282* .. 3.841 1 ... 3.2357*•• 
(0.525) (0. 180) (0.388) (0.557) (0. 189) (0.387) (0.650) (0.183) (0.371) (0.682) (0. 189) (0.373) 
LAG_O -0.1002 0.2200 2.3247** 2.9400' -0.4745 3. 1734* .. 0.04 18 0.6110 2.2957'* 3.2006 0.2 136 2.8169*** 
( 1.005) (0. 765) (0.926} (1669) (1.143) (0.980) (1.275) (1 0 18) (0.929) (2 300) (1031) (0.889) 
uj -8 .0634* -8 . 1426*•• -4.0618 -10.7790 -4.0450* -6. 1800 -5.1669 .-4 .7398*** -0.6227 -7 .3354 -1.9742 -4.3276 
(4.719) (2.061) (4.035) (6.655) (2.333) (4.84 1) (4.489) ( 1. 80 1) (3.562) (7.457) (2.346) (3.998) 
Sigma_uj 1.9645*** 1.3458* .. 2.4797*** 2.2569··· 1.4661··· 2.0832*** 2.3419*•• 1.343&••• 1.9622*•• 3.0565" 1.5299··· 1.9774*** 
(0.456) (0.202) (0.450) (0.649) (0.22 1) (0.432) (0.707) (0.202) (0.439) (1.262) (0 239} (0.399) 
/lho_/_2 0.935 0.154 0.735 0.410 
/lho_/_3 0.993 0.793 0.999 0.929 
llho l 3 0.897 0.705 0.734 0.715 
ObseJVations 2, 188 2, 168 2, 134 2, 168 
Log-likelihood (LL) -889.3674 -860.5163 -875.4408 -870.0853 
LL constant only -945.7635 -9 10.7239 -920.7931 -920.44 12 
Wald stat. 11 2 .7922 100.4 15 1 90.7046 100.71 17 
Siinilicance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Note: 
This table reports the means of the coefficient es ti mates of the dynamic random effects MMNL to select one of 
three hedging portfolios-{!) swap and put options, (2) swaps and co/lars, and (3) swaps, put options, and 
costless co/lars-for the subsampl e of gas hedgers. The base case is using swap contracts only. COR_/0 _FCF for 
the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities ; HERF GAS for the geographical dispersion 
of gas production; PQ_COR_GAS for the gas quantity-price correlatio-;;; OVER_INV fo~ overinvestment; 
OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the CEO; MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common 
shares held by the CEO; % CS INST for the percentage of common shares held by institutional in vestors; 
TAX_SA VE for the expected pem;tage of tax savings; TLCF stands for TLCFs scaled by the book value of total 
assets; LEV for the leverage ratio; CONSTRA!NT for financial constraints; DTD for the DTD; JNV_OPP for 
investment opportunities; UND_GAS for undeveloped proved gas reserves; FUTURE_GAS, SPOT_GAS, and 
VOL_GAS for gas future and spot priees and volatility, respect ively; UNCER_GAS for gas production uncertainty; 
COST_CV for the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per BOE; 0 /L_J-/EDG, !R_ HEDG, FX_HEDG, and 
BASIS_HEDG are dummy variables for oi l, IR, FX, and basis risk hedging, respective! y; GAS_REV for revenues 
from gas production; IMR _GAS for the inverse Mi li s ratio from the first-step Heckman regress ion (Table A. 1.3); 
LAG for the lagged dependent variable; and LAG_O for the first observation. The coefficients of the exogenous 
variables' means are not reported here for conciseness and are avai lable upon request. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. The superscripts ***, **,and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respective! y. 
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Table 1.9 Hedging portfolio choice by oi l hedgers 
Modell M odel2 Model 3 Modcl 4 
Dependant variables Swaps .._ Swaps + Swaps + Swaps + 
Swaps -t- Swaps + Co/lars + Swaps + Swaps + Co/lars + Swaps + Sll'aps + Co/lars + Swaps + Swaps + Co/lars + 
Put options Co/lars Putoetiom Put options Co/lars Put options Put options Co/lars Put options Put O[Jiions Co/lars Put options 
(1) (li) (Ill ) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII ) (IX) (X) (X l) (X II) 
COR_IO_FCF -2.7309 -0.0486 0.0425 -4.2599" -0. 1835 -0.4804 -2.7180 0.1298 0.2752 -2.8437* 0.0247 -0.3498 
( 1. 850) (0.431) (0.746) ( 1.688) (0.436) (0.707) (1.9 10) (0.429) (0.752) (1.5 11) (0.435) (0.699) 
HEI?J~OIL -0.9574 2.7762*** 0.9429 -1.2176 3.07 14*** 1.5233 
(3 .8 14) ( 1. 045) ( 1.827) (3 727) (1.063) (1.807) 
PQ_COJI_OIL -1. 8948 0.2817 0.2435 - 1. 8978 0.2664 -0.0 109 
(1.66 1) (0.328) (0.700) ( 1.485) (0.328) (0.661) 
OVER_JNV 2.3335* 0.2800 -0.6270 2.4 165** 0.2073 -0.5909 
(1 192) (0 299) (0.545) ( 1.1 49) (0.293) (0.542) 
0/"l ~CEO 0.0501" -0.0022 0.0043 0.0400' 0.0012 0.00 15 0.0592*** -0.0040 0.0050 
(0.020) (0.005) (0.014) (0.021) (0.003) (0.003) (0.02 1) (0.005) (0.013) 
MV_(S_CEO -8.0300 2.2892' 0.2434 -7.7560 1.4 191 0.0496 -8.0806 2.6 113** 1.0862 
(16.948) (1.33 1) (5 .148) (16.331) (1392) (4 .682) (18.848) (1.327) (4 .826) 
%_CS_JNST 2.852 1 0.0920 -0.2079 
(2.903) (0.712) (1.330) 
TAX) AVE 17.866 1** 1.9370 -4.4769 16.8294' 1.72 14 -1.723 1 
(8.191) (2 .306) (12.410) (9.588) (2.38 1) ( 11 .280) 
'l'LCF -0.1810 1.368 1 -0.5394 0.8270 1.5653 -0.3020 
(4 .333) (1.346) (2.63 1) (5 .048) (1.305) (2 .595) 
LEV -8.0969 0.0268 1.4242 -7.2524 -0.1088 0.7652 
(7.12 1) (1.632) (2.607) (6.500) (1.568) (2.440) 
CONS711AINT 0.6528 -0.0 11 7 0.8732' 0.3328 -0 0198 0.9003** 
(0.897) (0.274) (0.447) (0.840) (0 271) (0.433) 
D7V -0. 1652 -0.0162 0.1090 -0.0758 -0.0232 0.0347 
(0.41 1) (0.120) (0.227) (0.439) (0.122) (0.229) 
INV_OPP 1.225 1 1.3159* 1.7 185' 0.3801 0.8754 1.0355 
(1.463) (0 .712) (0.895) (1.800) (0.742) (0.824) 
UND_OIL 11.4982 0.7859 2.0579 6.3964 1.7266 4.5504 
(23 887) (3.407) (5.484) ( 15.515) (3.483) (5.058) 
VOL_DIL 0.1668 -0.0308 0.007 1 0.241 1 -0.0416 -0.0356 
(0 135) (0.042) (0.083) (0. 167) (0.045) (0.082) 
FUTURE_OIL 0.3404* -0.0169 0.0927 0.2288' -0.0142 0.0749 
(0 177) (0.038) (0.074) (0.127) (0.038) (0.07 1) 
SPOT_OIL -0.2962"' 0.0299 -0.0789 -0.209 1* 0.0297 -0.0630 
(0.162) (0.038) (0.073) (0.122) (0.038) (0.070) 
UNCER_OIL -0.8425 -1. 3400 -0.4906 0.7025 -2.3 167" -0.3717 
(2 .567) (0.8 19) (1.399) (2.413) (0.922) (1.408) 
cosr_cv -7.5344 0.0743 -0.72 13 -4 .3 151 1. 5133 1.335 1 
(5.694) (0.33 7) ( 1.1 09) (4.4 12) (0.996) ( 1.027) 
GAS_HEDG -0.3332 0.4399 2.98 15" 
( 1.382) (0.557) (1.45 1) 
111_ /IEDG -0.48 10 0.1372 0.7083 
(1. 132) (0.304) (0.5 17) 
fX_HEDG -3 .2237 1.3204** 0.5769 
(4 .656) (0.672) (1.107) 
BASIS_HEDG - 1. 8850 -0.5905 -0.4051 
( 1.690) (0.363) (0.7 10) 
0/L_IŒV 2.2294 0.7476 3. 11 59 0.7369 0.54 17 1.17 14 
(4 .157) (1.303) (2.4 16) (4 .063) (1.284) ( 1.993) 
IMR_DIL 0.2289 - 1.1030* -1.8762 1.6797 0.2603 0.4796 -0.2946 -0.7839 - 1. 8701 0 3296 0.3457 0.2947 
( 1. 817) (0.659) ( 1.238) (2.578) (0.772) (1.11 0) (1.939) (0.705) ( 1.208) (2.019) (0.730) (1.082) 
LAG 4.6 \63*** 3.6750*** 3.2885*** 4.1698*** 3.6499*** 3.3325*** 4.3804*** 3.6805*** 3.3783*** 3.6572*** 3.6687*** 3.3 \98*** 
(0.932) (0 225) (0.449) (0 837) (0.232) (0.43 1) (0.940) (0.228) (0.44 1) (0.696) (0.226) (0.429) 
LAG_O (X) (X) -0.1268 (X) (X) 1.6318 (X) (X) -0.069 1 (X) (X) 0.2900 
(I.SIJ) (1.380) (1.372) (1.632) 
uj -3.3900 ·10 .3039*** -8.4440" -22.7548 0.6415 3.2016 2.9837 ·5 .2764** -2.5449 1.0 114 1.2818 2.2034 
(8.459) (2883) (4.183) (16.762) (4 . 123) (5 .998) (9226) (2 .270) (3 115) (14 .282) (3 290) (4 .274) 
Signn_ uj 3.2093** 2.oooo••• 2.3607*** 6.29 \4** 2.3399*** 2.9545*** 3.844 1** 1.9688*** 2. 1166** * 7. 1710" 2.4725*** 3.0574*** 
(1.634) (0.322) (0.559) (2586) (0.38 1) (0.578) (1.933) (0.327) (0.487) (3 .266) (0.393) (0.6 14) 
Rho_l_ 2 0.498 0.312 0.237 0.484 
/lho_l_ 3 0.862 0.786 0.652 0.855 
11ho2 3 0.860 0.832 0.891 0.867 
Observations 1,632 1,650 1.605 1.678 
Log-likelihood (LL) -619.8875 -628.8506 -615.5335 -653.7601 
LL constant only -668.3723 -705.328 1 -670.4718 -740.2093 
Waldstat. 96.9697 152.9549 109.8766 172.8985 
Si~n ificance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Note: 
This table reports the means of the coefficient es ti mates of the dynamic random effects MMNL to select one of 
the following three hedging portfolios-( !) swap and put options, (2) swaps and co/lars, and (3) swaps, put 
options, and costless co/lars- for the subsarnple of oil hedgers. The base case is using swap contracts only. 
CGR_!G_FCF for the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportunities ; HERF_GJL for the 
geographical di spersion of oil production; PQ_CGR_GIL for the oil quantity- price correlation; GVER_INV for 
overinvestment; OPT_ CEG for the number of stock options held by the CEO; MV_ CS_ CEG for the market value 
of common shares held by the CEO; %_CS_!NST for the percentage of common shares held by institutional 
investors; TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax savings; TLCF stands for TLCFs scaled by the book 
value of total assets; LEV for the leverage ratio; CGNSTRA!NT for financi al constraints; DTD for the DTD; 
JNV_GPP for investment opportunities; UND_GIL for undeveloped proved oil reserves; FUTURE_GIL , 
SPGT_GIL, and VGL_GIL for oil future and spot pri ees and volatility, respecti vely; UNCER_GIL for oil 
production uncertainty; CGST_CV for the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per BOE; GAS_HEDG, 
JR_HEDG, FX_HEDG, and BASJS_HEDG are dummy variables for gas, IR, FX, and basis risk hedging, 
respecti vely; GIL_REVfor revenues from oil production; JMR_GJL for the inverse Mill s ratio fi·om the first-step 
Heckman regression (Table A. IJ) ; LAG for the lagged dependent vari abl e; and LAG_O for the first observation. 
The coefficients of the exogenous vari ables' means are not reported here for conciseness and are avail able upon 
request. Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts *** , ** , and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respecti vely, and (X) indicates that the variable was omitted by STATA so ftware during the 
regression because of co-linearity. 
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 report the estimated coefficients ' means for explanatory variables, as 
weil as estimated means (uj), estimated standard deviations (Sigma_uj), and correlation 
coefficients (Rho _1_2, Rho _1_3, and Rho _2 _3) of unobserved heterogeneity ter ms for the 
remaining three hedging portfolios, nam ely (1) swap contracts combined with put options, 
(2) swap contracts combined with costless collars, and (3) swap contracts combined with put 
options and costless col lars. The results (see the lower parts of Tables 1.8 and 1.9) show a 
statistically non-zero standard deviation of the unobserved heterogeneity effects justifying the 
random effects specification. They also indicate higher correlations between the random 
effects of the three hedging portfolios for gas and oïl hedgers, respectively. This higher 
correlation of the random effects across hedging portfolios implies that the finn -specifie 
unobserved factors driving hedging portfolio choices overlap but are not the same. This 
finding appears to suggest that finn- specifie random effects are a crucial element to consider 
and that our mode! shou Id outperform other models without random effects. 
Lagged hedging portfolio cho ice exhibits a great degree of persistence 111 ali hedging 
portfolios. Results related to the correlation between internai cash flows and investment 
opportun ities are mixed. Although, this correlation is negatively re lated to put options in a 
statistically significant manner for oil hedgers as pred icted, it is positively related to the use 
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of put options and col lars for gas hedgers. The results further indicate that oïl hedgers with 
greater geographical diversification tend to include costless collars in their hedging 
portfolios. For gas hedgers, geographie diversification has the predicted positive sign but 
with no significant impact. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Brown and Toft 
(2002) and Gay, Nam, and Turac (2002, 2003) and previous findings, the positive price-
quantity correlation for gas hedgers appears to have a significant negative impact on the use 
of put options and/or collars in combination with swaps. Hence, gas producers with a higher 
positive price- quantity correlation tend to use swap contracts only, to mitigate adverse 
movements in revenues because priees and quantities are moving in the same direction. 
However, there is no evidence of this relation for oïl hedgers . 
The impact of the overinvestment problem on hedging portfolio choice is mixed. 
Although overinvestment is significantly negatively associated with put options for the subset 
of gas hedgers as predicted, it appears to be positively related to put options for oil hedgers. 
Consistent with the prediction, CEO option-holding is positively related to the use of put 
options in a statistically significant manner (particularly for oïl hedgers). Consistent with our 
findings in the previous section, a CEO's equity stake value in a finn is positively related to 
the use of collars. Overall, these results are consistent with Smith and Stulz's (1985) 
prediction. In addition, gas hedgers with higher percentages of institutiona l shareholding tend 
to use collars in combination with swaps. Contrary to expectations, tax function convexity is 
positively associated with the use of put options in addition to swaps for the subset of oil 
hedgers. TLCFs appear to have no real impact on hedging portfolio choice. 
The results also show, particularly for gas hedgers, that collars are negatively related to 
leverage in a statistically significant manner. This finding suggests that gas producers that are 
more leveraged but not yet in financial distress tend to lock in predetermined revenues to 
satisfy their future commitments by resorting to swap contracts. The financial constraint 
proxy seems to be significantly related to the use of put options and/or collars. This finding 
corroborates risk-shifting theory. Surprisingly, DTD appears to have no real impact on 
hedging portfolio choice. In line with Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and Adam (2009), 
the results show that investment opportunities are significantly positively related to the 
inclusion of put options and/or collars in hedging portfolios in addition to swap contracts. 
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This result confirms our findings in the dynamic ordered probit mode!. The results further 
show that undeveloped oil and gas reserves have no significant impact on hedging portfo lio 
choice. 
Gas future priees and gas priee volatilities are s ign ificant ly pos itively associated with 
costless collars. Furthermore, the results show that put options are negat ive ly related to o il 
spot priees and pos itively impacted by oil future priees. These fi ndings, perta ining to market 
conditions, corroborate our predictions and are consistent with the dynamic ordered probit 
mode! above. For the subset of gas hedgers, gas production uncertainty seems to be 
significa ntly positive ly related to the use ·of put options and col lars, as predicted. Conversely, 
oil production uncertainty is negatively re lated to collars. However, production cast ri sk (i.e., 
cash cast variability) appears to be s ignificantly negatively related to the use of put options 
for the subset of gas hedgers. 
The results further show that the existence of additional hedgeable risk ( i.e., FX and IR 
risk) is s ign ificant ly positively related to the use of put options and/or col lars in addition to 
swaps. This fi nding corroborates the theoretical predictions of Moschin i and Lapan (1995), 
Brown and Taft (2002), and Gay, Nam, and Turac (2002, 2003) that additiona l risks make 
total exposure non-linear and therefore the hedging strategy should a lso tend to be non-linear. 
Surprisingly, producers more engaged in natura l gas production tend to use more put opt ions 
or co llars in addition to swaps. This result is cons istent with our prev ious results and those of 
Adam (2009). 
1.4.2.3 Robustness Checks: Hedging Intensity by Derivative 
Results in previous sections are based on discrete cho ice models where each hedgi ng 
strategy is represented by a binary variable regardless of the quantity hedged. We now check 
the robustness of our results by constructing continuous measures of hedging intensity of 
using each of the major derivatives: swap contracts, put options and costless col lars. Hedging 
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intensity is measured by the ratio of derivative notional 16 position scaled by the total hedged 
quantity (i .e. , the aggregate hedging portfolio). Going into further details, we distinguish 
between hedging intensities for the current fiscal year (i.e., Year _0) and those for the 
following fiscal years. For swaps and collars, we consider the subsequent three fiscal years 
(i.e., Year_l-3). For put options, two fiscal years ahead are considered (i .e., Year_l-2) 
because hedging activity for farther horizons are rare. This distinction gives deeper insight 
into hedging dynamism. We then run random-effects tobit regressions and correct standard 
errors for within-firm correlation (clustering) and heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White-
Sandwich estimator. 17The independent variables used in these regressions are measured at the 
end of the previous quarter. 
Overall, results reported in Table 1.10 for gas hedgers and Tab le 1. Il for oi 1 hedgers are 
consistent with predictions and our previous findings. As predicted, gas hedgers with positive 
correlation between generated cash flows and investment expenditures tend to intensify their 
swap positions and to rely Jess on col lars. However, impacts of this positive correlation are 
more evident for farther horizons ( Year _ 1-3). Resu lts a Iso show that put option intensity 
increases with geographical diversification in gas production activities for both near (Year_O) 
and longer hedging terms (Year _1-2). This empirical evidence corroborates our prediction 
and findings in the ordered probit specification. Counter to our predictions, for the three-year 
horizon, swap intensity becomes negatively related to gas price-quantity correlation. Results 
reported in Table 1.1 0, for gas hedgers, indicate that the overinvestment problem has 
significant positive impacts on swaps ' intensity for the current year horizon and significant 
negative impacts oi1 put option positions for the current and subsequent years. These results 
confirm earlier findings for gas hedgers. 
16 We fo llow Haushalter (2000) and use notional quantities for put options because we Jack detai led information 
to calculate a delta-percentage for these options. At !east, we have three attributes of our sample that could 
mitigate thi s shortcoming in our study: (i) put options are used on average in Il % ( 12%) of fi rm-quarters with gas 
(oil ) hedging, (ii) put options are used most often with either swap/or collars, and (iii ) the fract ion of the quantity 
hedged by put options does not exceed 40% (50%) for gas (oil). 
17 The mode! is estimated using adaptive quadrature im plemented in Stata by a program GLLAMM (Generalized 
Linear Latent and Mi xed Models) using 30 integration points. For more details see Rabe-Hesketh, S. , Skrondal , A. 
and Pickles, A. (2005). 
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Note: 
This table reports the coeffi cient estimates of the random effects tobit models. The dependent vari ables are the 
hedging intensity by deri vati ve instrument (swap contracts," put options, and costless coll ru·s) for the subsample of 
gas hedgers: Year_O, Year_ l-2, and Year_ /-3 are hedging intensities fo r the current fi scal year, the subsequent 
two years, and the subsequent three years, respecti vely. lndependent vari ables, measured at the end of the previous 
quarter, are: COR_/0 _FCF for the correlation between free cash flows and investment opportuni ties; HERF_ GAS 
for the geographical di spersion of gas production; PQ_COR_GAS for the gas quantity- pri ce correlat ion; 
OVER_INV for overinvestment; MV_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held by the CEO; 
OPT_ CEO for the number of stock options he ld by the CEO; TLCF stands for TLCFs scaled by the book value of 
total assets; TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax savings; LEV for the leverage ratio; CONSTRA INT fo r 
financial constraints; !NV_OPP for investment opportuniti es; FUTURé-_GAS, SPOT_ GAS, and VOL_GAS for gas 
future and spot priees and volati lity, respectively; UNCER_GAS for gas production uncertai nty. Standard errors, 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering using Hu ber-White-Sandwich estimator, are in parentheses. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respecti vely. Sigma_u and 
Sigma_e stand for the standard deviations ofrandom-effects and error terms, respecti vely. 
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Note: 
Thi s table reports the coefficient estimates of the random effects tobit mode! s. The dependent variables are the 
hedging intensity by derivative instrument (swap contracts, put options, and costless col lars) for the subsample of 
oi l hedgers : Year _0, Year_J-2, and Year _1-3 are hedging intensities for the current fi scal year, the subsequent two 
fiscal years, and the subsequent three fiscal years , respective! y. ln dependent variables, measured at the end of the 
previous quarter, are: COR _JO _FCF for the correlat ion between free cash flows and investment opportunities; 
HERF _ 0/L for the geographical dispersion of oil production; PQ_ COR_ OJL for the oi l quantity-pri ce correlation ; 
OVER_JNV for overinvestment; M V_CS_CEO for the market value of common shares held by the CEO; 
OPT_CEO for the number of stock options he ld by the CEO; TLCF stands for TLCFs scaled by the book value of 
total assets; TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage oftax savings; LEV for the leverage ratio; CONSTRAINT for 
financial constraints; JNV_OPP for investment opportunities; FUTURE_OJL, SPOT_OIL, and VOL_OJL for oil 
future and spot priees and volatili ty, respectively; UNCER_OJL for oil production uncertainty. Standard errors, 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering using Huber-White-Sandwich estimator, are in parentheses. The 
superscripts *** , ** , and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Sigma_u and 
Sigma_ e stand for the standard deviations of random-effects and error terms, respective! y. 
Results further indicate, for gas hedgers, that collar intensity increases with managerial 
stockholding for the three-year horizon. Interestingly, managerial opt ion-hold ing has a 
significant negative impact on swaps and collars' notiona l quantities, and significant pos itive 
effects on put option intensity. The impacts of option-holding on swaps and put options are 
evident for near and farther horizons. For collars, this effect is ev ident only for more distant 
horizons. These finding corroborate our earlier results, and give empirical evidence of the 
impact of managerial risk aversion on firms ' hedgi ng behaviors. Oil hedgers and gas hedgers 
in the progressive tax region tend to intens ify their swap and collar positions respectively. As 
predicted, the positive relation between tax loss carryforwards and put options is more 
ev ident with the tobit model, particularly for gas hedgers. This latter finding corroborates 
Graham and Rogers (2002) conjecture that tax loss carryforwards capture a separate non-tax 
influence on firm's hedging behavior. ln addition, higher level of tax loss carryforwards 
means that the firm recently accumu lated losses and is more likely to be in financia l distress. 
Consequently, firm ' s manager enters costly non-linear hedging (put options) as risk-shifting 
strategy. 
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Consistent with previous results, more leveraged oïl hedgers tend to rely more on swap 
contracts and less on collars. Investment opportunities have a significant positive impact on 
put options' intensity for more distant horizons to avoid costly externa l financ ing and the 
underinvestment problem, as documented in our earlier results. For both Year _ 0 and Year _1-
3 horizons, results support prev ious findings and show that swap (co llar) intensity decreases 
(increases) with gas priee volatility and oïl and gas anticipated future priees, and increases 
(decreases) with o ïl and gas spot priees. Unlike findin gs in previous sections, results further 
indicate that put option intensity increases (decreases) with gas spot (future) priees. One 
explanation could be that in high spot priees environments, o ïl and gas producers tend to take 
larger put option pos itions to lock-in the current priees because they believe that priees are 
more likely to decrease in the future. Conversely, firms tend to hedge less by costly put 
options when future priees are anticipated to increase because shortfa ll s in future inflows are 
less likely and hedging needs are less press ing. Surprisingly, put option pos itions are not 
affected by gas priee volatility or o ïl market conditions. Gas production uncerta inty appears 
to be pos itively related to larger co ll ars pos itions as in our earlier resu lts. 
Following Adam (2009), we re-estimate the random-effects tobit models using alternative 
measures of hedging intensity of put options and costless co llars. Put options and collars' 
. . Put options Coll ars . 
mtens1ty are measured by and respect1ve ly. Swap co n tracts + Put options Swaps con tracts + Collars 
Results reported in Table A. 1.9 show some noticeable di fferences with the results of the 
mixed multinomial logit 18• We find an unpredictable negative impact of diversification in oïl 
activities on put opt ions ' intens ity for the Year _1-2 horizon. Gas diversification loses its 
statistical significance. However, this fi nd ing corroborates the mu lt inom ia l logit resu lts. The 
negative associat ion between managerial stockhold ing and put options ' extent is now more 
evident as predicted. Moreover, o ïl hedgers with tax loss carry forwards rely more on co llars. 
Consistent with the multinomial logit results, tax function convexity is significantly 
positively related to put options for Year _1-2 horizon, however, counter the prediction. 
Unlike multinomial logit models, for gas hedgers, put options are no longer positively related 
to investment opportunities but they are now significant ly positively correlated to gas priee 
18Resul ts using these alternative measures of hedging intensities cou id be seen as robustness checks of results of 
the mixed multinomiallogit for hedging portfolios. 
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volatili ty. For o it hedgers, oit spot and future priees have no longer significant impact on put 
options' intens ity. 
Table A. l.l 0 summarizes our predictions and findings aris ing from the models used in 
the prev ious sections. 
1.4.2.4 Robustness Checks: Other Specifications 
ln this section, we check the robustness of our prev ious results to other specifica tions 
related to hedging strategies c lass ification and some variables construction. Fi rst, we c lass ify 
hedging strategies into two categor ies: linear and non-linear. Linear strategies inc lude swap 
contracts, forward and futures. Non-linear strategies comprise put options, cost less collars 
and three-way collars. We after distinguish between fir ms using only linear strategies, a 
combination of linear and non-linear strategies, and only non- linear strategies. As before, we 
use a dynamic mixed multinomia l logit for this new specification of the hedging strategies. 
The use of linear strategies only is the base case. We a lso recalculate the correlations between 
spot priees and produ ced quantities (PQ_ COR_ GAS and PQ_ COR_ OIL) and the coeffi c ients 
of variation of produced quantities (UNCER_GAS and UNCER_OJL) and cash costs 
(COST_CV) based on roi ling windows of eight quarterly observations. 
F ina lly, we calculate the sensitivities of revenues and investment costs to the ri sk 
exposure in a more direct manner to test the argument of Froot, Scharfestein, and Stein 
( 1993) exposed in HYPOTHESIS 1. We then calculate the correlation between firm's free 
cash flows (as previously defined) and oi t (gas) spot priees. For the sensitivity of investment 
costs, we calcu late the correlation between capita l expenditures and oit (gas) spot priees. 
These coefficients of correlation are calculated at the end of each quarter us ing ro ll ing 
windows of eight quarterly observations. Subsequent ly, we calcu late the absolute value of the 
d ifferentia i between both sensitivities offree cash flows and investment costs (i.e. , sensitivity 
of investment costs minus the sensitivity of free cash flows). A smaller differentiai means 
that firm ' s revenues and investment costs have closer sensitivities to oit (gas) priees and 
bigger differentiai means dissimilar sensitivities. We predict a positive sign for the absolute 
values ofthese differentiais in sensitivities (DJFF_GAS and DIFF_OIL). 
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Table A. 1. Il reports the regression results for oil and gas hedgers separately and shows 
noticeable differences with previous results related to hedging p01tfolio choice using a mixed 
multinomial Iogit (Table 1.8 and Table 1.9). Surprisingly, differentiais in sensitivities of 
firm's revenues and investment costs have no significant impact on the hedging strategy 
choice. Higher geographical diversity in oil production activities appears to be positively 
related to the use of non-1inear strategies as predicted. The newly calculated variables, 
namely the correlation between produced quantities and spot priees, the production 
uncertainty, and cash cost risk, Jose their significant impacts. Results related to managerial 
risk aversion and tax arguments are mixed. As predicted, the CEOs option-holding and tax 
Joss carry-forwards are positively related to the use of non-Iinear strategies. However, CEOs 
shareholding and tax save measure have unpredicted positive association with non-Iinear 
strategies. Financial constraints measures have no real impacts on strategy choice. Consistent 
with predictions and previous results , investment opportunities, gas priee volatility and gas 
future priees are positively related to the use of non-linear strategies. The results further show 
that when oil and gas producers hedge simultaneously both commodities and basis risks, they 
tend to use more Iinear strategies because the firm's aggregate exposure becomes Jess non-
Iinear (e.g., Brown and Toft, 2002). 
1.5 Concluding remarks 
A rich body of empirical literature on corporate risk management explores the incentives, 
determinants, and virtues of hedging. While this empirical literature comprehensively 
answers why firms hedge risks and identifies the determinants of hedging extent and effects, 
the question of how firms hedge risks has been of lesser concern. Using a unique, hand-
collected dataset of detailed, publicly available quarterly information on the risk management 
activities of 150 US oil and gas producers during the period from 1998 to 2010, we extend 
the empirical literature by investigating the determinants of hedging strategy choice. 
Overall, our results show that the state dependence or preference characteristic in hedging 
strategy choice must be considered when explaining firm hedging behavior. We find that a 
positive correlation between internai funds and capital expenditures is positively related to 
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the use of more linear hedging strategies because oil and gas producers are naturally 
diversified. In addition, we observe that geographie diversification in oil and gas production 
significantly affect the manner in which producers hedge their exposures. This operative 
tlexibility is related to hedging strategies with payoffs departing from strict linearity. As 
predicted, the price-quantity correlation appears to impact the derivative choice in a 
significant manner and is associated positively with swap use for gas hed ging particularly. 
Overinvestment appears to be a real concern when choosing hedging strategies and it 
motivates the use of more swap contracts only or col lars only. 
In tine with our predictions, we find that CEOs with higher shareholding use more linear 
strategies and CEOs with higher option holding tend to use more hedging portfolios with 
non-linear payoffs . Surprisingly, the results show that higher stockholding and option holding 
are both positively related to the use of collars only. The presence of institutional investors 
also affects hedging programs. Tax function convexity has a significant and mixed impact on 
derivative choice. Tax loss carryforwards are negatively associated with the use of swap 
contracts as predicted. 
Results further indicate that oil and gas producers that are more leveraged but not yet in 
financial distress tend to use swap contracts more frequently because they are seeking 
predetermined revenues to satisfy their future debt commitments. More solvent oil and gas 
producers tend to use collars only and to avoid swaps only. Consistent with risk-shifting 
theory, we find that oil and gas producers close to financial distress use more hedging 
portfolios with non-linear payoffs. lnvestment opportunities are related to more non-linear 
hedging strategies. Further, we find that hedging strategy choice is strongly correlated with 
the economie conditions of the oil and gas market (i.e., spot priees, future expected priees, 
and volatilities). Results pertaining to additional non-hedgeable risks (i.e. , quantity and cost 
uncertainty) and additional hedgeable risks (FX, IR, and basis risks) indicate that these risks 
play an important role in hedging choices. More focused oi l and gas producers tend to use 
more non-linear strategies. Finally, we check the robustness of our empirical findings using 
continuous measures of hedging intensity by instrument. 
APPENDIX 1.1 
HOW DO FIRMS HEDGE RISKS? 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM US OIL AND GAS PRODUCERS 
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Table A.J.2 Transition probabi li ties matrix for oil and gas hedging strategies 
Put ont ~ Put+collar Put+swa~ Co ll ar on t ~ Collar+~u t+swa~ Coll a r+swa~ Swa~ on t ~ 
Panel A: G as hedging st rategies (% ) 
Put onl)' 85.45 3.64 4.55 2.73 0.9 1 1. 82 0.91 
Put+collar 8.57 71.43 0.00 1 1.43 5.7 1 2.86 0 00 
Put+swap 3.76 0.00 84.96 0.75 3.76 0.75 6.02 
Collar only 0 .73 1.81 0.00 87.84 0.73 7.62 1.27 
Collar+put+swa p 1.1 0 2.20 0.55 1.1 0 79.67 14.29 1.1 0 
Co llar+swap 0.00 0. 10 0. 10 4.29 1.99 88.28 5.23 
Swa ~ onl:l' 0. 11 0.2 1 0.54 0.86 0. 11 5.9 1 92.27 
Pa nel B: Oit hedg ing strategies (% ) 
Put onl)' 89.76 3.94 2.36 0.00 0.79 0.79 2.36 
Put+collar 5. 17 72.41 1.72 13.79 6.90 0.00 0.00 
Put+swap 3. 13 0.00 87.50 0.00 6.25 0.00 3. 13 
Collar on ly 0. 18 1. 10 0.00 90.83 0.73 6.42 0.73 
Collar+p ut+swap 0.00 3.9 1 2.34 0.78 79.69 12.50 0.78 
Co llar+swap 0. 17 0.00 0.17 6.35 1.67 85.45 6. 19 
Swa~ onl:l' 0.24 0.00 0.48 1. 19 0.36 4.30 93.44 
Table A.1.3 First step of the two-step Heckman regression with samp le se lection: 
Determinants of the oi l or gas hedging decision 
Dependent variables Oit hedge Gas hedge 
(1) (Il) 
TAX SAVE 0.9005** 0.1232 
(0.366) (0.428) 
LEVERAGE 1.5843*** 1.9 170*** 
(0.09 1) (0.096) 
CASH_COST 0.0398*** 0.0605*** 
(0.003) (0.005) 
BVCD -1.2947*** - 1.2417*** 
(0.246) (0.2 14) 
Q_RATIO -0. 1056*** -0.1288*** 
(0.0 14) (0 014) 
RESERVE -0.0009*** -0.000 1*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
MKT VALUE 0.3924*** 0.5700*** 
(0.043) (0.043) 
SALES 0. 1994*** 0.0894*** 
(0.0 19) (0.0 17) 
CONSTANT -2 .2678*** -2. 1663*** 
(0.088) (0.089) 
Observations 5,798 5,798 
Pseudo-R squared 0.3025 0.3 129 
Chi squared 2399.4838 2512.4946 
Significance 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: 
This table reports the coefficients estima tes of the pro bit mode!. The dependent variable is the hedging decision dummy varia ble, which 
takes the va lue of one if the finn has oit or gas hedging position, respective! y, for the quarter and zero otherwise. The independent 
variab les are TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax savings, LEVERAGE for the leverage ratio measured by the book value of 
long-lerm debt scaled by the book va lue of tota l assets, CASH_ COST for the production cost per BOE, B VCD for the book value of 
convertible debts scaled by the book value of total assets, Q_RAT!O for the qu ick ratio measured by the book value of cash and the 
equivalent of cash scaled by the book value of current liabilities, RESERVE for the quantities of proved reserves for oit (for oi t hedgers) 
and gas (for gas hedgers), MKT_ VALUE for the logarithm of the market value of common shares outstanding (i.e. , closing priee at the 
end of the quarter multipli ed by the number of common shares outstanding), and SALES for the loga ri thm of sales at the end of the 
quarter. Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
APPENDIX 1.2 
UNIVARlATE ANAL YSIS 
Univariate Analysis 
Tables A.l.4 and A.1 .5 repo11 descriptive stati stics of the independent variables and tests 
of differences between the. means and medians of relevant variables by derivative instruments 
for gas and oil hedgers separately. The means are compared by us ing a t-test assuming 
unequal variances; the medians are compared by using a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum 
Z-test and two-sided p-values. As discussed, we retain only the three major derivative 
instruments : put options, costless collars, and swap contracts (the three instruments 
correspond to more than 93% of ali oil and gas hedging). These major instruments could be 
class ified according to their payoff linearity. Put options are the most non-linear instruments, 
swap contracts are the most linear, and costless collars fall in between. Overa ll , the univariate 
results support the premise that firms with greater investment opportunities tend to use more 
non-linear instruments (i .e., put options and costless collars) than linear instruments (i.e., 
swap con tracts). 
Unexpectedly, higher undeveloped proved o il and gas reserves appear to be associated 
more with the use of swap contracts. On average, firms usi ng more swap contracts and 
costless collars seem to have a higher correlation between interna i cash flows and investment 
opportunities than those using put options as predicted. Interestingly, the univariate results 
support the prediction that large profitable oil and gas producers with fewer growth options 
tend to use more linear instruments to avoid the over investment problem, as suggested by 
Morellec and Smith (2007) and Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2009). 
The results related to tax incentives are mixed. Although tax function convexity and tax 
preference items (i.e., TLCFs) tend to be more related to the use of swaps for the subsample 
of oil hedgers as predicted, they are unpredictably more associated with put options and 
costless collars for the subsample of gas hedgers. On average, users of put options have a 
relatively lower DTD and lower leverage ratios. lnterestingly, these findings suggest that 
there is a non-monotonie relation between the use of put options and finn financia l health. 
Hence, firms either c lose to or far from financial distress tend to use more non-linear hedging 
strategies. ln contrast, swap contracts are associated more with relatively higher DTDs and 
h igher leverage ratios . 
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On average, swap contracts are assoc iated with a higher CEO equity stake va lue in the 
finn, as predicted. Unexpectedly, put options are associated with fewer CEO option holdings, 
particularly for the subsample of oil hedgers. The results also show that a higher percentage 
of institutional shareho lding is more related to the use of put opt ions and costless co llars. The 
results of the means comparison concerning the impact of addit iona l non-hedgeable ri sks 
(i. e., production unce1tainty, cash cost risk) are mixed. A lthough higher cash cost risk is more 
related to the use of costless collars and put options as pred icted, oil and gas product ion 
uncerta inties seem to be more assoc iated with the use of swaps. 
The results for the price-quantity correlation and geographical and industr ia l 
diversification are mixed. However, the use of put options is more closely related to a lower 
price-quantity correlation and higher geographica l divers ification fo r the subsa mple of gas 
hedgers, as predicted. The use of put options by oi l hedgers is more strongly assoc iated with 
a hi gher price-quantity correlation and lower geograph ical diversification. Tests further show 
that firms operating primarily in gas production use more co llars and those operat ing 
primarily in oil production use more put options. Surpris ingly, the results show no significa nt 
differences in the economie condit ions of the oi l and gas markets between swap contracts and 
put options. ln fact, higher volatility, higher spot priees, and higher future priees are largely 
assoc iated with the use of costless collars. 
We now analyze financ ia l and operational characteristics by hedging portfo lios when oil 
and gas hedgers use more than one instrument simultaneous ly. Tables A. l .6 and A. l. 7 report 
un ivar iate results re lated to those portfolios. We reta in comparisons involv ing the next two 
hedging portfolios : swaps combined with put options versus swaps comb ined with cost less 
collars. The first portfolio is supposed to have a more non-linear payoff. As predicted, the 
resu lts show that users of swap and collar portfolios have lower investment opportunities and 
la rger undeveloped proved o il and gas reserves. Unexpectedly, swap and collar portfolios are 
associated with a lower correlation between internai cash flows and investment opportunities, 
lower expected tax savings, and lower tax preference items (TLCFs). In addition, users of 
swap and collar portfolios have fewer fi nancial constraints coupled with a higher DTD and 
lower leverage ratios. 
75 
Consistent with the predictions, swap and collar portfolios are associated with a higher 
CEO equity stake value in the firm. Counter to predictions, these portfolios seem to be 
associated with higher stock option holding. As predicted, the results indicate that swap and 
collar portfolios are related to lower production uncertainty and a higher price-quantity 
correlation. Nonetheless, swaps and collars portfolios ' users have higher cash cost variability 
and greater geographical diversification, contradicting the conjecture. For the subsample of 
ga s hedgers, the univariate results show, unexpectedly, that swaps and collars portfolios are 
associated with higher gas priee volatility and with higher gas future priees. As predicted, 
swaps and collars portfolios are related to higher gas spot priees. 
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81 
Table A. 1.8 Fraction of the notional position by instrument 
Panel A: Gas hedging (%) 
Strate gy Swap+put Swap+col lar Col lar+put Swap+put+coll ar 
Instrument Swap Put Swap Coll ar Coll ar Put Swap Put Col l ar 
Mean 59.3 40.7 53.1 46.9 58.2 41.8 33 .1 19.3 47 .7 
Median 64.9 35. 1 55 45 60 40 30.6 13.8 46.5 
SD 26.3 26.3 30 30 20.8 20.8 24 .2 15.9 25.3 
Min 7.2 0.5 0.2 0 2.6 1.1 0.1 0.4 3. 1 
Max 99.5 92.8 100 99.8 98.9 97.4 91.7 66.4 96.9 
Panel B: Oi1 hedging (%) 
Strate gy Swap+put Swap+co11ar Collar+put Swap+put+coll ar 
Instrument Swap Put Swap Coll ar Coll ar Put Swap Put Coll ar 
Mean 48 .7 51.3 50.7 49.3 62.3 37.7 36.5 17.9 45.6 
Median 49.2 50.8 51.6 48.4 66.6 33.4 30.3 15.8 48 .6 
SD 25 .2 25 .2 28.1 28. 1 27 27 26.2 12.8 26.5 
Min 4.4 2.3 0.02 1.3 0.5 2. 1 1.4 0.5 0.8 
Max 97.7 95.6 98.7 99.8 97.9 99.5 93 62.9 93.6 
Note: 
For a given hedging strategy, this table g ives summary statistics of th e fi·action of notional position hedged by each 
instrument. 
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Table A.l.l 1 Alternative specifications for hedging strategies 
Gas hedge~ Oil hedge~ 
Modell Model2 Modell Model 2 
Dependant va riab les Linear + Non-linear Linear + Non-linear Linear + Non-linear Linear + Non-/inear 
Non-linear on/y Non-linear on/y Non-linear on/y Non-/inear on/y 
(!) (Il) (lll ) (fV) (V) (V I) (V Il ) (V ill ) 
DIFF_(GAS/0/L) 0.1798 0. 1424 0.1723 0.0205 0.1879 -0.0670 0. 11 53 -0.0553 
(0.254) (0.326) (0.256) (0.328) (0.293) (0 324) (0.295) (0.328) 
HERF_(GASIO!L) 0.8649 -0.0807 1.2503 0.0 182 2.240 1 ** 2.5245** 1.8389* 1.4475 
(1.580) (2.0 16) (1.563) (2 .005) (1 041) (1.249) ( 1 048) (1226) 
PQ_ COR_(GASIOIL) 0. 1676 0.2100 0. 1300 0. 1402 0.0026 -0. 1334 0.0209 -0.0702 
(0. 176) (0.222) (0. 180) (0.226) (0. 199) (02 19) (0.200) (0 .2 18) 
OVER_!NV 0.0196 -0.4 174 -0 .0804 -0.3650 -0.0892 -0.2 101 -0.25 17 -0.225 1 
(0.250) (0.3 11 ) (0.242) (0 .307) (0.288) (0.3 14) (0 .287) (03 13) 
MV_CS_CEO 0.33 11 3.2528** -0.2955 2.4382 0.6460 -0.2728 0.0609 0.0255 
(1 045) (1529) (1 11 4) (1 579) (1420) (1 658) (148 1) ( 1.708) 
OPT_CEO 0.0008 0.0 1 07*** 0.000 1 0.0 123*** -0.0026 -0.00 12 -0 .00 19 0.0004 
(0 002) (0.004) (0.002) (0 .004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0 .004) 
%_CS_!NST 0.5 135 0.6789 0.0685 -0.0228 0.5507 -0.1640 -0.0055 -0.4 158 
(0.580) (0.731) (0.583) (0.728) (0.683) (0 .792) (0.7 12) (0.838) 
TAX_SAVE 2.2821 3.3056 1.6079 3.8772* 0.4959 -6 .9269 O. 7088 -6.7426 
(1.480) (2.346) (1. 5 16) (2330) (3 .094) (5 .348) (2.894) (5.62 1) 
TLCF -0.3354 0.8256 -0.0896 0.4 786 1 878 1 4.0882*** 1. 822 1 3.3872** 
(0.927) (1.064) (0.928) (1.039) (1.28 1) (1.409) (1.235) ( 1.322) 
LEV -16363 0.37 11 -1.25 16 -1.5883 
( 1.1 52) (1.148) ( 1. 633) ( 1. 834) 
CONSTRAINT 0.3587 0.2771 0. 1811 -0.2086 
(0222) (0.284) (0.262) (0.296) 
DTD 0.0288 0. 1448 -0.0067 0.1647 
(0.092) (0 .122) (0. 125) (0. 140) 
!NV_OPP 1.9229** 0.9639 1.48 12** 0.7823 
(0.748) (0.880) (06 11 ) (0 . 736) 
UND _(GASIO!L) -0.0803 0.3042 0.0399 -0.382 1 
(0 .161) (0.274) (3.435) (4.2 17) 
VOL _(GAS/0 /L) 0.4430*** 0.6279*** -0.0532 0.003 1 
(0. 165) (0.202) (0 042) (0.049) 
SPOT_(GASIO!L) -0.0466 -0.1238 0.0460 0.0034 
(0 087) (0. 107) (0.038) (0 044) 
FUTURE_(GAS/0/L) 0. 1776* 0.3720*** -0.036 1 0.003 1 
(0 100) (0. 123) (0.039) (0.045) 
UNCER _(GAS/Of L) 0.5578 -0.1533 0.9666 -0.558 1 0.9259 -0 .2 136 0.9220 -0.6909 
(0.658) (0.895) (0.622) (0 .856) (0.718) (0.828) (0. 704) (0.82 1) 
COST_C V 0.35 17 0.1974 0.2410 0. 11 23 -0.2855 03 165 -0.5222 -0. 1703 
(0.789) (0.826) (0. 764) (0 .82 1) ( 1.040) (1.074) ( 1.066) ( 1. 096) 
(01 UGAS) _ HEDG 0.0276 -0.733 1** 0.0258 -1. 1669*** 
(0 .268) (0 .327) (0.475) (0 .43 7) 
FX_HEDG -0.1298 -1.0422 0.2706 -0 .3783 
(0.568) (0 960) (0.738) (0.848) 
!R_HEDG 0.4268* -0.07 18 -0.2068 -0.46 10 
(0252) (0333) (0. 309) (0.359) 
BASIS_HEDG 0.052 1 -0.8459* -0.5224 -1.6466*** 
(0.320) (0.455) (0.3 86) (0.461) 
(GAS/0/L)_REV 1.3379 1 8800 1.3320 2. 11 00* 0320 1 -1. 1906 0.3663 -0 .7394 
(0.980) ( LJ 62) (0 976) (1.177) ( 1.1 56) (1.238) ( 1.1 52) (1.243) 
IMR -0 .1343 0330 1 0. 11 17 1. 0068 -0.6089 -0.6089 -0. 1254 -0.1 157 
(0.540) (0.641 ) (0.587) (0.655) (0.648) (0 648) (0.708) (0.789) 
LAG 4.86 12*** 7. 7323*** 4.7203*** 7.5889*** 4. 7574* ** 6.0465*** 4.7322*** 5.9883*** 
(0.2 11 ) (0. 753) (0.208) (0.759) (0.256) (0.473) (0.260) (0.479) 
LAG_O 0.3053 2.0497** 0.6227 1.6652* 0.3764 3.2 136** 0.5687 4.0424*** 
(0.479) (0.879) (0 552) (0 928) (1.193) (1 414) (1.1 71 ) (1510) 
uj -4.9440*** -3.3724 -3. 1510 -6 .5407** -8 .9 1 05*** -8 .9957*** -7.0245** -12.0699*** 
(1773) (2.844) (1978) (3.333) (2 543) (3 .237) (2.841) (3.46 1) 
Observations 2,865 2,892 2,396 2,420 
Log-1 ikelihood (LL) -1076.5 184 -1 081862 1 -910.0535 -907.2457 
LL constant-only -11 02.9459 -1116.298 1 -947.4364 -944.7210 
Wald stat 52.8549 68.87 19 74.7659 74.9507 
S i~nificance 00000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0000 
------------- - ·- -- -------------------------------, 
86 
Note: 
This table reports the means of the coefficient estimates of the dynamic random effects MMNL to select one of the following two hedging 
strategies- (!) linear and non-linear strategies, and (2) on/y non-linear strategies-for the gas hedgers and oil hedgers separately. The 
base case is using only linear strategies . DIFF_ GAS (0/L) is the absolu te value of differentiais in firm's revenues and investment costs 
sensitivities to gas (oil) priee fluctuations ; HERF_GAS (0/L) for the geographical dispersion of gas (oil) production; PQ_COR_GAS 
(0/L) for the gas (oil) quantity-price correlation calculated using rolling windows of eight quarterly observations; OVER INV for 
overinvestment; OPT_CEO for the number of stock options held by the CEO; MV_CS_CEO for the market value ofcommon shares held 
by the CEO; %_CS _!NST for the percentage of common shares held by institutional investors; TAX_ SAVE for the expected percentage of 
tax savings; TLCF stands for TLCFs scaled by the book value of total assets; LEV tor the leverage ratio; CONSTRA !NT for financial 
constraints; DTD for the DTD; INV_OPP for investment opportunities; UND_GAS (0/L) for undeveloped proved gas (oil) reserves; 
FUTURE_ GAS (0/L), SPOT_GAS (0/L), and VOL_GAS (0/L) for gas (oil) future and spot priees and volatility, respectively; 
UNCER_GAS (0/L) for gas (oil) production uncertainty measured by the coefficient of variation of dai ly produced quantities using 
rolling windows of eight quarterly observations; COST_CV for the coefficient of variation of the cash cost per BOE using rolling 
windows of eight quarterly observations; GAS(O!L)_HEDG, IR_HEDG, FX_HEDG, and BAS!S_HEDG are dummy variables for gas 
(oil ), IR, FX, and bas is risk hedging, respectively; GAS(O!L)_REVfor revenues from gas (oi l) production; IMR for the inverse Mills ratio 
from the first-step Heckman regression (Table A. 1.3); LAG for the lagged dependent variable; and LA G _ 0 for the first observation. The 
coefficients of the exogenous variables' means are not reported here for conciseness and are avai lable upon request. Standard en·ors are in 
parentheses. The superscripts ***, **,and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respective! y. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates how firms design the maturity of the ir hedging programs, and the 
real effects of maturity choice on firm value and risk. Using a new dataset on hedging 
activities of 150 U.S. oil and gas producers, we find strong evidence that hedging maturity is 
influenced by investment programs, market conditions, production specificities, and hedging 
contract features. We also give empirical evidence of a non-monotonie relationship between 
hedging maturity and measures offinancial distress. We further investigate the motivations of 
earl y termination of con tracts. Finally, we show th at longer hedging maturities cou Id 
attenuate the impacts of commodity priee risk on finn value and risk. 
Keywords: Risk management, maturity cho ice, early termination, economie effects, oi l and 
gas industry. 
JEL classification: D8, G32. 
2.1 Introduction 
We explore a new channel in corporate risk management literature through which firms 
could create value and reduce risk by considering the following questions: How far ahead do 
firms hedge? What are the determinants of the maturity structure of firms' hedging 
programs? What are the economie effects of hedging maturities on finn value and risk? 
These questions are still largely unexplored because of the lack of empirical analysis due to 
limitations of the data. Using an extensive and new hand-collected dataset on the risk 
management activities of 150 U.S. oil and gas producers with quarterly observations over th e 
period 1998-2010, we fill this gap in the literature and answer the above questions. It is 
important to ùnderstand why firms within the same industry and with the same risk exposure 
differ in terms oftheir hedging maturity structure. 
We contribute to the literature on corporate hedging in several ways. Our first 
contribution is to provide empirical evidence of the rationales and determinants of the 
maturity structure of hedging contracts at inception; we also study the rationales for early 
termination of hedging contracts, and the real implications of maturity choice on firm value 
and risk. We hence add new significant results to the empirical literature; the seant empirical 
studies discuss the maturity structure of hedging in a largely descriptive manner. 19 In 
19 Dol de ( 1993) surveys the hedging practices of244 Fortune 500 companies and finds that the common practice 
is to hedge cash fl ow exposures within a horizon of two to four quarters. ln li ne with Dol de ( 1993), Tu fano 
(1996) provides statistics about the percentage of the production hedged for North American gold mining firm s 
for 1991 -1 993, and finds that they hedge 61.2% oftheir gold production for the current year ( 199 1) and 10% and 
Il% for the subsequent two years. ln a Wharton survey offinancial ri sk management practices and derivatives of 
399 U.S. non-fi nancial fi rms, Bodnar et al. , ( 1998) report that 82% of the questioned firms use foreign currency 
deri vati ves with an initial maturity of 9 1 days or less, and only 12% use foreign currency derivatives with 
maturities exceedi ng 3 years. They also find that hedging ratios at longer maturit ies decreased dramatically 
during 1998. Adam and Fernando (2006 and 2008) study the cash flow gains from selective hedging for a sample 
of 92 North American gold producers from 1989 to 1999 and report descriptive stat istics of hedgi ng ratios up to 
five years. They fi nd that gold producers use hedging programs with one-year maturities in 90% of firm-quarters 
with non-zero hedging with a mean hedging ratio of 54% of expected· gold production, hedging programs with 
three-year maturities in 51% of hedging quarters with an average hedgi ng ratio of 2 5%, and programs with five-
year maturities in 18% with an average hedging ratio of 28%. They also point out that near-term hedging ratios 
are more volatile than those with longer horizons. Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) investigate the jet fue l 
hedging act ivities of U.S. airline firms during 1992-2003 and find that hedging maturities vary significantly 
between firm s (e.g., from one year to six years ahead) and that hedgi ng ratios of the next year's fuel consumption 
are very disparate (e.g. , from 1% to 43%). 
- - - -- -- ---- --------
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addition, our data collected from publicly disclosed information avoid the non-response bias 
associated with questionnaires and provide detailed information about real hedging activities. 
Finally, we study hedging activities of both commodities ( oil and gas) separately, which 
gives deeper insight into oil and gas producers ' hedging dynamics. 
Consistent with our predictions, results of our base model (i.e., Dynamic System-GMM 
Panel Model) show that oil and gas producers, having substantial growth options, use 
hedging contracts with longer maturities to avoid shortfalls in their future cash tlows. We 
also find that oil and gas producers with a higher positive correlation between their 
investment expenditures and internai cash tlows tend to use short-term hedging contracts 
because they benefit from a natural hedge. ln line with Fehle and Tsyplakov's (2005) 
prediction, we give strong evidence of the non-monotonie (concave) relationship between 
measures of the likelihood of financial distress (i.e., leverage) and hedging maturity. This 
non-monotonie relationship means that hedging maturities increase and then decrease with 
the likelihood offinancial distress. 
Results also indicate that distressed oil and gas producers (i.e., with insufficient liquidity) 
enter long-term put options as a risk-shifting (asset substitution) strategy. Costly put options 
with long maturities increase rather than eliminate the firm 's payoff volatility and decrease 
assets available for debtholders. Results further show that oil and gas producers with higher 
cash flow volatility, due to higher production uncertainty and/or higher price-quantity 
correlation, tend to use farther hedging positions to avoid shortfalls in their future revenues. 
We also observe strong evidence of the impact of market conditions on hedging maturity 
choice. Oil and gas priee volatilities are significantly positively related to longer maturities 
hedging, as predicted by Fehle and Tsyp lakov (2005). Accordingly, higher priee volati lity 
makes firms reluctant to incur costly early termination of their hedging contracts unless spot 
priees increase significantly. We further verify that when future priees are expected to be 
higher, firms tend to use short-term hedging. Consistent with Feh le and Tsyplakov (2005), 
we find empirical evidence of a non-monotonie (concave) relationship between oil and gas 
spot priees and hedging maturities. 
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Results show that the hedging contract features (i.e., moneyness, strike priee) have an 
evident impact on maturity choice. As predicted, oïl and gas producers keep in-the-money 
hedging contracts until they mature and terminate out-of-the-money contracts early. Results 
further imply that a hedging contract initiated at a sufficiently higher strike priee is more 
likely to be kept for longer periods. Consistent with our predictiop, tax function convexity 
motivates the use of long-term contracts and tax loss carry-forwards seem to be a disincentive 
to hedge longer exposures because they could be used as a caution to reduce firms' future tax 
liabilities. With respect to asset-liability management, we find that oïl and gas producers seek 
to match the maturities of their hedging and of their oïl and gas developed reserves (i .e. , 
as sets) and debt. 
Results are largely robust to other data collection criteria. Specifically, we use maturity 
choice at inception of the hedging contracts and find results largely s imilar to those of our 
base specification (i.e., Dynamic System-GMM Panel Madel). Our results are validated aga in 
when we study the determinants of the early termination of hedging contracts. Finally, we 
give novel evidence of the impact of hedging maturity on finn value and risk, and find that 
long-term hedging lowers the sensitivity of the stock return to changes in gas priees, in 
particular. However, we find no significant impact on sensitivity to oïl and gas priee 
volatility. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we state our hypotheses. ln 
Section 3, we describe our data, and dependent and independent variables. Section 4 presents 
the retained econometrie methodology. Section 5 reports univariate results and Section 6 
investigates the empirical evidence of the maturity structure of corporate risk management. In 
Section 7, we test the robustness of our results by exploring the determinants of maturity 
choice at the inception of hedging contracts and the determinants of ear ly tennination of 
outstanding hedging contracts. We then investigate the real implications of hedging maturity 
choice empirically in Section 8, and Section 9 conclu des the paper. 
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2.2 Hypotheses 
The lack of testable theoretical predictions on hedging maturity structure was 
compensated by Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005). They present an infinite-horizon continuous 
time model of a firm that can adjust the hedge ratio and matur ity of its hedging instruments 
dynamically in response to fluctuations in finn output priee. Their model is calibrated to 
replicate empirical observations for a gold mining finn and produces a number of new 
theoretical predictions pertaining to the optimal timing, adjustment, and roi lover of hedging 
contracts and their maturities, which we will describe in depth to develop our hypotheses in 
this section and test empirically after. 
2.2.1 Financial distress 
A large body of the empirical literature has analyzed the positive relationship between 
financial constraints and firms' hedging activities (e.g., Nance et al., 1993 ; Géczy et al., 
1997; Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998; Adam, 2002, 2009). In line with this extant 
literature, Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005) analyzed the implications of financial distress on risk 
management adjustments. Based on simulations of output (gold) spot priees, they find a non-
monotonie relationship between hedging maturity and measures of the probability of 
financial distress. This non-monotonicity means that hedging maturity first increases and then 
decreases with the probability of financial distress. To put it another way, firms near di stress 
are often observed with short-run hedging contracts, and may terminate longer contracts at a 
high cost as a result of risk-shifting behavior. Firms far from distress opt for short-term 
contracts because of the low marginal benefits of hedging for wealthy firms ( e.g., Stulz, 
1996). 
Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005) also find that financial distress costs are negatively related to 
hedging maturity. Their simulations show that firms with high distress costs tend to use 
shorter maturity hedging. Thus, distress costs increase when the firm ' s cash inflows (i.e., its 
selling priees) are insufficient to cover production costs and debt payments. Hence we posit: 
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HYPOTHESIS 1: Hedging maturity is negative/y related to (i) either high or low likelihood 
of financial distress, and (ii) higher distress costs. 
To verify the empirical relevance ofthis prediction we use the following two measures of 
the distress likelihood: (1) the leverage ratio as measured by the book value of long-term debt 
in current liabilities plus half of long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets as used by 
Moody's-KMV, and (2) distance-to-default, which is a market-based measure originating 
from Merton 's (1974) approach. This measure gives the number of standard deviations that 
the finn is away from default (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). We also use leverage squared and 
distance-to-default squared to capture non-linearity between financial soundness and hedging 
maturity. We predict a positive sign for the leverage ratio and distance-to-default and a 
negative sign for their squared values. 
Following Fehle and Tsyplakov ' s (2005) methodology, we measure firm 's incurred 
distress costs by the following product /[ Liquidity- M] max[O, -p + c + d] where 1 is an 
indicator function and Liquidity is the quick ratio (i.e., cash and cash equivalents scaled by 
the book value of current liabilities). We use the quick ratio because a finn could use this 
liquidity as a caution to repay future debt requirements (see Dionne and Triki, 20 13). M is the 
median quick ratio of the oïl and gas industry. I[Liquidity- M] = 1 if Liquidity < 
M and 0 otherwise. max[O, -p + c + d] means that a finn incurs distress costs that are 
proportional to the shortfall of its realized sel ling priees p compared with its production costs 
c and debt payments d. These realized prices20 include the monetary effects of hedging 
activities, if any. The letter c is for cash cost.21 Debt payments are measured by the quarterly 
interest expenses and the outstanding proportion of long-term debt to CUITent liabilities at the 
end of the quarter, and are represented by d . The variables p, c and d are expressed per 
Barrel of Oïl Equivalent (BOE). Therefore, a firm incurs distress costs when its liquidity is 
below the industry's median and its actual cash inflows (i .e. , realized selling priees net of 
2
° Firms disclose their reali zed sel ling priees for oil and gas, respectively, on an annual basis. For each fi nn, we 
repeat the annual observation for each quarter of the same fiscal year. These realized pri ees incl ude the monetary 
effects of the firm 's hedging acti vities if any. 
21 Cash costs are disclosed annually. For each firm , we repeat the same observat ion for each quarter of the same 
fiscal year. 
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production costs) are insufficient to meet debt requirements. These distress costs may entai! 
higher future external financing costs. 
2.2.2 Market conditions 
The corporate hedging literature shows that market conditions, namely spot priees and 
their volatilities, play a crucial role in why frrms hedge, how much they hedge, and how they 
hedge (see for instance Bodnar et al., 1998; Stulz, 1996; Brown and Toft, 2002; Adam, 
2009). Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005) investigate the evolution of risk management contracts 
and the spot priee history by si mu lating the stochastic process of the gold spot priee. 
Basically, they fi nd strong evidence of a non-monotonie relationship between spot priee and 
hedging contract maturity. This means that when spot priees are very high or low, firms 
choose short maturity hedging. As for Hypothesis 1, when spot priees are very high (low), the 
1ikelihood of distress is very 1ow (high). For the range of spot priees between these two 
extremes, firms tend to adjust their risk management instruments more frequently and then 
tend to enter into newly initiated contracts with longer maturities. 
Moreover, Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005) find that firms with higher priee volatility tend to 
choose longer hedging contracts. In a higher priee uncet1ainty environment, firms tend to 
refrain from costly early termination oftheir outstanding contracts unless spot priees increase 
significantly. These firms often conclude long-run contracts. In addition, we expect that when 
future priees are anticipated to be higher, firms tend to terminate their outstanding contracts 
and initiate new risk management contracts with higher exercise priees. Moreover, the newly 
initiated contracts will be for short-term matu rit ies to prevent them from be ing worthless in 
the future. We therefore posit: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Hedging maturity is negative/y related to (i) either very high or very low 
spot priees, and (ii) higher antieipated priees. Converse/y, firms prefer longer maturity 
eontraets when priee volatility is higher. 
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We extract the oil and gas spot priees observed at the end of each quarter from the 
Bloomberg Financial Markets database. 22 We calculate the volatility of oil and gas for each 
quarter as the standard deviation of daily spot priees within the quarter. As a proxy for the 
future tendency of oil and gas priees, we calculate an expected return by E[Rt] = log[FtfSt] 
where Fe and Sc are respectively the priees of 12-month Futures23 contracts and the spot 
priees observed at the end of quarter t. We expect a positive sign for spot priees and 
volatilities, and a negative sign for spot priees squared and expected returns E[Rc]. 
2.2.3 Hedging contract features 
Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005) find that features of existing hedging contracts, namely 
moneyness, remaining maturity and strike priee, play an important role in optimal rollover 
and adjustment decisions. Regarding these features, they derive the following prediction that 
we will investigate empirically. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Hedging contracts initiated at higher strike priees are more likely to be 
kept until maturity because they are more likely to be in the money for a longer period 
As proxy for the strike priee at initiation of the hedgi ng contracts, we calculate the mean 
of the spot priee during the quarter of the initiation. This proxy will give the information on 
the leve! of the strike priee of the initiated contract. The moneyness is calculated by the strike 
priee as previously mentioned minus the mean spot priee in the current quarter. We predict a 
positive sign for both strike priee and moneyness. 
22 We use the West Texas lntermediate crude oit (WTJ) index as proxy for the oit spot priees. For natural gas spot 
priees, we use an average index established by Bloomberg Financial Markets database from different location 
indices (Gulf Coast, Henry Hub, Rocky Mountains, etc.). 
23 For future oit and gas priees, we use (i) Bloomberg NYMEX Crude Oit 12-Month Strip futures priee, and (i i) 
Bloomberg NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas 12-Month Strip futures priee. These two indices are establi shed by 
the Bloomberg Financial Markets database as the arithmetic averages of oi t (gas) futures contract priees over the 
next 12 months. 
---------------------------------------------------
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2.2.4 Underinvestment costs 
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) argue that firms with future investment expenditures 
and higher marginal costs of externat financing should hedge to reduce the investment 
financing costs. Subsequent corporate risk management literature shows that hedging is more 
valuable for firms with substantial investment opportunities and costly external financin g. 
The main argument is that hedging allows firms to reduce their cash flow volatility and hence 
avoid cutting planned profitable projects. In the same context, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 
(1993) assert that a firm tends to hedge less the more closely correlated its internai cash flows 
are with its future investment opportunities. We thus explore the impact of the 
underinvestment argument on hedging contract maturity and we predict: 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Hedging maturity is positive/y related to firm 's growth options and 
negative/y related to a positive correlation between interna! cash jlows and investment 
expenditures. 
lnvestment oppotiunities are measured by the ratio of the cost incurred over the net 
property, plant and equipment (net PP&E) at the beginning of the quarter. 24 In the oit and gas 
industry, the cost incurred includes the total costs of oil and gas property acquisition, 
exploration and development. We also calculate the correlation coefficient between generated 
cash tlows and costs incurred.25 It is worth noting that these calculated cash tlows are not 
polluted or contaminated by the monetary effects of hedging because these effects are 
reported in comprehensive income as suggested by the new der ivative accounting standard 
F ASB 133, effective since 1998. The correlation coefficients are calculated, for each finn, in 
a rolling window by taking ali the observations avai lable until the current quarter. 
24 The cast incurred is given on an annual basis. We suppose that these costs are linearly dispersed over the year 
and di vide the annual amount by four to geta quarterly cast incurred for the fiscal year. 
25 [nternally generated cash flows are measured by the Free Cash Flow before capital expenditw·es, as in Lehn and 
Poul sen ( 1989). They calcul ate Free Cash Flow before investment as operating incarne before depreciation less 
total incarne taxes plus changes in the deferred taxes from the previous quarter to the current quarter less gross 
interest expenses on short- and long-term debt less the total amount of preferred dividends less the total dollar 
amou nt of dividends declared on corn mon stock. 
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2.2.5 Production characteristics 
Severa! studies, 26 mostly theoretical, have investigated the role of characteristics of 
production activity on firm ' s hedging behavior. These studies demonstrate the importance of 
production uncertainty (i.e. , quantity risk) and the correlation between produced quantities 
and spot priees on firm ' s hedging programs (i.e. , hedging extent and strategy choice). We 
explore the effects of these characteristics on hedging maturity choice. By deriving the 
optimal hedge analytically, Brown and Toft (2002) show that firms tend to hedge less for 
longer exposures because of the difficu lty in forecasting the ir future produced quantities 
accurately. 
These theoretical models also highlight the important impact of the correlation between 
produced quantities and spot priees on hedging decisions. Brown and Toft (2002) and Gay, 
Nam, and Turac (2002, 2003) find that firms with a negative price-quantity correlation 
benefit from a natural hedge with declining quantities and increasing priees, and vice versa. 
On the contrary, a positive price-quantity correlation leads to higher variations in firm ' s cash 
flows because both priees and quantities are moving in the same direction. Hence we 
propose: 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Hedging maturity is negative/y related to production uncertainty and 
positive/y related to price-quantity correlation. 
For each firm, we measure production uncertainty by the coefficient of variation of daily 
production27 for oil and gas respectively by taking ali the observations available until the 
eut-rent quarter. We calculate the correlation coefficient between daily oil (gas) production 
and oil (gas) spot priees by taking ali the firm ' s observations available until the current 
quarter. 
26 These studies include Moschini and Lapan (1 995), Brown and Toft (2002), Gay, Nam, and Turac (2002, 2003) 
and Adam (2009). 
27 Daily production for oil and gas, respectively, are di sclosed by fi rms annually. We repeat the annual 
observation for each quarter of the same fiscal year. 
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2.2.6 Other control variables 
We include the following control variables largely retained 111 the corporate risk 
management literature. 
2.2.6.1 Managerial risk aversion 
As proxy for managerial risk aversion, we include the number of options and the market 
value28 of the firm's stocks held by the CEO. According to Smith and Stulz (1985), managers 
should undertake hedging activities more actively iftheir utility is a concave function offirm 
value, and they should be reluctant to engage risk management activities if their utility is a 
convex function of the firm's value. Therefore, we predict that a CEO owning a significant 
fraction of the firm 's common shares tends to use hedging contracts with longer maturities 
because he would like to insulate the finn value from the underlying risks. Conversely, we 
expect a CEO with significant option holdings to tolerate more volatility in firm value, and 
consequently prefer short-term hedging contracts. 
2.2.6.2 Tax incentives 
The tax argument for corporate hedging is accounted for using a simulation procedure 
proposed by Graham and Smith (1999) to measure the expected percentage of tax savings 
arising from a 5% reduction in the volatility of pre-tax income. The tax argument means that 
hedging increases the firm's after-tax value when its loca l tax function is convex. A firm will 
thus hedge more extensively when its taxable income is in the progressive region of the tax 
structure. We expect firms with higher tax function convex ity to use hedging contracts with 
longer maturities that would increase the tax benefits of hedging. We also use the book value 
oftax loss carry-forwards scaled by the book value of total assets. Graham and Rogers (2002) 
argue that tax loss carry-forwards are uncorrelated with tax function convexity, and that this 
28 We use the number of options held by the firm ' s CEO at the end of each quarter and we measure the CEO' s 
firm-specific wealth by the logarithm of one plus the market value of common shares held by the CEO at the end 
of each quarter. We use the logarithm specification of the market value of common shares held by CEOs to reflect 
the fact that the CEOs' risk aversion should decrease as their firm-specific wealth increases (Tufano, 1996). 
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variable might measure other corporate characteristics. Thus, we expect that it represents a 
disincentive to hedge because firms could use this tax shield to minimize their future tax 
liabilities. Therefore, we predict that firms with higher tax Joss carry-forwards tend to use 
short-term hedging contracts. 
2.2.6.3 Asset-Liability Management 
Asset-Liability Management is also accounted for in our analysis. Maturity matching is a 
common best practice in corporate finance. We use the following two measures: (1) a 
weighted average maturity of debt. This average maturity is calculated as the book value-
weighted average maturities of debt that mature within one, two, three, four and five years 29; 
and (2) an expected life duration (in years) of developed reserves for oïl and gas separately. 
This expected life duration is calculated by dividing the current quantity of o ïl (gas) 
developed reserves by the current annual oïl (gas) production. These two variables allow us 
to capture any maturity matching between both the hedging strategy and the firm ' s assets 
(proven reserves, which are the most important components of an oïl and gas producer's 
assets) and hedging strategy and the firm ' s future debt commitments. 
2.3 Sample construction and characteristics 
2.3.1 Sample construction 
This study is implemented on a sample of 150 US oï l and gas producers over the period 
of 1998 to 201 O. The oï l and gas industry is an excellent laboratory to test corporate risk 
management motivations and implications for severa] reasons. First, firms in this industry 
share homogenous risk exposures (i.e. fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas priees). 
Hence, diversity in hedging strategies implemented does not come from differences in risk 
exposure, but is more likely to result from differences in finn characteristics. Second, the 
existence of financial derivatives on crude oï l and natural gas offer these firms severa! priee 
29 These items are di sclosed by COMPUSTAT on an annual bas is. We repeat the annual observation for each 
quarter of the same fiscal year. 
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hedging methods. Third, improvements in accounting disclosure related to oïl and gas 
producing activities have made operational data available. These data pertain to exploration, 
production and reserve quantities, cash costs, etc. 
A preliminary list of 413 US oïl and gas producers with the primary Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code 1311 30 (Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas) was extracted from 
Bloomberg. Only firms that met the following criteria were retained: have at !east five years 
of historical data of oïl and gas reserves during the period 1998-201 0; the 1 0-K and 1 0-Q 
reports are available from the EDGAR website, and the finn is covered by COMPUST AT. 
The filtering process produced a final sample of 150 firms with an unbalanced panel of 6,326 
firm-quarter observations. To our knowledge, this sample is the most recent and the largest in 
the empiricalliterature on risk management in the oïl and gas industry. 
Data on these firms ' financial and operational characteristics were gathered from severa! 
sources. Data regarding financial characteristics were ta ken from the COMPUST AT 
quarterly dataset held by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Other items related to 
institutional and managerial share-holding and option-holding were taken from the Thomson 
Reuters dataset maintained by WRDS. Data related to oïl and gas producers ' reserves, 
production quantities, cash costs, exploration, development and property acquisitions were 
taken from Bloomberg' s annual data set and verified and supplemented by hand-collecting 
data directly from 10-K annual reports. Quarterly data about oï l and gas producers ' hedging 
activities were hand-collected from 1 0-K and 1 0-Q reports. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the definitions, construction and data sources of the variables. 
30 SIC code 131 1 "Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas, " which comprises companies primarily involved in the 
operation ofproperties for the recovery of hydrocarbon li quids and natural gas. 
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2.3.2 Sample characteristics 
2.3.2.1 Descriptive statistics: Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is hedging maturity measured by the average rema ining maturity_ 
weighted by the hedged national quantity as follows : 
- "k+S Nr.j XT HM·· - L. l ,J ,t T=k Lk+S N . 
T=k T.J 
(1) 
where HMi,J,t is the weighted-average remaining maturity for finn i at quarter t and 
hedging instrument j. The hedging instrument cou Id be swap contracts, put options, costless 
collars, forward or future contracts and 3-way collars. Nr,J is the hedged notional quantity 31 
for instrumentj and horizon T. T departs from the current fiscal year to five years ahead. We 
retain a maximum of five years because we rarely find firms with hedging positions 
exceeding this horizon. k takes the value of 1 at the beginning of the current fiscal year or a 
fraction of the year otherwise (e.g., 0.75 for nine months). 
Table 2.2 contains descriptive statistics of the weighted-average hedging maturity by 
hedging instruments for oil and gas hedgers separately. Overall, Table 2.2 shows that gas 
hedgers and oil hedgers adopt quite similar hedging horizons for each hedging instrument. 
For examp1e, the average remaining maturity for swap contracts is 1.286 ( 1.227) years for gas 
(oil) hedgers. For put options, the remaining maturity is, on average, 1.023 (1.083) years for 
gas (oil) hedgers. Moreover, statistics show little variation of average remaining maturities 
across instruments. Swaps contracts and 3-way collars seem to have the longest average 
remaining maturity with respectively 1.286 and 1 .187 years for gas hedgers, and 1.227 and 
1.448 years for oil hedgers. Forward and future contracts appear to have the nearest average 
31 We fo llow Haushalter (2000) and use national quantities for put options because we Jack detailed information 
to calculate a delta-percentage for these options. At !east, we have three attributes of our sample that could 
mitigate this shortcoming in our study: (i) put options are used on average in Il % ( 12%) offirm-quarters with gas 
(oil) hedging, (i i) put options are used with either swap/or coll ars most, and (i ii) the fraction of the quantity 
hedged by put options does not exceed 40% (50%) for gas (oil). 
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remaining maturities with 0.856 (0.818) years for gas (oil) hedgers. We also calculate the 
average rema ining maturity for oïl (gas) hedging portfolios that include two or more 
instruments simultaneously. Hedging portfolios have an average remaining maturity of 1.222 
(1.204) years for gas (oil) hedgers. Hedging horizons therefore seem to not differ 
s ignificantly across oil and gas and across hedging instruments. Statistics related to hedging 
maturities reported in Table 2.2 are in line with previous empirical findings that firms tend to 
hedge near-term positions. 
Table 2.2 Weighted-average maturity by hedging instrument (in years) 
Hedging Instrument Obs %of use Mean Median 151 quartile 3' qua11 ile Min Max Std Dev 
Panel A: Gas hedgers 
Swap contracts 2255 45.58% 1.286 1.161 0.894 1.582 0.250 5 0.65 1 
Costless Col lars 1840 37.19% 1.156 1.032 0.822 1.404 0.250 4. 190 0.539 
Put options 522 10.55% 1.023 1 0.750 1.273 0.250 3.220 0.538 
Forwards or Futures 16 1 3.25% 0.856 0.9 14 0.6 16 1.002 0.250 1.942 0.330 
3-way Collars 169 3.42% 1.1 87 1.096 0.88 1 1.427 0.250 3.101 0.5 11 
Gas hedging portfol io 3137 1.222 1.111 0.906 1.478 0.250 5 0.559 
maturity 
Panel B: Oil hedgers 
Swap contracts 17 11 45.25% 1.227 1.06 1 0.750 1.530 0.250 3.758 0.644 
Costless Coll ars 1403 37. 11 % 1.221 1.050 0.799 1.500 0.250 4.439 0.62 1 
Put options 448 11.85% 1.083 1 0.750 1.41 6 0.250 2.970 0.548 
Forwards or Futures 105 2.78% 0.818 0.750 0.500 1 0.250 1.750 0.332 
3-way Col lars 11 4 3.02% 1.448 1.230 0.855 1. 840 0.250 4.2 12 0.878 
O il hedging portfolio 2607 1.204 1.061 0.820 1.489 0.250 3.935 0.575 
ma tu rit 
Table 2.2 also shows that gas hedging occurred in 3137 firm-quarters (49 .58% of the 
firm-quarters in the sample) and oil hedging occurred in 2607 firm-quarters ( 41.21% of the 
firm-quarters in the sample). Table 2.2 presents a breakdown ofthe frequency of use for each 
hedging instrument. The most common hedging vehic les used in the oil and gas industry are 
swap contracts, with 45.58% (45.25%) of use in gas (oil) hedging. The second most 
freq uently used instrument is costless collars, with 37.19% (37 .11 %) for gas (oil) hedging. 
Next are put options, with 10.55% for gas hedging and 11 .85% for oi l hedging. The least 
used instruments are forward or futures contracts, with only 3.25% (2.78%) for gas (oil) 
hedging and 3-way collars, with only 3.42% (3.02%) for gas (oil). 
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2.3.2.2 Descriptive statistics: Independent variables 
Descriptive statistics are computed on the pooled dataset. Table 2.3 g1ves the mean, 
median, 1 st quartile, 3rd quartile and standard deviation for the 150 U.S. oit and gas producers 
in the sample. Statistics show that oil and gas producers expend, on average, the equivalent of 
22.37% of the book value of their net property, plant and equipment in exploration and 
reserve acquisition and development. The correlation between internai cash flows and 
investment expenditures has a mean (median) of0.307 (0.373), with one fourth of the sample 
having a correlation less than -0.015 and another fourth a correlation greater than 0.70. These 
two specificities of the frrm's investment programs create opposite effects on the hedging 
needs of oil and gas producers because investment expenditures accentuate these needs and a 
higher positive correlation attenuates them. The two measures of financial constraints, 
namely distance-to-default and the leverage ratio, indicate that oil and gas producers have a 
relatively solid financial situation. Distance-to-default and leverage ratio have, respectively, a 
mean (median) of 2.234 (2.052) and 15 .8% (14.2%), which reflects little variation in the 
financial solvency of the sample firms. 32 Surprisingly, statistics indicate that oil and gas 
producers in financial distress (i.e. , with liquidity below the industry ' s median, and realized 
selling priees insufficient to cover production costs and debt requirements) incurred on 
average distress costs of 2.3$/BOE. However, 75% of the sample does not incur any distress 
costs, and only a few producers have insufficient operating income to meet their debt 
commitments. 
32 Drucker and Puri (2009) examine the secondary market for loan sales in the USA over the 1999-2004 period . 
Usi ng a sample of726 1 loans, they find a mean (median) for Di stance-to-Default of2.304 ( 1.929). Campello et 
al. (20 11 ) study the implications of hedging for corporate financing and investment. Using a dataset of 1185 firms 
over the period 1996-2002, they fi nd a mean (median) for the Distance-to-Default of 2.464 ( 1.861 ). 
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Table 2.3 Summary statistics for sample firms financial and operational characteristics 
Variable Obs Mean Median 1' 1 quartile 3'a quartile Std. Dev 
Variables that proxy for underinvestment costs 
!NV OPP 6,006 0.224 O.ü75 0.041 0.129 3.619 
COR_C!_CF 6, 196 0.307 0.373 -0.0 15 0.693 0.452 
Variables that proxy for financial distress costs 
DTD 5,686 2.234 2.052 1.323 2.862 1.36 1 
LEV 6,063 0.158 0.142 0.053 0.220 0. 153 
D!S_COSTS 6,298 2.347 0 0 0 16.957 
Variables that proxy for production characteristics 
PROD CV 0 /L 6,058 0.416 0.3 13 0. 141 0.587 0.388 
COR_PQ_O!L 6, 119 0.229 0.455 -0.287 0.723 0.587 
PROD CV GAS 6,078 0.408 0.303 0.146 0.582 0.359 
COR_PQ_GAS 6, 112 0.154 0.230 -0 . 174 0.504 0.4 19 
Variables that proxy for managerial risk aversion 
CEO_CS 6,326 28 .983 1.125 0.000 11.563 152.159 
CEO OPT 6,326 174.386 0.000 0.000 120.000 68 1.760 
Variables th at pi'Oxy for tax advantage 
TLCF 6,066 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.438 
TAX SAVE 6,160 0.052 0.048 0.029 O.ü70 0.051 
Variables th at proxy for the asset-liability management 
DEBT MAT 6, 116 2 2 0 3.349 1.640 
RES MAT 0/L 6, 157 9.055 7.542 5.050 10.639 10.846 
RES MAT GAS 6, 180 9.506 7.476 5.206 10.439 10.657 
Note: 
This table provides financial and operational statistics for the 150 US oil and gas producers for the period 1998-
201 O. JNV_OPP for investment opportunities; COR_C!_CF for the correlation between fi·ee cash flows and cost 
incurred; DTD for distance-to-default ; LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the sum of long-term debt in 
current liabilities plus one-halflong-term debt scaled by book value of total assets; D!S_COSTS for distress costs 
(in$); PROD_CV_O!L and PROD_CV_GAS measure the production uncertainty for oil and gas respectively; 
COR_PQ_OJL and COR_PQ_GAS measure the quantity-price correlation for oil and gas respectively; CEO_CS 
for the market value of corn mon shares held by firm 's CEO (in MM$); CEO _ OPT for the number of stock options 
held by firm 's CEO (in 000); TLCF for tax Joss carry-forwards scaled by the book value of total assets; 
TAX_SA VE for the expected percentage of tax saving; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (in years); 
RES_MAT_O!L and RES_MAT_GAS are the expected !ife of proven oil and gas reserves (in years). 
Statistics further show higher production uncertainty, as measured by the coefficient of 
variation in daily production, with a mean (median) of0.41 (0.31) for oil and 0.41 (0 .30) for 
gas production respectively. Interestingly, the price-quantity correlation is relatively positive 
with a mean (median) of 0.23 (0.45) for oil and 0.15 (0.23) for gas. The higher leve) of 
production uncertainty and the positive price-quantity correlation create additional variability 
in generated cash flow, and consequently greater hedging needs for oil and gas producers. 
The tax preference item, measured by the ratio of the book value of tax Joss carry-forwards 
scaled by the book value of total assets, has a mean (median) of 13.42% (0.00%). The 
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expected tax saving benefits of hedging have a mean (median) of 5.24% (4.80%), which are 
quite similar to the findings of previous studies. The manager' s stock and option ownership 
varies considerably, with a mean (median) of 28.983 MM$ (1.125 MM$) for stockholding 
and 174,386 (0.000) for options. Debt maturity has a mean and median of 2 years. Oil and 
gas proven reserves have almost similar expected life durations, with a mean (median) of 9 
(7) years. 
2.4 Econometrie methodology 
The inspection of the time series characteristics of the remaining hedging maturity by 
instrument shows a higher first-order seriai correlation ranging from 0.8 to 0.9. This 
motivates the modeling of the hedging behavior within a dynamic rather than a static 
framework. The general madel ofthe data-generating process is as follows: 
HMi,t.J = p1HMi,t- 1,1 + f3JXi ,t + q;1Y1,c + Ei,t.J + ui,J; IP11 < 1; (i = 1, ... , N: t = 
1, ... ,TJ, (2) 
where H Mi,t ,J is the remaining maturity for hedging instrument j used by frrm i at 
time t. Hedging instrument j might be swaps contracts, put options, costless collars, 
forward and future contracts, or 3-way collars. H Mi,t- 1,1 is the observation on the 
same series for the same frrm in the previous period. Xi.t is a set of observed 
exogenous variables related to investment programs, fmancial distress, taxes, 
managerial risk aversion, production function characteristics, oil and gas market 
conditions and asset-liability management, which may be associated with hedging 
maturity choice for instrument j by frrm i at time t. Xi,t also includes the Inverse 
Mills Ratio coming from the frrst step of the Heckman regression with sample 
selection. }},t contains hedging contract j features at time t, namely, moneyness and 
strike priee. ui,J is the unobserved firm-instrument specifie effects and Ei,J ,t is the 
disturbance term that is assumed to be independent across frrms with 
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E(u .. ) = E(E· · t) = E(u .. E .. t) = O. 1,] 1,] , 1,] 1,], 
We follow Arellano and Baver (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in estimating the 
madel in equation (2) by a Dynamic System-GMM Panel Mode] (SYS-GMM hereafter). We 
choose this special econometrie specification because other econometrie frameworks ( e.g., 
OLS, 2SLS and Within Group estimates) lead to asymptotically inefficient estimates as 
mentioned by Bond (2002), especially for smal l time-series panel data. Moreover, we prefera 
SYS-GMM specification over the Difference-GMM, developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), because the latter mode! suffers from poor finite sample properties in terms of bias 
and precision, especially when the series are close to a random-wa lk, as was subsequently 
weil documented by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
A SYS-GMM33 estimate for dynamic panel data combines moment conditions for the 
mÇ>del in first difference with moment conditions for the madel in leve! which improves the 
estimates even when the series are very persistent. We use two-step estimation, which leads 
to standard errors that are theoretically robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary patterns of 
autocorrelation within individuals, but they are downward biased, as suggested by Roodman 
(2009a). To control for this bias, we implement the Windmeijer (2005) correction for the 
potential downward bias in the standard errors produced by two-step estimation. ln addition, 
two-step estimation allows a robust Hansen J-test, which is not available in one-step 
estimation. Following the good practice guideline suggested by Roodman (2009a, 2009b), 
we report statistics that allow us to test the validity of the econometrie spec ification of the 
estimated SYS-GMM Madel. 
To control for the possibility of sample selection bias, the estimation of ali our models 
was derived in the context of the Two-Step Heckman Regress ion with Selection. This 
procedure captures the sequential decisions of oïl and gas producers: a first decision to hedge 
or not and a second decision about the nature of the hedging strategy. ln the first step, we 
follow the literature and moqel the existence of hedging activity as a function of variables 
33 We estimate the mode! in equation (2) with the user-written command xtabond2 in Stata Software developed by Roodma n 
(2009b). 
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that are conjectured to be determinants of the hedging decision: tax incentives, 1everage ratio, 
liquidity, cash costs, convertible debt, firm market value, sales to capture the market risk 
exposure of firms, and oil and gas reserves quantities that should be qualified as hedging 
substitutes. Table A.2.1 reports the estimation results of the first step. We observe that almost 
ali variables are statistically significant and with appropriate signs, as already obtained in the 
previous literature on the decision to hedge (Tufano, 1996; Graham and Rogers, 2002 ; 
Campe llo et al. , 2011; Dion ne and Triki, 2013 ). 
2.5 Univariate results 
Table 2.4 presents our univariate results, comparing oil and gas producers ' characteristics 
and market conditions, based on the remaining maturities of hedging portfolios (i.e. , a 
simultaneous combination ofhedging instruments). We then classify the remaining weighted-
average maturities as (1) short-term maturities (i .e., below one year ahead), (2) medium-term 
maturities (i.e. , between one and two years ahead), and (3) long-term maturities, exceeding 
two years ahead. Tests of differences between means and medians of relevant variables 
contrast short- and medium-terms to long-term maturities and are conducted for gas and oil 
hedgers separately. Comparison of means is constructed using a t-test assuming unequal 
variances; comparison of medians is constructed using a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum 
Z-test and two-sided p-values are computed. 
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Table 2.4 Characteristics of oil and gas producers and market conditions by hedging maturity 
Characteri sti cs of oil and gas producers and market conditions by hedging maturi ty 
Short Medium Long Short vs. Medium vs. 
Maturi ty Maturity Maturity Long Long 
p-Value p -Va lue p-Value p-Va lue 
Variabl e Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median (Mean) (Med ian) (Mean) (Median) 
Panel A: Gas hedgers 
Financi al distress 
LEV 1287 0.183 0. 160 1555 0.198 0.176 267 0.23 1 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.024 
DTD 127 1 2.305 2.237 15 16 2.402 2.3 12 250 2.6 15 2.3 79 0.002 0.0 19 0.036 0. 173 
DIS_COSTS 1299 1.6 12 0 1569 1339 0 269 2.586 0 0.129 0.000 0.045 0.000 
Underi nvestment costs 
JNV OPP 1284 0.098 O.ü78 153 3 0.111 0.078 268 0. 134 0.068 0.0 16 0.10 1 0.13 1 0.07 1 
COR CI CF 1299 0.41 8 0.502 1569 0.427 0.529 269 0.282 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Production characteristics 
PROD_CV_GAS 1299 0.346 0.266 1569 0.474 0.369 269 0.528 0.439 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.497 
COR_PQ_GAS 1299 0.207 0.306 1569 0.306 0.39 1 269 0.20 1 0.306 0.8 11 0.807 0.000 0.002 
Managerial risk aversion 
CEO_CS 1299 33 .373 3.682 1569 52.285 6.38 1 269 46.969 12.917 0.146 0.000 0.565 0.000 
CEO OPT 1299 203,532 20,000 1569 2 10,3 16 18,655 269 42 1,252 6,000 0.034 0.425 0.043 0.8 14 
Tax incentives 
TAX_SAVE 1287 0.048 0.046 1563 0.050 0.047 269 0.049 0.046 0.686 0.172 0.492 0.634 
TLCF 1287 0.069 0 1554 0.054 0 268 0.037 0 0.000 0.0 18 0.033 0.007 
Asse t-liability management 
RES MA T GAS 1299 7.407 6.642 1569 8.609 7.728 269 10.872 8.826 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DEBT MAT 1299 2. 147 2.200 1569 2.709 3 269 2.666 3 0.000 0.000 0.664 0.495 
Market conditions 
GAS_SPOT 1298 5.049 4.830 1566 5.598 5.530 269 5.357 5.050 0.084 0.070 0. 17 1 0.075 
GAS_ VOL 1298 0.7 14 0.468 1566 0.816 0.622 269 0.788 0.549 0.036 0.002 0.437 0.534 
GAS_RET 1298 0. 121 0.100 1566 0.145 0. 11 0 269 0. 137 0.100 0.227 0.387 0.525 0.60 1 
Pa nel B: Oil hedgers 
Financial distress 
LEV 1172 0.198 0.173 11 69 0.189 0.169 250 0.175 0.163 0.003 0.042 0.046 0.045 
DTD 11 5 1 2.34 1 2.240 11 45 2.379 2.308 240 2.669 2.707 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIS_COSTS 11 77 1.256 0 11 73 1.66 1 0 250 0.899 0 0.45 1 0.9 13 0. 139 0.585 
Underinvestment costs 
INV OPP 11 6 1 0.093 0.068 11 58 0.130 0.079 250 0. 180 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.01 6 0038 
COR_CJ_CF 1180 0.405 0.486 1177 0.457 0.559 250 0.359 0.378 0.11 0 0.073 0000 0.000 
Prod uc ti on ch a racte ristics 
PROD_CV_OIL 11 76 0.374 0.282 11 75 0.464 0.384 234 0.490 0 .3 76 0.000 0.000 0.325 0.808 
COR_PQ_OIL 11 80 0.28 1 0.509 11 75 0.446 0.639 234 0.456 0.574 0.000 0.000 0.748 0.9 16 
Manageria1 risk aversion 
CEO_CS 11 80 57.79 1 3.95 1 1177 52.202 7.002 250 76.033 15.016 0.150 0.000 0.037 0.000 
CEO_OPT 11 80 182,748 50,000 1177 194,666 7 250 448,562 3,2 12 0.024 0.055 0.035 0.445 
Tax Incentives 
TAX_SA VE 11 73 O.ü48 0.047 11 74 0.052 O.ü48 250 0.047 0.046 0.478 0.429 0.0 11 0.07 1 
TLCF 11 72 0.09 1 0 11 69 0.067 0 250 0.034 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Asset-liabili ty management 
RES MAT 0 /L 1180 7.883 6.97 1 1177 8.599 8. 149 250 11 .078 9.972 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DEBT MA T 1180 2.331 2.636 1177 2.715 3 250 2.870 3.037 0.000 0.000 0.148 0.23 3 
Market conditions 
OIL_SPOT 11 79 46.648 32.500 11 77 62 .638 65 .870 250 73.42 1 70.6 10 0.000 0.000 0000 0000 
OIL_ VOL 11 79 3. 168 2.23 3 1177 4.189 3.306 250 4.930 3.654 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
0/L RET 1179 -0.024 -0.023 1177 0.006 0.0 16 250 0.0 19 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
----------------- --- ------------------ - - ------------
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Note: 
This table provides the mean and median valu es of firms' fi nancia l and operational characteri sti cs and market conditions 
according to the weighted-avera ge maturity of the hedging portfolio. For each finn-quarter with hedging activity, a hedging 
portfolio maturity is classified as short-lerm maturity if it is below one year ahead, a medium-term maturi ty ifi t is between one 
and two years ahead, a nd a long-term maturity if it exceeds two years ahead. INV_GPP fo r investment opportun iti es; 
CGR_CI_CF for the correlation between free cash fl ows and cost incurred; DTD for di stance-to-de fault; LEV for the leverage 
ratio measured by the sum of long-lerm debt in current liabilities plus one-half long-term debt sca led by book va lue of total 
assets; DIS_CGSTS for di stress costs (in $); PRGD_CV_GIL and PRGD_CV_GAS measure production uncer1a inty fo r oil and 
gas respectively; CGR_PQ_GIL and CGR_PQ_GAS measure the quantity -price correlati on for oil and gas respecti vely; 
CEG _CS for the market value ofcommon shares held by firm ' s CEO (in MM$); CEG _GPT for the number of stock options held 
by firm ' s CEO (in 000); TLCF for ta x Joss carry-forwards sca led by the book va lue of tota l assets; TAX_SAVE fo r the expected 
percentage of tax saving; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (i n yea rs) ; RES_MAT_GIL a nd RES_MAT_GAS are the 
expected life of proven oil and gas reserves ( in years); GAS_SPGTa nd GIL_SPGTare spot priees; GAS_ VGL and GIL_ VGL are 
hi storical volatilities of spot priees over the current quarter; GAS_RET and GJL_RETare oil and gas returns measured by log( l2-
month future priee/spot priee). Compari son of mea ns is constructed using a /-t est assuming unequal variances; compari son of 
medians is constru cted by using the non-parametri c Wil coxon rank sum Z-score. Two sided p -va lues are reported . 
The univariate tests show considerable number differences between finn-quarters with 
long-term maturities and those with short- or medium-term maturities for o il hedgers and gas 
hedgers separately. Table 2.4 Panel A reports results pertaining to the subsa mple of gas 
hedgers and Panel B presents results for oil hedgers. Results show that oil and gas producers 
with higher distance-to-default tend to choose longer maturities. Results related to the 
leverage ratio are mixed. Although the higher leverage ratio is more related to longer 
maturities for gas hedgers, it seems to be more associated with shorter maturities for oi 1 
hedgers. Counter to our predictions, higher distress costs are more related to long-run 
contracts for gas hedgers. Consistent with our predictions, results further show that oil and 
gas producers with higher growth opportunities prefer long-run hedging contracts, and that 
higher correlation between free cash flows and investment expenditures motivates the use of 
short- and medium-term contracts. 
Univariate tests a lso show that oil and gas producers with higher production uncerta inty 
tend to use long maturity contracts. This is inconsistent with the prediction that higher 
production uncertainty makes firms reluctant to make a large hedge for more distant 
exposures. We find that price-quantity correlation is more closely re lated to medium-term 
contracts for gas hedgers, and to long-term contracts for oil hedgers. In sum, these findings 
corroborate our predict ion that fir ms with higher price-quantity correlation tend to use longer 
maturities because their cash flows are more volati le. Consistent with our prediction, the 
Wilcoxon test for difference in medians shows that higher CEO stake value in the firm is 
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more related to long maturity contracts. In contrast, higher CEO option-holdings are 
associated with long-term contracts, which contradicts the prediction that a manager with a 
convex utility in finn value has a disincentive to undertake corporate hedging. 
Univariate tests pertaining to tax incentives indicate that medium-term hedging is related 
to a higher percentage of tax savings for oit hedgers. Consistent with our prediction, oit and 
gas producers with higher tax loss carry-forwards tend to use short maturity hedging. 1 n 
addition, oi t and gas producers with remaining longer maturities of debt and proven reserves 
tend to choose long-run contracts. This corroborates the asset- liability management 
argument. As predicted, results pertaining to market conditions suggest that higher spot 
priees and volatilities are more associated with medium-term contracts for gas hedgers and 
longer contracts for oit hedgers. Conversely, when oil future priees are anticipated to be 
higher, oil hedgers tend to prefer long maturity contracts. 
Table 2.5 presents our results, comparing the moneyness and strike priees of hedging 
instruments based on their remaining maturities. Table 2.5 Panel A reports results pertaining 
to gas hedgers and Panel B presents results for oit hedgers. For conciseness, we concentrate 
our analysis on the three major hedging instruments used by oit and producers: swap 
contracts, put options and costless collars.34 For oit hedgers, we find that swap contracts with 
the longest maturities have the lowest moneyness as measured by the strike priee minus the 
spot priee. One explanation would be that firms are reluctant to exit out-of-the-money swaps 
prior to the agreed-upon termination date due to the termination costs. Consistent with our 
prediction, results also show that higher strike priees are more related to medium-term swaps 
for gas hedgers and to long-term swaps for oil hedgers. We furth er find that higher 
moneyness and strike priees are more related to medium-term put options in the case of gas 
hedging. As predicted, longer term put options are more associated with higher strike priees 
for oil hedgers. Consistent with predictions, longer term collars are related to higher 
moneyness and strike priees for both o it and gas hedgers. 
34 We skip the observations related to forwa.rd/futures contracts because they contribute to only 3.25% of gas 
hedging act ivity and 2.78% of oil hedging activity. We also omit observations related to three-way col lars because 
they are used in only 3.42% of cases for gas hedging activity and 3.02% of cases for oi l hedging. 
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2.6 Maturity structure of corporate risk management 
To investigate the determinants of hedging maturity choice by oïl and gas producers, we 
estimate the dynamic panel regression using a two-step SYS-GMM35 mode! as presented 
previously. In these regressions, the weighted-average remaining maturity is regressed on 
variables that measure underinvestment costs, financial distress costs, production function 
characteristics, managerial risk aversion, tax incentives, market conditions, asset-liability 
management and contract features. Many specifications of the SYS-GMM are estimated for 
the subset of oïl hedgers and gas hedgers separately and for the following major hedging 
instruments used: swap contracts, put options and costless collars. We based our analysis on 
remaining maturity by instrument rather than the whole hedging portfolio to get more insights 
into the hedging dynamics of oïl and gas producers. 
35 Following the good practice gu ideline suggested by Roodman (2009a and 2009b), we use ali available lags of 
the dependent variabl es as instruments to retain more information. We also apply a collapsing technique to avoid 
instrument proli feration that weakens the Hansen test instrument validity. We further repo1t: (i) the number of 
instruments generated for the regression, (ii) the Hansen J-test stati stics and p-value, and (iii) the Arellano-Bond 
test for a second-order seria i correlation in residuals (i.e. , AR (2) test). 
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Table 2.6 Maturity structure by gas hedgers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Swap Swap Swap Swap Put Put Put Put Costless Costless Costless Costless 
contracts contracts contracts contracts o~tions o~tions o~tions o2tions collars collars co !lars collars 
INV_OPP 0.3292""" 0.3468""" 0.2735"" 0.3192""" 0.0695 0.0634 
(0.089) (0.082) (0.114) (0.108) (0.086) (0.079) 
COR_ CL CF -0.0437 -0 0026 -0.1851"" -0.2055"" -0.0028 0.0599 
(0.042) (0.048) (0.081) (0.099) (0.044) (0.043) 
LEV 1.3438""" 1.4572""" 1.3907""" 3.2410""" 0.8867""" 1.0542""" 
(0.280) (0.281) (0.424) (0.600) (0.184) (0.175) 
LEV_SQUARE -0.9482""" -1.1349""" -1.3725 -5.4469""" -0.5349""" -0.6324""" 
(0.360) (0.402) (0.866) (1.456) (0.130) (0.170) 
DTD 0.0994""" 0.0115 0.1499""" 
(0.029) (0.050) (0.032) 
DTD_SQUARE -0.0087" 0.0062 -0.0237""" 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
0/S_COSTS 0.0041 0.0028 0.0069 0.0081" 0.0014 0.0001 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) 
PROD_CV_ GAS 0.0734 0.1487"" 0.0923 0.0765 0.1273""" 0.1439""" 
(0.051) (0.057) (0.101) (0.102) (0.047) (0.052) 
COR_PQ_GAS 0.0550 -0.0073 0.007 1 0.0110 0.0940"" 0.0031 
(0.051) (0.045) (0.083) (0.078) (0.042) (0.039) 
GAS_ VOL 0.0555··· 0.0541""" 0.1128""" 0.1287""" 0.0482"" 0.0425"" 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019) 
GAS_RET -0.1307" -0.1572"" -0.4896""" -0.4689""" -0.2587""" -0.2710""" 
(0.070) (0.069) (0.142) (0.130) (0.070) (0.076) 
GAS_SPOT 0.1309""" 0.1457""" 0.0997""" 
(0.016) (0.029) (0.017) 
GAS_SPOT_SQUARE -a.oo8o··· -0.0074""" -0.0047""" 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
MONEYNESS 0.0144" 0.0209 ... 0.0158 0.0161 0.0109 0.0142" 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) 
STRIKE 0.0299""" 0.0384""" 0.0222""" 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) 
TLCF -0.3411""" -0.3849""" -0.3462""" -0.4941""" -0.0611 " -0.1061"" 
(0.062) (0.142) (0.050) (0.178) (0.036) (0.041) 
TAX_SAVE -0.0491 0.2914 0.0389 1.9730"" 0.4577 0.7561"" 
(0.140) (0.235) (0.848) (0.764) (0.409) (0.340) 
DEBT_MAT 0.0396""" 0.0368""" 0.0082 -0.0146 0.0307""" 0.0337""" 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) 
RES_MAT_GAS 0.0184""" 0.0188""" 0.0212""" 0.0208""" 0.0228""" 0.020o··· 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
CEO_CS 0.1218 0.1756 -0.2095 0.2573 0.1841 0.1322 
(0.114) (0.154) (0.330) (0.326) (0.148) (0.121) 
CEO_OPT 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002""" -0.0001"" 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMR 0.1829""" 0.1002"" 0.1202"" 0.2569""" 0.1225" 0.0851 0.1181" 0.2251""" 0.1288""" 0.0583 0.0597 0.1734""" 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.057) (0.063) (0.065) (0.083) (0.061) (0.082) (0.047) (0.046) (0.049) (0.051) 
LAG_1 0.5597""" 0.5836""" 0.5834""" 0.5742""" 0.4892" .. 0.5592""" 0.5120""" 0.4766 ... 0.5816""" 0.6043""" 0.5918""" 0.6044""" 
(0.053) (0.044) (0.051) (0.050) (0.080) (0.094) (0.074) (0.081) (0.049) (0.051) (0.053) (0.047) 
LAG_2 -0.0289 
0.022 
Observations 2,123 2,129 2,096 2,108 480 485 478 480 1,726 1,746 1,699 1,745 
Number of firms 99 100 99 99 44 49 43 44 93 95 93 94 
Number of instruments 63.0000 61 .0000 63.0000 62.0000 63.0000 61 .0000 63.0000 62.0000 63.0000 61 .0000 63.0000 62.0000 
F statistic 409.4175 705.0217 428.2656 433.7338 173.8287 182.3584 227.4729 200.8200 412.9824 570.3112 601.2629 575.2583 
p value F statistic 0.0000 00000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J statistic 63.8114 53.8975 62.5987 59.8964 36.6077 30.6516 36.9887 33.0220 60.9116 52.6989 56.9287 60.2093 
p value of Hansen statistic 0.1074 0.3641 0.1279 0.1595 0.9356 0.9893 0.9295 0.9761 0.1613 0.4082 0.2640 0.1769 
AR(2) test statistic -1.4614 -1.3744 -1.6156 -0.7854 -0.6087 -0.9605 -0.3671 -1.4434 -1 .3989 -0.8421 -1.3168 -1.5502 
p value of AR(2) statistic 0.1439 0.1693 0.1062 0.4322 0.5427 0.3368 0.7136 0.1489 0.1618 0.3997 0.1879 0.1211 
Sigma e 0.3393 0.4425 0.3471 0.3459 0.3049 0.4605 0.3100 0.3164 0.3175 0.4135 0.3194 0.3277 
Note: 
This table provides the two-step SYS-GMM result s for the determinants of the weighted-average remaining maturity for swap contracts, put optio ns and 
costless collars respectively. The results are for the subsample of gas hedgers. INV_OPP for investment opportunities; COR_C!_CF for the correlation 
between free cash tlows and cast incurred; LEV for the l everage ratio measured by the sum of long-term debt in current liab ilities plus one-half long lerm 
debt scaled by book va lue of total assets; LEV_SQUARED is the leverage rat io squared; DTD for distance-to-default; DTD_SQUA RED for the distance to 
default squared; DIS_COSTS for di stress costs ( in $/BOE); PROD_CV_GAS measures gas production uncertainty ; COR_PQ_GAS m easures the gas 
quantity-price correlat ion; GAS_ VOL for gas priee volatility ; GAS_RET for gas return as measured by log(gas 12-month future priee/gas sport priee); 
GAS_SPOT and GAS_SPOT_SQUA RED are for gas spot priee and gas priee squared; MONE YNESS measured by the contract strike priee minu s the 
averag e spot priee during the current quarter; STRIKE is the contract' s strike priee; TLCF for tax Joss carry - forwards scaled by the book value of tota l 
assets; TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage oftax saving; DEBT_ MAT is the long-lerm debt matmity ( in years) ; RES_ MAT_ GAS are the expected !ife 
of proven ail and gas reserves ( in years); CEO _CS for the market va lu e of common shares held by finn ' s CEO (in logarithm); CEO _OPT for the number of 
stock options held by firm ' s CEO (in 000); IMR is the inverse Mill s Ratio (Table A.2 . 1); LAG_! is the dependent variable first lag; LAG_2 is the dependent 
variable second lag (used w hen there is second -arder seriai correla tion in the error term). Standard errors are clu stered by firm and incorporate the 
Windmeij er (2005) correction, in parentheses. ***Significant at the l% leve!, ** Significant at the 5% leve!, * Significant at the 10% l eve!. 
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Table 2.7 Maturity structure by oi l hedgers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Swap Swap Swap Swap Put Put Put Put Costless Costless Costless Costless 
contracts contracts contracts contracts oetions o~tions o~tions OE!tions Cotlars Col lars Coll ars Col lars 
INV_OPP 0.2623"" 0.2200 .. 0.5839 •• 0.5923 •• 0.1001. 0.0916. 
(0.129) (0.110) (0.222) (0.235) (0.052) (0.052) 
COR_ Cf_ CF -0.1294·· · -0.0818. 0.0487 0.0533 0.0213 0.0302 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.076) (0.094) (0.052) (0.059) 
LEV 0.5090" 0.8594··· 1.5182. 1.6283•• 1.1577••• o.823r·· 
(0.265) (0.256) (0.803) (0.760) (0.348) (0.208) 
LEV_ SQUARE -0.2940 -0.7017". -1.5120 -1 .3516 -1.4545··· -0.9989··· 
(0.402) (0.349) (2.053) (1.702) (0.522) (0.292) 
DTD 0.0729 •• 0.2709··· 0.1614··· 
(0.029) (0.075) (0.055) 
OTD_SQUARE -0.0049 -0.0474••• -0.023o·· 
(0.003) (0.015) (0.010) 
0/S_COSTS 0.0011 -0.0006 0.0146··· 0.0103··· 0.0003 0.0005 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
PROO_CV_O/L 0.1090" 0.1260• 0.0089 0.0109 -0.0404 -0.0797 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.119) (0.104) (0.062) (0.059) 
COR_PQ_OIL 0.0590 0.0001 0.0217 -0.0442 0.0983 •• 0.0427 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.084) (0.084) (0.048) (0.046) 
OIL_VOL 0.0189··· 0.0206··· 0.0159 •• 0.0205 •• 0.0133 •• 0.017o··· 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
0/L_RET -0.0313 O.D165 -0.3799 -0.3938 -0.2188 -0.0051 
(0.195) (0.209) (0.495) (0.504) (0.230) (0.215) 
0/L_SPOT 0.0149··· 0.0043 o.oo8o··· 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
0/L_SPOT_SQUARE -0.0001 ··· -0.0000 -a.oooo·· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MONEYNESS 0.0028". 0.0033··· 0.0015 0.0031 0.003?"·· 0.0044··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
STRIKE 0.005?"·· 0.0037" •• 0.0033··· 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
TLCF -0.394o··· -0.568o··· -0.264o··· -0.4791··· -0.0531 -0.0813 
(0.082) (0.134) (0.062) (0.163) (0.059) (0.052) 
TAX_SAVE 0.1945 0.1802 0.1319 0.9001 0.1094 0.0787 
(0.154) (0.140) (0.612) (0.583) (0.286) (0.273) 
DEBT_ MAT 0.0416··· 0.042o··· 0.0280 -0.0006 0.031o··· 0 .026o·· 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) (0.011) (0.010) 
RES_MAT_OIL 0.0311··· 0.0272••• 0.0119 •• 0.0052 0.0182""• 0.0161··· 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
CEO_CS -0.1633 -0.0628 -0.3542 -0.3388 -0.0665 -0.1324 
(0.137) (0.139) (0.318) (0.343) (0.140) (0.146) 
CEO_OPT 0.0002. 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
/MR 0.1311 .. 0.1470"" 0.1049. 0.2848··· 0.1382". 0.2096""" 0.0121 0.18oo··· 0.2054"" " 0.1265"" 0.1797"" 0 .1946""" 
(0.059) (0.071) (0.060) (0.062) (0.059) (0.066) (0.052) (0.052) (0.068) (0.049) (0.068) (0.044) 
LAG_1 0.563o··· 0.5548··· o.5728··· 0.5490 ... 0.4545··· 0.5872••• 0.476o··· 0.5211··· 0.5858··· o.6229··· 0.5745··· 0 .6256··· 
(0.039) (0.046) (0.042) (0.046) (0.063) (0.062) (0.084) (0.076) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.035) 
LAG_2 -0.0496 •• -0.0696··· -0.0432 •• -0.0529·· 
(0.020) (0.023) (0020) (0.020) 
Observations 1,593 1,608 1,572 1,608 402 417 393 414 1,331 1,351 1,311 1,351 
Number of firms 88 89 88 89 36 40 35 37 81 81 81 81 
Number of instruments 63.0000 61 .0000 63.0000 62.0000 57 .0000 57 .0000 57.0000 56.0000 63.0000 61.0000 63.0000 62.0000 
F statistic 293.9642 413.6701 255.7297 280.9298 128.4730 176.0464 102.0687 336.8433 280.2979 444.6558 275.8100 318.6617 
p value F statislic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 
Hansen J statistic 51.8717 51.3504 55.6423 54.2101 29.0451 28.2022 27.3456 35.4909 59.4069 46.4226 56.9199 53.5233 
p value of Hansen statistic 0.4007 0.4206 0.2708 0.3170 0.9688 0.9865 0.9825 0.8441 0.1960 0.6558 0.2642 0.3777 
AR(2) test statistic -1 .0896 0.1353 -1 .2967 -0.7639 0.5991 1.4030 1.0248 1.2104 0.8288 0.2945 0.9272 1.0881 
p value of AR(2) statistic 0.2759 0.8923 0.1947 0.4449 0.5491 0.1606 0.3055 0.2261 0.4072 0.7684 0.3538 0.2766 
Si2ma e 0.3144 0.4310 0.3160 0.3163 0.3038 0.4969 0.3079 0.3177 0.3374 0.4834 0.3324 0.3533 
Note: 
This table provides the two-step SYS -G MM results for the determinants of the weighted-average remaining marurity for swap contracts, put options and 
costless co llars respective! y. The results are for the subsample of oil hedgers. INV_OPP for investment opportun ities; COR_ Cl_ CF for the correlation between 
free cash flows and cost incurred; LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the sum oflong-term debt in current liabilities plus one-half long lerm debt scaled by 
book va lu e of total assets; LE V_SQUARED is the leverage ratio squared; DTD for dista nce-to-default; DTD_SQUARED for distance-to-default squared; 
DIS_COSTS for distress costs (in $/BOE); PROD_CV_OIL measures oil production uncertainty; COR_PQ_OIL measures the oil quantity-price correlation, 
OIL_ VOL for oil priee volatility; OIL_RET for oil return as measured by log(oi l 12-month future price/oi l sport priee); 0 /L_SPOTand OIL_SPOT_SQUARED 
are for oil spot priee and oi l priee squared; MONEYNESS measured by the contract strike priee minu s the average spot priee during the current quarter; 
STRIKE is the contract's strike priee; TLCF for tax Joss carry-forwards scaled by the book value of total assets; TAX_SA VE for the expected percentage oftax 
saving; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (in years); RES_MAT_OIL are the expected li fe of proven oil and gas reserves (in years); CEO_CS for the 
market value of common shares held by firm ' s CEO (in logarithm); CEO_OPT for the number of stock options held by firm ' s CEO (in 000); IMR is the inverse 
Mi Il s Rat io (Table A.2.1 ); LAG _1 is the dependent variable fi rst Jag; LAG _2 is the dependent variable second lag (used when the re are second order seriai 
correlation in the error term). Standard errors are clustered by firm and incorpora te the Windmeijer (2005) correction, in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% 
level, ** Significant at the 5% levcl , * Significant at the JO% leve!. 
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The results in Tables 2.6 (gas hedgers) and 2.7 (oil hedgers) are generally consistent with 
hypotheses pertaining to underinvestment costs. In particular, oil and gas producers with 
higher future investment opportunities (INV_ OP P) tend to use longer term swap contracts, 
put options and costless col lars. Oil and gas producers with substantial growth opportun ities 
employ hedging contracts with longer maturities to reduce any shortfall in their future cash 
flows and hence avoid both cutting planned investment programs and cost ly externa l 
financi ng. We a lso find a significant negative effect of the correlation between investment 
expenditures and internally generated cash flows (COR_CI_CF) and hedging contract 
horizon because firms benefit from a natural hedge. We find that the remaining maturities of 
put options and swap contracts decline with this positive corre lation for gas hedgers and oïl 
hedgers respectively. The impacts on cost less co llars' maturities are mixed and insignificant. 
Interestingly, results reveal opposite effects of firm 's investment specificities on hedging 
maturity structure: growth options accentuate future funding needs and a positive correlation 
dampens this need. These opposite effects are essentia lly driven by the simu ltaneous positive 
impacts of current oil and gas priees on future investment opportunities and present cash 
intlows. 
The results pertaining to financial distress give strong ev idence of the non-monotonie 
relationship between hedging horizons and the likelihood of financial distress . In line with 
Feh le and Tsyplakov's (2005) prediction, we find that the leverage ratio (LEV) and the 
leverage squared (LEV_ SQUARE) have highly significant positive and negative coefficients 
respectively for both subsets of gas hedgers and oï l hedgers, for the three hedging 
instruments.36 These non-monotonie (concave) relationships mean that hedging maturities 
should first increase and then decrease with the likelihood of financial distress. To further 
investigate this non-monotonie relationship empirically, we use an alternative robust measure 
ofthe likelihood offinancial distress, namely, distance-to-default. Interestingly, results show 
that remaining maturity should increase and decrease with the distance to default. Generally, 
we find that Distance-to-Default (DTD) and its squared value (DTD _SQUARE) are 
respectively significantly positively and negatively related to hedging instrument maturity. 
The non-monotonie relationship between hedging maturity and leverage ratio is shown, for 
36 As robustness checks, we measure the leverage ratio by: (i) long-term debt in CUITent liabilities plus long-term 
debt scaled by total assets, (ii) long-term debt scaled by total assets. Results are the same. 
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each hedging instrument, in Figure 2.1 for gas hedgers and in Figure 2.2 for oil hedgers. 
These figures show that this non-monotonie relationship is more pronounced for put options 
for gas hedgers and for costless collars for oil hedgers. 
Gas hedgers: 
Non-monotonie relation between hedging maturity and leverage 
x xxx 
__ ,....,_2_<_ ___ __ x ___ _ 
x x 
Leve rage 
• Swap contracts 
• Put options 
" Costless col lars 
x Fehle and Tsyplakov 
(2005) 
Figure 2.1 Non-monotonie relationship between hedging maturity and leverage for gas hedgers 
Note: 
This fi gure illustrates the relation between hedging matur ity and leverage rat io by: Maturity = a x 
LEV+ {3 x LEV 2 with a and {3 coming from the estimation of our base mode! SYS-GMM in table 6. 
The coefficients a and {3 equal 1.45 and -1 .13 for swap contracts, 3.24 and -5.44 for put options, and 1.05 
and -0.63 for costless col l ars (see Table 6 Col umns 4, 8 and 12). For Fehle and Tsypl akov (2005), a and {3 
equal 0.70 and -0.69 (see Table 15, pp.40 from Fehl e and Tsyplakov, 2005). 
Oil hedgers: 
Non-monotonie relation between hedging maturity and leve rage 
~ ,_ x 
x 
x X X x 
x _____ _){ __ ·····------·- ···------·----
x 
ro ------------------------------~----------------~ x 
E ······~ -. ~ - -x-----.-.-------·-m---- X • --~~--
~ x .:: t t tH!!::··~ ·· • 1* •• --- ---··-·--·-····-·-·-·------·-·-··-··········-··-· -·-------~-
Leverage 
+ Swap contracts 
• Put options 
A Costless col lars 
x Fehle and Tsyplakov 
(2005) 
Figure 2.2 Non-monotonie relationship between hedging maturity and leverage for oil hedgers 
Note: 
This figure illustrates the relation between hedging maturity and leverage ratio by: Maturity =a x 
LEV + f3 x LEV 2 with a and f3 coming fi·om the estimation of our base mode! SYS-GMM in Table 7. 
The coefficients a and f3 equal 0.86 and -0.70 for swap contracts, 1.63 and -1.35 for put options, and 0.82 
and -1.00 for costless col lars (see Table 7 Columns 4, 8 and 12). For Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005), a and f3 
equal 0.70 and -0.69 (see Table 15, pp.40 from Fehle and Tsyplakov, 2005). 
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In contrast with our hypotheses, we find that distressed oi l and gas producers incurring a 
higher dollar loss per Barrel of Oi l Equivalènt (DIS_COSTS) tend to use put opt ions with 
longer maturities. This empir ica l findi ng contradicts the simu lation resu lts of Feh le and 
Tsyplakov (2005), who find that firms incurring higher distress costs tend to use short-term 
hedging contracts. A possible explanation comes from Jensen and Meckling's (1976) risk 
shifting (or asset substitution) approach. By entering costly long-term put options, distressed 
oi l and gas producers increase rather than eliminate the firm's payoff volatility, decrease 
assets available for debtholders and preserve any upside potential for shareholders. 
Results further indicate that oil and gas producers with higher production uncertainty 
(PROD_CV_OIL and PROD_C V_GAS) tend to use long-term swap contracts and costless 
collars. The impact on put options ' maturities is also positive but not significant. This finding 
contradicts Brown and Toft (2002), who assert that higher production uncertaù1ty makes 
firms reluctant to hedge farther exposures. As predicted, we find that higher price-quantity 
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correlations (COR_PQ_OIL and COR_PQ_GAS) motivate oïl and gas hedgers to use more 
distant costless collar positions. A higher price-quantity correlation induces higher finn cash 
flow volatility because both priees and quantities are moving in the same direction. 
Altogether, we find that oil and gas producers with higher cash flow volatility, due to higher 
production uncertainty and/or higher price-quantity correlation, tend to use longer hedging 
positions to avoid shortfalls in their future revenues . 
The results for variables pertaining to market conditions are highly consistent with our 
predictions. We find that ail and gas priee volatilities (OIL_ VOL and GAS_ VOL) are 
signifieantly positively related to longer maturities for the three hedging instruments. This 
corroborates the simulation results of Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005), namely that in a higher 
priee fluctuation environment, firms tend to refrain from costly early termination of their 
outstanding eontraets unless spot priees inerease s ignificantly. We further find that when 
future gas priees are expected to be higher, as measured by GAS_ RET, gas hedgers tend to 
use short-term hedging. This is consistent with the prediction that when future priees are 
expeeted to be higher, firms tend to terminate their outstanding contraets and initiate new 
hedging contracts with higher exercise priees. In addition, these newly initiated contracts 
have short maturities to prevent them from being worthless in the future. Surprisingly, 
expeeted tendeney in future oïl priees, as measured by OIL _RET, has the predieted negative 
sign but no significant impact. 37 
Our results also provide strong evidence of a non-monotonie relationship between spot 
priees and hedging maturities, as conjectured by Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005). We find that 
oil and gas spot priees ( OIL _SPOT and GAS_ SPOT) and the spot priees squared 
(OIL_SPOT_SQUARE and GAS_SPOT_SQUARE) have highly significant positive and 
negative coefficients respectively, yielding a non-monotonie relationship. Accordingly, when 
spot priees are either very high or very law, firms are more likely to choose short-term 
hedging contracts. This corroborates the non-monotonie relationship between financial 
distress likelihood measures (i.e., leverage ratio and distance-to-default) and hedging 
37 We further investigate the effects of anticipated oil and gas priees, as observed in the future contracts market, 
on hedging maturity choice by using the following Futures terms: three, six, fifteen, eighteen and twenty four 
months ahead. Our results are unchanged with 12-month future contracts. 
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maturity. When spot priees are very high or low, firms are more like ly to be far from or deep 
in finaneial distress respeetively. Figures 3 and 4 show the non-monotonie relationship 
between hedging maturity and spot priees for gas hedgers and oi l hedgers separately. The 
non-monotonie relationship is more evident for swap eontraets for oil hedgers. 
Note: 
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Gas hedgers: 
Non-monotonie relation between hedging maturity and gas spot priee 
--·····---------------- ................. _________________________ _____________________ _ 
.·· ·· ·:: tt 
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------------f-~--.-..4 .. ____________ ~----------· 
' Â ·- - --rA_&.____________________ . ---------------------
1 
Gas spot priee ($/MMBTU) 
+ Swap contracts 
1111 Put options 
A. Cost less col lars 
Figure 2.3 Non-monotonie relationship between hedging maturity and gas 
spot priees for gas hedgers 
This figure illustrates the relation between hedging maturity and leverage ratio by: Maturity =a x 
GAS_SPOT + f3 x GAS_SPOT 2 with a and f3 coming from the estimation of our base mode! SYS-GMM 
in Table 6. The coefficients a and f3 equal 0.13 1 and -0.008 for swap contracts, 0.146 and -0.007 for put 
options, and 0.100 and -0.005 for costl ess coll a rs (see Table 6 Columns 2, 6 and 1 0). 
-----, 
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• Swap contracts 
Ill Put options 
A Cost less col lars 
Oil spot priee ($/barrel) 
Figure 2.4 Non-monotonie relationship between hedging maturity and oil spot priees for oi l hedgers 
Note: 
This fi gure illustrates the relation between hedging maturity and leverage ratio by: Maturity =a x 
OIL_SPOT + {3 x OIL_SPOT 2 with a and {3 coming fi·om the estimation of our base mode! SYS-GMM 
in Table 7. The coefficients a and {3 equal 0.015 and -0.0001 for swap contracts, 0.0043 and -0.00000185 
for put options, and 0.008 and -0.00004 for costless coll ars (see Table 7 Columns 2, 6 and 1 0). 
Hedging contract features appear to have an evident impact on hedging maturity choice. 
Results show that swap contracts and costless collars with higher MONEYNESS (e.g., strike 
priees higher than current spot priees) tend to have longer maturities. For put options, 
moneyness has the predicted sign but no significant impact. As predicted, oi l and gas 
producers keep in-the-money hedging contracts until they mature and ear ly terminate out-of-
the-money contracts. Results also indicate that when hedging contracts are initiated at 
sufficiently higher priees (STRJKE) they are more likely to be kept for longer periods. 
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Consistent with our expectations, we find that oil and gas producers with higher tax loss 
carry-forwards (TLCF) choose short-term hedging maturities. Tax loss carry-forwards thus 
seem to be a disincentive to hedge longer exposures because they reduce firms ' future tax 
liabilities. This corroborates the argument of Graham and Rogers (2002) that tax loss carry-
forwards are uncorrelated with tax function convexity. As predicted, results further show a 
significant positive association between tax function convexity (TAX_SAVE) and put option 
and costless collar maturities for gas hedgers, in particular. For oil hedgers, the tax function 
convexity measure has the predicted sign but no significant impact. 
Results for variables pertaining to asset-liability management are as predicted. We find 
that oil and gas producers with longer average debt maturity (DEBT_MAT) tend to use more 
distant swap and collar positions. 38 Average debt maturity appears to have no significant 
impact on put option maturity. We document strong evidence of a pos itive impact of the 
expected !ife duration of proven oil and gas reserves (RES_MAT_OIL and RES_MAT_GAS) 
on maturities of the three hedging instruments. These resu lts suggest that oil and gas 
producers seek to match the maturities of the ir hedging and the maturities of the ir assets and 
debt. The CEO' s stake value in the firm ( CEO _CS) seems to have no impact on hedging 
maturity choice. CEO option-holding has a mixed impact. Although CEO option-holding 
(CEO _ OPT) is negatively related to collar maturities for gas hedgers, it is positively related 
to swap maturities for oil hedgers. 
38 We use an alternati ve measure of average debt maturity as described by Eisdorfer (2008). The fi rm 's average 
debt matur ity is estimated by: f = T~ (0.5 STD + 5 LTD) where TD, STD, and LTD are the book values of total, 
short-term, and long-term debt. Our results are the same. 
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2. 7 Robustness checks 
In this section, we investigate the empirical relevance of our predictions and our previous 
findings by: (i) studying maturity choice at hedging contract inception, (ii) and investigating 
the determinants of the early termination of outstanding hedging contracts. 
2. 7.1 Maturity choice at the inception of the hedging contract 
We skim the time series of the weighted-average maturity by hedging instrument and 
detect initiation dates by choosing observations where the observed maturity at time T is 
superior to the one at time T-1 . We runa poo led cross-sectional ti me-series regression of the 
weighted-average maturities at the inception dates on firm 's fundamentals , production 
function characteristics and oi l and gas market cond itions. Table 2.8 and 2.9 report the 
regression results for gas hedgers and oil hedgers separately. 
Variables 
INV_ OPP 
COR_CI_CF 
LEV 
LEV_SQUARE 
DTD 
DTD_SQUARE 
0/S_COSTS 
PROD_CV_GAS 
COR_PQ_ GAS 
GAS_VOL 
GAS_RET 
GAS_SPOT 
GAS_ SPOT_ SQUARE 
S TRIKE 
TLCF 
TAX_SA VE 
DEBT_MAT 
RES_ MAT_GAS 
CEO_CS 
CEO_OPT 
IMR 
CONSTANT 
Observations 
R-sguared 
Note: 
Table 2.8 Maturity choice at the inception ofhedging contracts by gas hedgers 
(1) 
Swap 
contracts 
0.0026 
(0.109) 
-0.5737' 
(0.343) 
1.0634"' 
(0.306) 
0.0294 
(0.054) 
-0.1624" 
(0.072) 
-0.0259 
(0.041) 
0.0015 
(0.132) 
-1.4783' 
(0.873) 
0.0142'" 
(0.005) 
-0.3736'" 
(0.060) 
1.6506'" 
(0.112) 
733 
0.0799 
(2) 
Swap 
contracts 
-0.2297'" 
(0.063) 
0.0057" 
(0.003) 
-0.0159 
(0.035) 
0.0010 
(0.003) 
-0.5876'" 
(0.142) 
0.0152 
(0.013) 
0.2019 
(0.258) 
0.0007 
(0.001) 
-0.2885" ' 
(0.057) 
1.6762'" 
(0.124) 
735 
0.0825 
(3) 
Swap 
contracts 
0.0146 
(0.111) 
-0.0023 
(0.040) 
0.0025 
(0.006) 
0.0257 
(0.057) 
-0.1725" 
(0.067) 
-0.0364 
(0.039) 
-0.0392 
(0.126) 
(4) 
Swap 
contracts 
-0.2398'" 
(0.071) 
-0.9896" 
(0.408) 
1.11 76'" 
(0.333) 
0.0055" 
(0.002) 
-0.0141 
(0.010) 
(5) 
Put 
options 
-0.0512 
(0.140) 
1.9823" 
(0.784) 
-2.5490" 
(1.280) 
0.2925" 
(0.114) 
-0.1216 
(0.092) 
0 .0072 
(0.055) 
-0.1774 
(0.170) 
(6) 
Put 
options 
-0.4763'" 
(0.120) 
0.0036 
(0.005) 
0 .0524 
(0.040) 
-0.0028 
(0.003) 
-0.5165' " -0.7963'" 
(0. 147) (0. 198) 
-1 .5711' -0.1894 
(0.841) (0.878) 
0.0188 0.0068 
(0.013) (0.020) 
0.0120"' O. 0320'" 
(0.004) (0.007) 
-0.3237'" 
(0.060) 
1.5977'" 
(0.115) 
726 
0.0649 
0.1969 
(0.269) 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
-0.3941--
(0.071 ) 
1.8711'" 
(0.147) 
735 
0.0948 
-0.0970 
(0.112) 
0.6523'" 
(0.194) 
168 
0.2083 
-0.0600 
(0.297) 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
-0.3959'" 
(0.108) 
1.4443'" 
(0.181) 
168 
0.2047 
(7) 
Put 
options 
-0.0371 
(0.151) 
-0.1624 
(0.119) 
0.0253 
(0.021) 
0.2413" 
(0.121) 
-0. 1775' 
(0.091) 
-0.0135 
(0.053) 
-0.1942 
(0.163) 
-0.3458 
(0 .831) 
0.0281'" 
(0.007) 
-0.3236'" 
(0 .095) 
1.3201'" 
(0.212) 
167 
0.1947 
(8) 
Put 
options 
-0.4721 '" 
(0.137) 
1.5209 
(1.168) 
-2.8874 
(2.469) 
0.0056 
(0.005) 
0.0260" 
(0.012) 
-0.6928'" 
(0.208) 
-0.0029 
(0.020) 
0.1344 
(0.360) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
-0.2614 
(0.158) 
1.2623'" 
(0.261) 
163 
0.1898 
(9) 
Costless 
co llars 
0.1862" 
(0.082) 
0.4274 
(0.329) 
-0.3952 
(0.320) 
0.2699'" 
(0.057) 
0.0628 
(0.053) 
0.0377 
(0.038) 
-0.0055 
(0.100) 
0.2650 
(0.201) 
0.0128" 
(0.005) 
-0.3176'" 
(0.070) 
1.0725'" 
(0.098) 
603 
0.1236 
(10) 
Costless 
co !lars 
-0.0388 
(0.055) 
0.0015 
(0.002) 
0.0654" 
(0.027) 
-0.0032 
(0.002) 
-0.0835 
(0.152) 
0.0242" 
(0.011) 
0.4796" 
(0.205) 
0.0001 
(0.000) 
-0.2978"' 
(0.073) 
1.1194'" 
(0.096) 
608 
0.0872 
(11) 
Costless 
collars 
0.1876" 
(0.079) 
0.0425 
(0.064) 
-0.0085 
(0.010) 
0.2538'" 
(0.060) 
0.0392 
(0.052) 
0.0317 
(0.038) 
-0.0033 
(0.099) 
0.2519 
(0.214) 
0.0122" 
(0.005) 
-0.3778'" 
(0.065) 
1.1399'" 
(0.109) 
597 
0.1220 
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(12) 
Costless 
collars 
-0.0025 
(0.058) 
0.7591 " 
(0.357) 
-0.6584' 
(0.359) 
0 .0010 
(0.002) 
0.0278'" 
(0 .009) 
-0.1434 
(0.152) 
0.0229" 
(0 .012) 
0.4417" 
(0.205) 
0 .0001 
(0 .000) 
-0.2299'" 
(0.080) 
1.0577'" 
(0.121) 
607 
0 .0888 
This table provides pooled cross-sectional lime-series regressions of the determinants of the weighted -average remaining maturity for 
swap contracts, put options and cost less collars respectively. The result s are for the subsample of gas hedgers. INV_OPP for investment 
opportuniti es; COR_ Cl_ CF for the correlation between free cash fl ows and cost incurred; LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the sum 
oflong-term debt in current liabilities plus one -halflong-term debt sca led by book value of total assets; LEV_SQUA RED is the leverage 
ratio squared; DTD for di stance-to-default; DTD_SQUARED for distance-to-default squared; DIS_COSTS for distress costs (in $/BOE); 
PROD_CV_GAS measures gas production uncertainty; CO R_PQ_GAS measures the gas quanti ty-pr ice corre lation; GAS_ VOL for gas 
pri ee volatili ty; GAS_RET for gas return as measured by log(gas 12-month future priee/gas sport priee); GAS_SPOT and 
GAS_SPOT_SQUARED are for gas spot priee and gas priee squared; MONEYNESS measured by the contract strike priee minu s the 
average spot priee during the current quarter; STRJKE is the contract ' s strike priee; TLCF for tax loss carry-forwards sca led by the book 
va lue of total assets; TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax sav ing; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (i n years) ; 
RES_MAT_GAS are the expected li fe of proven oil and gas reserves ( in yea rs); CEO_CS for the market value of common shares held by 
firm ' s CEO (i n logarithm); CEO_OPT for the number of stock options held by firm 's C EO (i n 000); IMR is the inverse Mi ll s Ratio 
(Table A.2 .1). Robu st standard errors using Huber- White-Sandwich estimator are in paren theses. ***S ignificant at the 1% leve!, ** 
Signifi cant at the 5% leve!, * Signi ficant at the 10% leve!. 
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Table 2.9 Maturity choice at the inception ofhedging contracts by oïl hedgers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11 ) (12) 
Variables Swap Swap Swap Swap Put Put Put Put Costless Costless Costless Costless 
contracts contracts contracts contracts o~tions o~tions o~tions o~tions col lars col lars collars collars 
INV_OPP 0.1860 0.2165 0 .3426'' 0.3949' .. 0.2728''' 0.2879''' 
(0.154) (0.142) (0.157) (0. 145) (0.104) (0.104) 
COR_CI_CF -0.2169 ... -0.2177' .. -0.1492 -0.1486 -0.0184 -0.0360 
(0.063) (0.065) (0.124) (0.125) (0.075) (0.086) 
LEV -1.3732''' -0.2853 -1 .8256 -0.2747 -0.3317 -0.3262 
(0.403) (0.378) (1 .277) (1 .569) (0.425) (0.478) 
LEV_SQUARE 1.0744 ... -0.0052 3.5507 1.2990 0.0682 0.1122 
(0.377) (0.342) (3.041) (3.217) (0.500) (0.543) 
DTD 0.1393' .. 0.2988'" 0.1412" 
(0.035) (0.101) (0.065) 
DTD_SQUARE -0.0098' .. -0.0515' .. -0.0200' 
(0.003) (0.015) (0.010) 
DIS_COSTS 0.0018 0.0029' 0.0085' 0.0119' .. -0.0003 0.0007 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
PROD_CV_OIL 0.3939' .. 0.3406' .. -0.1638 -0.1586 -0.1665' -0.1750' 
(0.089) (0.087) (0.125) (0.112) (0.095) (0.094) 
COR_PQ_OIL -0.0259 0.0060 -0.0359 -0 0879 0. 1208''' 0.1039'' 
(0.042) (0.037) (0.088) (0.079) (0.047) (0.048) 
OIL_VOL 0.0126 0.0279 .. 0.0155 0.0294 .. 0.0032 0.0094 
(0.01 1) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
OIL_RET 1.0026' .. 0.9922' .. -0.1797 0.1297 1.3909' .. 1.5355' .. 
(0.359) (0.348) (0.562) (0.589) (0.419) (0.424) 
OIL_SPOT 0.0222' .. 0.0058 0.0105 .. 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
OIL_SPOT_SQUARE -0.0001' .. -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STRIKE 0.0100'" 0.0039" 0.0049'" 
(0.001) (0.002) (0 .001) 
TLCF -0.4943'" -0.4607" .. -0.6377" .. -0.6094 .. -0.2474''' -0.2038'" 
(0.133) (0.136) (0.215) (0.261) (0.079) (0.077) 
TAX_SAVE 0.0044 -0.0476 0.8006 0.6848 -0.11 29 -0.7660 
(0.208) (0.211) (1.408) (1 .555) (1 .037) (1 .001) 
DEBT_MAT 0.0212 0.0196 0.0128 0.0093 0.0296' 0.0328 .. 
(0.014) (0.01 4) (0.025) (0. 026) (0.015) (0.016) 
RES_MAT_OIL 0.0272 ... 0.0234'" 0 .0132 .. 0.0108" 0.0051 0.0039 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
CEO_CS -0.1867 -0.1990 0.0916 -0.0315 0.0717 0.1074 
(0.229) (0.230) (0.673) (0.696) (0.321) (0.323) 
CEO_OPT 0.0006 0.0007 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0 .000) 
IMR -0.2008" 0.0349 -0.0675 0.0230 -0.4435 ... -0.3672'" -0.3348' .. -0.3689" -0.2096'" -0.0748 -0.1387' -0.1324 
(0.091) (0.087) (0.083) (0.094) (0.121) (0.105) (0.086) (0.147) (0.077) (0.080) (0.081) (0.083) 
CONSTANT 1.2574 ... 0.6425"' 0.6798'" 0.9784 ... 1 .5144'" 1.3262'" 0.9009'" 1.3511'" 1.4490'" 0.8816'" 1.1732'" 1.1215'" 
(0.117) (0 115) (0.121) (0.133) (0.241) (0.198) (0.215) (0.322) (0.123) (0 127) (0 143) (0.144) 
Observations 562 570 557 570 128 132 126 129 433 436 430 436 
R-squared 0.1874 0.2042 0.1950 0.2045 0.2062 0.2111 0.2643 0.2148 0.0952 0.1078 0.1129 0.1046 
Note: 
This table provides pooled cross-sectional ti me-series regressions of the determinants of the weighted-average remaining maturity for swap contracts, put 
options and costless co llars respectively. The results are for the subsample of oil hedgers. !NV_OPP for investment opportunities; COR_CI_CF for the 
correlation between free cash fl ows and cost incurred; LEV for the leverage ratio measured by the sum of long-term debt in current liabi li ties plus one-half 
long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets; LEV_SQUARED is the leverage ratio squared; DTD for distance-to-default; DTD_SQUARED for 
distance-to-default squared; DIS_COSTS for di stress costs (in $/BOE); PROD_CV_OIL measures ai l productionuncertainty; COR_PQ_OIL measures the 
oil quantity-price correlation; 0/L_ VOL for a il priee volati lity; 0/L_RET for ail return as measured by log(o il 12-month future priee/a il sport priee) ; 
0/L_SPOTand 0/L_SPOT_SQUARED are for oil spot priee and oi l priee squared; MONE YNESS measured by the contract strike priee minus the average 
spot priee during the current quarter; STRIKE is the contract's strike priee; TLCF for tax Joss carry-forwards sca led by the book va lue of total assets; 
TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax sav ing; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (i n years); RES_MAT_OIL are the expected li fe of 
proven ail and gas reserves (in years); CEO _CS for the market value of common shares held by firm ' s CEO (in logarithm); CEO _OPT for the number of 
stock options held by firm 's CEO (in 000); IMR is the inverse Mill s Ratio (Table A.2. 1). Robust standard errors using Huber-White-Sandwich estimator 
are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% leve!, ** Significant at the 5% leve! , * Significant at the 10% level. 
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In line with the baseline mode! (i.e., SYS-GMM), results illustrate the opposite effects of 
investment program specificities and the non-monotonie relationship between new contracts ' 
maturities and measures of likelihood of financial distress (LEV and DTD). Oistress costs and 
production uncertainty have the same positive impact on hedging maturities of newly 
initiated contracts. Results also indicate that the maturities of newly initiated hedging 
contracts are increasing with strike priees and reserves' expected !ife duration, and decreasing 
with tax Joss carry-forwards. The coordination between debt maturity and newly initiated 
collars is again confirmed but it disappears for initiated swaps. Results further show, for gas 
hedgers, that managers with a higher stake value in the firm prefer long-term collars, as 
predicted. 
However, impacts of leverage ratio and gas price-quantity correlation on maturities of 
newly initiated swaps contradict our previous findings. Surprisingly, oil and gas market 
conditions largely Jose their effect on hedging contract maturity at initiation . The non-
monotonie relationship with spot priees appears to exist only for newly initiated swaps' 
maturities for oil hedgers. Dissimilar to baseline mode! results, oil hedgers tend to initiate 
longer maturity swaps and collars when anticipated oil priees are increasing. One possible 
explanation for this finding could be that, when o il priees are anticipated to be high in the 
near term (e.g., we use 12-month future contracts), firms believe that they are more likely to 
decline in the long run (i.e., mean reversion); hence they tend to initiate long-term hedging 
contracts to lock-in higher strike prices.39 Managerial option-holding appears to have no 
significant impact on maturity choice at the inception of hedging contracts. 
2.7.2 Determinants of the early termination decis ion of hedging contracts 
Termination of a hedging contract is considered as an early termination when the 
outstanding hedging contract has a remaining weighted-average maturity equal to or above 
six months. For each instrument, we create a du mmy variab le that takes the va lue of one 
when we pick up observations of no-hedging preceded by an outstanding hedging with 
39 We use the following Futures ' terms for anticipated oïl and gas priees, as observed in the future contracts 
market: three, six, fi fteen, eighteen and twenty-four months ahead. We observe changes only for put option 
maturities, which become significantly negative! y affected by three- and six-month gas future pri ees, as predicted. 
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remaining maturity equal to or above six months and zero otherwise. We run pooled cross-
sectional time-series probit regressions of these dummy variables on firm fundamentals , 
production characteristics and oil and gas market conditions. Tables 2.10 and 2.11 report the 
regression results for gas hedgers and oïl hedgers separately. 
We find strong evidence of a non-monotonie (convex) relationship between early 
termination of swap contracts and leverage ratio, in particular. 40 This finding means that early 
termination of swap contracts decreases then increases with the probability of financial 
distress. Put options and costless collars also exhibit a non-monotonie (convex) relationship 
with financial leverage but with lower statistical significance. This empirical evidence 
corroborates our previous findings. Price-quantity correlations are negatively related to early 
termination. This is in line with predictions and previous findings that firms with positive 
price-quantity correlation tend to use longer hedging positions because their generated cash 
fiows are more volatile. 
Consistent with our previous findings , higher oil and gas priee volatilities prevent the 
early termination of hedging positions. Results further indicate that when future oil priees are 
anticipated to be higher, firms tend to early terminate their outstanding swap contracts to 
profit from the rising priees orto lock in higher strike priees for new contracts. Results again 
show an evident non-monotonie (convex) relationship between early termination and oil and 
gas spot priees. When oil and gas priees attain higher levels, outstanding hedging contracts 
are actively terminated and might be replaced by new contracts with higher strike priees. 
40 We also use distance-to-default and find similar results. 
Note: 
Table 2.10 Determinants ofearly termination ofhedging contracts by gas hedgers 
Variables 
OPP_INV 
(1) 
Swap 
contracts 
0.2358 
(0.284) 
(2) 
Swap 
contracts 
COR_CI_CF -0.0556 
(0.115) 
LEV -2.9846*** 
(0.795) 
LEV_SQUARE 1.8096*** 
(0.664) 
0/S_COSTS -0 0083 
(0.007) 
PROD_CV_GAS 0.0479 
(0 144) 
COR_pQ_GAS -0.1553 
(0.144) 
GAS_ VOL -0.5007*** 
(0.144) 
GAS_RET 0.1737 
(0.328) 
GAS_SPOT -0.1848*** 
(0.068) 
GAS_SPOT_SQUARE 0.0061 
(0.005) 
MONYNESS -0.1084 
(0.185) 
REMAIN/NG_MA T -0.4496* 
(0.261) 
TAX_SAVE -0.4619 
(1.036) 
DEBT_MAT -0 .0580* 
RES_MAT_GAS 0.0106 
CEO_CS 
CEO_OPT 
CONSTANT 
Observations 
Pseudo-R squared 
Chi-squared 
Significance 
(0.007) 
-1 .1494*** 
(0.167) 
2,312 
0.0762 
34.5827 
0.0001 
(0.030) 
-1.7609 
(1.456) 
-00007 
(0.001) 
-0.7850*** 
(0.210) 
2,342 
0.0569 
45.6079 
0.0000 
(3) 
Put 
options 
-0.3690 
(0.790) 
-4.1255* 
(2.176) 
4.4556 
(3.985) 
-0.4728 
(0.291) 
-0.2885 
(0.182) 
-0.1973 
(0.204) 
-0.1456 
(0.388) 
-1 .2286*** 
(0.396) 
-0 0073 
(0.021) 
-0.5415 
(0.354) 
559 
0.2 174 
44.9633 
0.0000 
(4) 
Put 
options 
0.1147 
(0.221) 
-0 0161 
(0.016) 
-0.3378*** 
(0.108) 
0.0223*** 
(0.007) 
-0.2623 
(0.404) 
-0.4984 
(4.009) 
-0 0016 
(0.051) 
-13.9335* 
(7.343) 
0.0009 
(0.001) 
-0.3609 
(0.385) 
564 
0.0883 
16.3846 
0.0593 
(5) 
Costless 
coll ars 
0.0856 
(0.273) 
-0.5718 
(0863) 
0.5257 
(0.628) 
-0.1927 
(0.154) 
-0.2564* 
(0.145) 
-0.2868** 
(0 .137) 
0.2358 
(0.315) 
-1 .1152*** 
(0.299) 
0.0146* 
(0.009) 
-1 .5494*** 
(0.232) 
1,865 
0.1527 
32.6056 
0.0002 
(6) 
Costless 
coll ars 
-0.1326 
(0.138) 
0.0040 
(0.004) 
-0.3630*** 
(0.081) 
0.0195*** 
(0.006) 
0.2060 
(0.164) 
-0.3618 
(0.834) 
-0.0345 
(0.033) 
-3.0740* 
(1 864) 
-0 0039* 
(0.002) 
-0.2803 
(0.251) 
1,905 
0.1002 
45.0865 
0.0000 
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This table pro vides poo led cross-sectional ti me-series PRO BIT regress ions of the determinants of the ea rl y termi nation of swa p 
contracts, put options and costless collars respecti vely. The resu lts are for the subsample of gas hedgers. !NV_ OPP fo r 
investment opportunities; COR_CI_CF for the correlation between free cash flows and cost incurred; LEV for the leverage ratio 
measured by the sum of long-term debt in current liabi liti es plus one-ha lf long-term debt sca led by book va lue of total assets; 
LEV_SQUARED is the leverage ratio squared; D!S_COSTS for di stress costs (in $/BOE); PROD_CV_GAS measures gas 
production uncertainty; COR_PQ_GAS measures the gas quantity-price correlation; GAS_ VOL for gas priee vo latility ; 
GAS_RET for gas return as measured by log(gas 12-month futu re priee/gas sport priee); GAS_SPOT and 
GAS_SPOT_SQUARED are for gas spot priee and gas priee squared; MONEYNESS measured by the contract strike priee minus 
the average spot priee during the current quarter; STRIKE is the contract' s strike priee; REMAINING_ MAT is the remaining 
maturi ty at the termination date (in years); TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage oftax saving; DEBT_MATis the long-term 
debt maturity (in years); RES_MAT_GAS are the expected life of proven oil and gas reserves ( in years); CEO_CS for the market 
value ofcommon shares held by firm 's CEO (in logarithm); CEO_OPTfor the number of stock options held by firm ' s CEO (in 
000); Robust standard errors using Huber-White-Sandwich are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% leve!, ** S ignificant at 
the 5% leve! , * Significant at the 10% leve!. 
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Table 2.11 Determinants of early termination of hedging con tracts by oil hedgers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Swap Swap Put Put Costless Costless 
contracts contracts o~tions o~t ions coll ars coll ars 
OPP_INV -0.3025 0.1810 0.2939 
(0.446) (0.424) (0.24 1) 
COR_C/_CF -0.0697 0.3345 0.0397 
(0.147) (0.259) (0.138) 
LEV -3.2636*** -3.2577 -2.3780** 
(1.109) (3.305) (1.043) 
LEV_SQUARE 2.6593*** 2.4391 1.9671 
(0.931) (7.625) (1.219) 
0/S_COSTS -0 .0302 -0.01 31 0.0029 
(0.027) (0 01 3) (0.005) 
PROD_CV_OIL 0.0381 -00322 -0.3278 
(0.206) (0.414) (0 208) 
COR_pQ_OIL -0.2531** -0.3286* -0 .3523*** 
(0.127) (0.183) (0 11 6) 
0/L_VOL -0.1 040** -0.01 70 -0.1482** 
(0.053) (0.040) (0.059) 
0/L_RET 3. 0460*** 1.3630 1.9779 
(0.921 ) (1.426) (1.214) 
0/L_SPOT -0.0441 *** -0.0290*** -0.0463*** 
(0.009) (0 010) (0.007) 
0/L_ SPOT_ SQUARE 0.0002*** 0.0002** 0.0002*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MONYNESS -0.4600*** -0.0167 -0.0452 
(0.097) (0.027) (0.030) 
REMAINING_MAT -0.8982*** -1 .0269** -0.8855*** 
(0 285) (0.456) (0.282) 
TAX_SAVE 0.9225 6.3143* 1.1 954 
(0.890) (3.477) (1.1 30) 
DEBT_MAT -0.0075 -0.2048*** -0.0156 
(0.039) (0.062) (0.034) 
RES_MAT_OIL 0.0186 -0 0957 -0 01 52 
(0.012) (0.064) (0.015) 
CEO_CS -1 .2290 -1.0270 -1.0966 
(1.137) (2.493) (0.709) 
CEO_OPT -0.0008 0.0006 -0.0025 
(0.002) (0.001 ) (0.003) 
CONSTANT -1.0042*** -0.4612* -0.271 8 -0.6973* -0.5360* -0.1093 
(0.256) (0.264) (0.686) (0.382) (0.275) (0.239) 
Observations 1,747 1,792 446 47 1 1,435 1,471 
Pseudo-R squared 0.1385 0.3535 0.2079 0.1282 0.1570 0.1770 
Chi-squared 37.2153 108.8693 20.0476 25.2569 34.1545 73.2886 
Significance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0176 0.0027 0.0001 0.0000 
Note: 
This table pro vides poo led cross -sectional ti me-series PRO BIT regress ions of the determinants of the earl y terminat ion of swap 
contracts, put options and costless co llars respectively. The results are for the subsample of ail hedgers. INV_OPP for 
investrnent opportunities; COR_ CI_ CF for the correlation between free cash fl ows and cast incurred; LE V for the Jeverage ratio 
measured by the sum of long-tem1 debt in current 1 iabiliti es plus one-hal f long-term debt sca led by book va lue of tota l assets; 
LEV_SQUARED is the Jeverage ratio squared; DIS_COSTS for distress costs (in $/BOE); PROD_CV_OIL measures ail 
production uncerta inty; COR_PQ_OIL measures the ail quantity-price correlation; 0/L_VOL for ai l priee vo lati lity; OIL_RET 
for ail return as measured by log(oil 12-month futures priee/ail sport priee) ; OIL_SPOTand 0/L_SPOT_SQUARED are for ail 
spot priee and ail priee squared; MONEYNESS measured by the contract strike priee minus the average spot priee during the 
current quarter; STR!KE is the contract' s strike priee; REMAINING_MAT is the rema ining maturity at the termination date (in 
years); TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving; DEBT_MAT is the long-term debt maturity (in years); 
RES_MAT_OIL is the expected !i fe of proven oil and gas reserves (in years); CEO _CS for the market va lue of common shares 
held by firm's CEO (in logarithm); CEO _OPT for the number of stock options held by firm 's CEO ( in 000); Robu st standard 
errors using Hu ber-White-Sandwich are in parentheses. * **Significant at the 1% leve!, ** Significant at the 5% leve!, * 
Significant at the 10% leve! 
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Results also show that in-the-money swap contracts are less likely to be prematurely 
terminated by oil hedgers. The remaining maturity of hedging contracts is statistically 
negatively related to early termination, namely contracts with longer remaining maturity are 
less likely to be prematurely terminated. Possible explanations could be that the early 
termination of longer contracts generates higher termination costs, and/or for longer 
maturities market conditions could improve over the remaining life of the contract, which 
becomes more beneficiai for hedgers. The impact of debt maturity on early termination is 
negative as predicted but significant only in cases of swap contracts for gas hedgers and put 
options for oil hedgers. Unexpectedly, higher percentages of tax save motivates the early 
termination of put options by oil hedgers, and longer gas reserves duration motivates the 
early termination of collar positions. As predicted, managers with higher stockholding tend to 
maintain their outstanding hedging contracts, in particular put options and col lars. 
2.8 Real implications of hedging maturity choice 
In this section, we extend the controversial existing literature that focu ses on the 
relationship between corporate hedging and firm risk and value. One strand of this empirical 
literature finds no support for the risk reduction argument and finn value maximization 
theory (see for instance Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Guay and Kothari , 2003; Jin and 
Jorion, 2006; Fauver and Naranjo, 201 0). In contrast, another strand of the literature shows 
that firm's derivative transactions translate into increases in shareholder value (Allayannis 
and Weston, 2001; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Carter, Rogers, and Simkins, 2006; Adam and 
Fernando, 2006; Bartram, Brown, and Conrad, 20 Il). Other studies give empirical evidence 
of risk reduction associated with derivative usage ( e.g., Guay, 1999; Allayannis and Ofek, 
2001; Bartram, Brown, and Conrad, 2011 ). Aretz and Bartram (20 1 0) review the existing 
empiricalliterature on corporate hedging finn value and risk. 
We complement the empirical literature by going into further detail and investigating the 
real implications of the maturity structure of corporate risk management on: (1) firms ' stock 
return sensitivity to changes in oil and gas priees; (2) firms ' stock volatility sensitivity to oil 
and gas priee volatilities. In addition, our study does not suffer from the endogeneity concern 
related to derivatives use as advanced by Jin and Jorion (2006) to explain the controversial 
results in the literature. This is because we select firms within the same industry; they have 
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the same exposure to commodity risks and they differ vastly in tenns of their hedg ing 
behaviors. To our knowledge, no empirical study to date gives direct evidence of the effects 
of maturity structure of corporate hedg ing on firm value and ri s k. 
2.8.1 Effects of hedging maturity on stock return sensitivity 
Our tests expand on that of Jin and Jorion (2006), who run poo led cross-sectional time-
series regressions of finns' stock returns on the market and oil and gas priee changes, and 
control for commodity risk hedging and proven oil and gas reserves. We estimate the 
following models with interaction variables reflecting the impact of hedging maturity in oil 
beta: 
_ ( "1;"' 3 ail reserveu- 1 ) 
Ri,t- al+ flm x Rm,t + Yoil + L..j=l Yj x HMi,j,t-l + Y4 x MVE;,t-1 x Rau,t + 
/3gas X Rgas,t + Ei,t (3) 
and a symmetric equation for gas beta. R ;,t is the total stock rate of return for finn i in 
month t, Rm 1 is the monthly return of the S&P 500 index, Roi/ 1 is the monthly rate of 
' ' 
change in the priee of the NYMEX WTI crude oil near-month futures contract, R gas ,t is the 
monthly rate of change in the priee of the NYMEX Henry Hub natura l gas near-month 
futures contract. H MiJ,t-l are three variables reflecting outstanding maturities for swap 
contracts, put options and costless collars at the end of the previous month for o it (gas) 
hedgers.41 Oil reserve/MYE (gas reserve/MYE) are the discounted dollar va lues of oit (gas) 
developed reserves divided by the market value of equ ity.42 The presented mode! in (3) 
allows us to detect the impact of the maturity structure on the sensitivity of finn 's stock 
return to changes in oit and gas priees. We then predict negative signs on the maturities of the 
tlrree hedging strategies (i.e., swaps, put, and collars). Oil and gas reserves should have 
41 We co !lect hedging strategy observations on a quarter! y basis. For the first two months of each fiscal quarter, 
we repeat the observations at the end of the previous fiscal quarter. We then suppose that hedging strategies 
outstanding at the end of the previous fi scal quarter are effective un til the end of the current fi scal quarter wh en 
we update the observations with the new information reported by firms. 
42 We calculate developed oil and gas reserve quantities on a quarterly basis by considering production, 
development, and acquisition and exploration activities. For the first two months of each fiscal quarter, we repeat 
the observations at the end of the previous fi scal quatter. Following SF AS No. 69 and SEC regu lations, we 
calculate a standat·dized measure of discounted future net cash flows from developed reserves by considering 
current oil and gas priees, CUITent production quanti ti es and costs, and a discounting rate of 10%. The ratio of 
reserve/MYE is updated monthly by considering the firm 's new stock, oi l and gas priees. 
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positive signs because a greater ratio of reserve/MYE induces greater exposure to oit and gas 
priee fluctuations. We include firm fixed effects and correct standard errors for within-firm 
correlation (clustering) and heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator. 
We further include the inverse Mills ratios coming from the Heckman first-step for both 
subsets of oit hedgers and gas hedgers. 
Panel A of Table 2.12 reports the estimations of the mo del in (3). Columns ( 1) and (2) of 
Panel A display the estimation of models with interaction variables between the remaining 
maturity of the hedging portfolio (i.e. , weighted-average maturity of ali outstanding hedging 
instruments) at the end of the previous month and the monthly rate of change in the priees of 
the NYMEX oit and gas futures contracts for subsets of gas hedging and oit hedging 
separately. Results show that these interaction variables have the predicted negative sign . 
However, this negative relationship is statistically significant only for gas hedgers. Longer 
hedging maturities could lower the sensitivity of stock return to changes in gas priees. Going 
further in detail, Column (3) of Panel A indicates that swap contracts and costless collars 
positions with the longest maturities could achieve the lowest sensitivity of stock return to 
changes in gas priees. Put options have the predicted negative sign but no significant impact. 
For oit hedgers, the three hedging instruments have no significant impact on the sensitivity of 
stock return to changes in oit priees as observed for the oit hedging portfolio (Column 4). 
Consistent with Rajgopal (1999), and Jin and Jorion (2006), results show that greater oit 
and gas reserves accentuate a stock's exposure to oit and gas priee fluctuations. We repeat 
our regressions and replace the ratio of reserve/MYE by the production mix, namely the ratio 
of the daily gas or oil production quantity divided by the total daily oit and gas production, 
and find similar results. The coefficients of the production mix ratios are positive, as 
predicted, and have higher economie significance. 
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Table 2.12 Effect of hedging maturity on stock return and volatility sensitivity 
Panel A Panel B 
Return Sensitivit):: Vol ati li~ Sensitivit):: 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Gas Oil Gas Oi l Gas Oi l Gas Oi l 
Variables Hed~ers Hed~ers Hed~ers . Hed~ers Hed~ers Hed~ers Hed~ers Hed~ers 
(RISIG)_MKT 1.0 155*** 1.0723*** 1.0143*** 1.0700*** 1.2699*** 1.3036*** 1.2679*** 1.3037*** 
(0.046) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.052) (0.059) (0.053) (0 .058) 
(RIS!G)_OIL 0.2730*** 0.3190*** 0.2743*** 0.2806*** 0.208 1*** 0. 1944*** 0.2082*** 0.22 15*** 
(0.023) (0 .056) (0.023) (0.045) (0.035) (0.052) (0.035) (0.049) 
(RJS!G)_GAS 0.24 18*** 0 .19 16*** 0 .2 152*** 0.1920*** 0 .0250 0.0459*** 0.0408** 0.0458*** 
(0.042) (0.0 16) (0.033) (0.0 16) (0 .020) (0.0 12) (0 0 17) (0.0 12) 
HEDG_ PORT_MAT x -0.079 1 *** -0.0562 0.0 170 0.0182 
(R/S!G)_(O!UGAS) (0.023) (0.037) (0.0 15) (0.029) 
S WAP_MAT x -0.0410*** -0.0258 0.0092 0.0125 
(RISJG)_(O!UGAS) (0.0 16) (0.028) (0.0 12) (0.030) 
PUT MAT x -0.0273 0.0474 -0 .030 1 0.0036 
(RIS!G)_(O!UGAS) (0.027) (0.06 1) (0.022) (0.045) 
COLLAR_ MAT x -0.040 1 ** -0 .0262 0.00 15 -0.0230 
(RIS!G)_(O!UGAS) (0.0 19) (0.027) (0 0 13) (0.023) 
RES_MVE (0/UGAS) x 0.0623*** 0.0433** 0 .0621 *** 0.0433** 
R_(O!UGAS) (0.020) (0.020) (0.02 1) (0.020) 
MKT_ VALUE 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV 0.5839*** 0.5250*** 0.5829*** 0.5 169*** 
(0.084) (0. 106) (0.084) (0. 1 05) 
DTD -0.0797*** -0.0823*** -0.080 1 *** -0.0827*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Q_RAT!O -0.02 13*** -0.02 12** -0.0206*** -0.0207** 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
JMR 0.0080 -0.00 14 0.0077 -0.00 11 0. 11 45*** 0.0895** 0. 1112*** 0.0826* 
(0.0 11) (0.010) (0.0 11 ) (0.0 10) (0.036) (0.045) (0.036) (0.046) 
CONSTANT 0.0059 0.0 133** 0.0060 0.0 13 1** 0. 1920*** 0.1976*** 0. 1952*** 0.2030*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.046) (0.050) (0.046) (0.049) 
Obs (firm-month) 8,58 1 7,145 8,581 7,145 8,582 7,150 8,582 7,150 
R-sq uared (within) 0. 1840 0. 1883 0. 1838 0.1884 0.47 18 0.4992 0.4720 0.4995 
Number of clusters 106 99 106 99 106 99 106 99 
F stati stic 164.2872 13 1.2653 125.1299 100.1854 116.25 12 114.0222 100.3655 95.3091 
Rho 0.0381 0.0325 0.0383 0.0326 0.2148 0.2099 0.2157 0.2103 
Sigma_U 0.0300 0.0275 0.0300 0.0275 0.1266 0.1221 0. 1269 0.1222 
Si~ma E 0.1505 0.1498 0.1506 0.1498 0.2421 0.2369 0.2420 0.2369 
Note: 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the fixed effects regressions of the effect of hedging stra tegy choice on firm ' s 
return and risk. The dependent variables are (i) the total stock rate of return for finn i in mon th t (Panel A), and (ii) the total 
stock risk measured by the annuali zed standard deviation of stock daily returns for finn i during month t (Panel B). R_MKT is 
the monthly rate of return in the S&P500 index. R_OIL is the monthly rate of change of the NYMEX near-month futures 
contra ct for oi l. R_GAS is the monthly rate of change of the NYMEX near-month futures contra ct for natural gas. S!G_MKT is 
the ann uali zed standard deviation of the market index daily returns during the month t. S!G_OIL and SJG_GAS are the 
annualized standard deviations of the oil (gas) da ily returns du ring the mon th t (e.g. , R_OJL and R_GAS). HEDG_ PORT_MAT is 
the remaining maturity of the hedging portfolio observed at the end of the previous month T-1. SWAP_MAT, PUT_MAT, 
COLLAR_ MAT are the remaining maturities observed at the end of the previous month t-1. RES_MVE stands for the lagged 
va lue of the ratio of discounted dollar value of oi l (gas) developed reserves divided by the market va lue of equity MKT_ VALUE 
measured by the logarithm of the market value of common shares outstanding (e.g., closing priee at the end of the month 
multiplied by the number of common shares outstand ing). LE V for the Jeverage ratio measured by the book value of long-lerm 
debt in current liabilities plus one-half long-term debt scaled by the book value of total assets; Q_RATJO for the quick ratio 
measured by the book va lue of cash and equ ivalent of cash scaled by the book va lue of current liabi lities; DTD for distance-to-
default; JMR is the Inverse Mills Ratio for oi l hedgers and gas hedgers respectively coming from the Heckman first-step (Table 
A.2. 1 ). Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering using Huber-White-Sandwich estimator, are in 
parentheses. ***S ignificant at the 1% leve!, ** Significant at the 5% leve!, * Signifi cant at the 10% leve 
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2.8.2 Effects of hedging maturity on stock volatility sensitivity 
This sub-section provides detailed evidence of the relation of firms' total risk measured 
by the annualized stock return volatility, and firms ' hedging strategies. Our aim is to examine 
which hedging maturity better mitigates the effects of the exposure to oil (gas) priee 
volatilities on firms' total ris k. Following Guay ( 1999), we partition the total stock return 
volatility into market risk, oil and gas risks and firm-specific ri sk. We then estimate the 
following mode! with interaction variables for oil hedgers: 
Oü = Wo + Wm X Om,t + (Wail + LJ=1 Wj X H Mi ,j ,t-1) X Ooil,t + Wgas X (Jgas,t + 
L.J= 4 w1 x Controlu +ou (4) 
and a symmetric equation for gas hedgers where a- . is the annualized standard deviation 
1,1 
of daily stock returns for firm i during month t to capture the aggregate firm risk, a-m,l is the 
annualized standard deviation of daily S&P 500 index returns during month t, a-oit ,t are CJgas ,t 
are the annualized standard deviations of daily returns of the NYMEX WTI crude oil and 
Henry Hub natural gas near-month futures contracts during month t. H Mi.J ,t-1 are 
outstanding remaining maturities as previously defined. Controlu are a set of exogenous 
variables related to firms ' characteristics. We retain firm size, leverage and liquidity, which 
Bartram, Brown and Stulz (2012) find to be important determinants of bath firm total risk 
and systematic risk. We also use Distance-to-Default, defined above, and the inverse Mills 
ratios coming from the Heckman first-step for both subsets of oil hedgers and gas hedgers 
respectively. This specification partitions total stock return volatility into finn-specifie 
exposures to oil and gas volatil ities, global market index risk and finn-specifie 
characteristics. We include firm fixed effects and correct standard errors for within-firm 
correlation ( clustering) and heteroskedasticity using the Hu ber-White-Sandwich estimator. 
Panel B ofTable 2.12 reports the estimations ofthe mode! in (4). Panel B also shows the 
estimation of models with interaction variables between the remaining maturity of the 
hedging portfolio at the end of the previous month and annualized standard deviations for oil 
and gas NYMEX contracts respectively (Column 5 and 6). Overall, results show that these 
interaction variables, in ail specifications, have no statistically significant effects on the 
sensitivity of stock volatility to commodity priee risk. Results also suggest that larger firms 
with higher financial leverage have higher return volatility, and firms with higher 
Distance-to-Default and carrying higher cash balances have lower stock return volatility. 
2.9 Concluding Remarks 
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A substantial body of the corporate risk management literature has increased our 
understanding of the motivations, virtues and value implications of hedging. This literature 
derives its theoretical or empirical predictions based on hedging extent or hedging activity 
participation. Due to the Jack of data, the empirical maturity structure of corporate risk 
management is discussed in a largely descriptive manner. In this study, we go beyond the 
classical questions in the corporate hedging literature and investi gate the foll owing questions: 
How far ahead do firms hedge? What are the determinants of the maturity structure offirms' 
hedging programs? and What are the economie effects of hedging maturities on finn value 
and risk? 
Using an extensive and new hand-collected dataset on the ri sk management activities of 
150 U.S. oil and gas producers and the empirical predictions of Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005), 
we find that the maturity structure of corporate hedging is positively influenced by firms ' 
investment opportunities. Results also show that a positive correlation between investment 
expenditure and generated cash flows gives firms a natural hedge and motivates the use of 
short-term contracts. We provide strong ev idence that hedging maturities should increase and 
then decrease with the 1ikelihood offinancial distress, as conjectured by Fehle and Tsyplakov 
(2005). Highly distressed oil and gas producers should enter long-term put options as a risk-
shifting strategy. Results indicate that o il and gas producers with higher cash flow volati lity 
tend to use longer maturity hedging to avoid shortfalls in their future cash flows. 
Interestingly, we observe strong evidence of the impact of market conditions on hedging 
maturity choice. We give empirical evidence of a non-monotonie relationship between oil 
and gas spot priees and hedging maturities, as suggested by Fehle and Tsyplakov (2005). In 
addition, hedging contract features (i.e. , moneyness, str ike priee) have an evident impact on 
maturity choice. Regarding asset-liability management, oi l and gas producers appear to match 
the maturities of their hedging positions and the maturities of their assets and debt. Tax 
function convexity seems to influence the maturity structure offirm's hedging. We also give 
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the first direct evidence of the motivations for early term ination of hedging contracts, 
which appears to be strongly influenced by the likelihood offinancial distress, spot priees and 
their volatilities, price-quantity correlation, and the remaining maturities of contracts. We 
also find evidence of a non-monotonie (convex) relationship between ear ly termination and 
financial leverage and spot priees. Table A.2.2 summarizes our predictions and findings 
arising from the baseline model (i.e. , SYS-GMM), maturity choice at inception of the 
hedging contract, and early termination of contracts. Overall, this table shows that our 
findings are stable and consistent across these tests. Finally, we explore the real effects of 
hedging maturity on finn value and risk, and provide empirical evidence that long-term 
hedging lowers the sensitivity of the stock return to changes in gas priees in part icular. 
APPENDIX 2.1 
FIRST STEP OF THE TWO-STEP HECKMAN REGRESSIONS WITH SAMPLE 
SELECTION: DETERMINANTS OF THE OIL OR GAS Hç:DGING DECISION 
144 
Table A.2. 1: First Step of the Two-Step Heckman regressions with sample selection : 
Determinants of the oi l or gas hedging decision 
Variable O il hedge Gas hedge 
TAX_SAVE 0.9005** 0. 1232 
(0.366) (0.428) 
LE VERA CE 1. 5843*** 1.9 170*** 
(0.091) (0.096) 
CASH_COST 0.0398*** 0.0605*** 
(0.003) (0.005) 
BVCD -1.2947*** -1.24 17*** 
(0.246) (0.2 14) 
Q_RAT!O -0. 1 056*** -0.1288*** 
(0.0 14) (0.0 14) 
RES_(O/UCAS) -0.0009*** -0.000 1 *** 
(0 .000) (0 .000) 
MKT_ VALUE 0.3924*** 0.5700*** 
(0.043) (0.043) 
SALES 0. 1994*** 0.0894*** 
(0.0 19) (0.0 17) 
CONSTANT -2.2678*** -2. 1663*** 
(0.088) (0.089) 
Observations 5,798 5,798 
Pseudo-R squared 0.3025 0.3 129 
Chi-squared 2399.4838 25 12.4946 
Signi ficance 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: 
Thi s table reports the coeffi cients es ti mates of the Probi t madel. The dependent variable is the hedging decision 
dummy vari able that takes the value of 1 if the oil and gas producer have any oil and gas hedging position for the 
quarter and 0 otherwise. The independent var iables are: TAX_SAVE for the expected percentage of tax saving; 
LE VERA GE for the leverage rati o measured by the book value of long-term debt scaled by the book value oftota l 
assets; CASH_COST is the production cost per Barrel of Oil Equi valent (BOE); BVCD fo r the book value of 
convertible debt scaled by the book value of total assets. Q_RATIO for the qui ck ratio measured by the book value 
of cash and equi valent of cash scaled by the book value of current liabili ties; RES_OIL and RES_GAS are the 
quantities of proven reserves fo r oil (for oil hedgers) and gas (for gas hedgers); MKT_ VA LUE measw·ed by the 
logarithm of the market value of comm on shares outstanding (i.e. , closi ng priee at the end of the qua11er 
mu ltiplied by the number of comm on shares outstanding); SA LES measured by the logarithm of sales at the end of 
the quarter. Standard en·ors are in parentheses. ***Sign ificant at the 1% leve!, ** Significant at the 5% leve!, * 
Signifi cant at the 10% leve!. 
APPENDIX 2.2 
SUMMARY OF OUR PREDICTIONS AND FINDINGS 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper revis its the quest ion of whether derivative use has real implications on finn 
value and ri sk. In light of the controversial results of the prev ious research, this paper revis its 
the hedging premium question for firms . We control for the endogeneity problem between 
derivatives use decis ion and other firm 's financial policies. Using a new dataset on the 
hedging activities of 150 U.S. oïl and gas producers, we find that hedging allows firms to 
realize higher selling priees and therefore higher accounting performance. We also find 
evidence of a significant risk reduction related to hedging. Finally, results show that hedging 
eases access to higher debt level, but with no real effects on loan spread. These rea l 
implications of hedging should translate into value ga ins for shareholders. 
Keywords: Corporate risk management, real implications, value creation, risk reduction, 
hedging benefits, oi l and gas industry. 
JEL classification: 08, G32. 
3 .1 Introduction 
In the frictionless world of Modigliani and Miller (M&M) (1958), there are no rationales 
for corporate risk management because it does not enhance finn value. However, risk 
management through derivative instruments becomes increasingly widespread in the 
imperfect real world where hedging activity has become very important. The Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) reports that, by the end of June 2013 , notional amounts 
outstanding of $10.6 trillion and $35 .8 trillion for, respectively, over-the-counter foreign 
exchange (FX) and interest rate (IR) derivatives held by non-financial entities. At the same 
date, over-the-counter commodity contracts have a notional amou nt outstanding of about $2 
trillion, gold not included. At the beginning of the millennium, these figures were only about 
$2.8 trillion, $5.5 trillion, and $0.3 trillion for FX, IR and commodity contracts (gold not 
included). Empirical evidences ( e.g., Haushalter, 2000, Jin and Jorion, 2006, Ku mar and 
Rabinovitch, 20 13) show increasing fraction of production protected from priee fluctuations 
using derivatives for the petroleum industry, for example. 43 
In the last three decades, growing risk management literature has emerged motivated by 
data availability and particularly improvements in theoretical backgrounds of corporate 
demand for protection. Mayers and Smith (1982), Stulz (1984), and Smith and Stulz (1985) 
are first to build a hedging theory relying on the introduction of frictions into the perfect 
world of M&M, and show that market frictions ( e.g. , bankruptcy costs, tax shields, agency 
costs) enable firms to create value by hedging actively. The subsequent empirical literature 
extends the knowledge on hedging determinants ( e.g., Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993 , 
Mian, 1996, Tufano, 1996, Haushalter, 2000). More recent lines in the literature focus on 
hedging value and risk implications for firms ( e.g., Guay, 1999, Allayannis and Weston, 
2001 , Jin and Jorion, 2006). Y et, empirical findings on value implications of risk 
management are fairly mixed and inconclusive. Methodological problems related to 
43 Haushalter (2000) reports an average fi·action of production hedged of3 0% for each year 1992, 1993, and 1994. 
Jin and Jorion (2006) fi nd that an average firm hedge 33% ( 41 %) of next-year oil (gas) production. Ku mar and 
Rabinovitch (20 13) report an average fraction of production hedged of 46% for the current qua1ter. The ir measure 
combines both oil and gas production . We provide more details on our sample firms' hedging ratios in subsequent 
section. 
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endogeneity of derivative use and other firm's decisions, sample selection, sample size, and 
the existence of other potential hedging mechanisms ( e.g., operational hedge) are often 
blamed for these mixed empirical evidences. 
This paper rev is its the question of hedging virtues 111 a more comprehens ive and 
multifaceted manner for a sample of U.S oi l and gas producers. To better ga uge the rea l 
implications of hedging, we examine its effects on the following finn characteri st ics: 1) 
realized oil and gas prices. 44 Oil and gas priees constitute the primar-y source of market risk 
for firms in the petroleum industry. Direct impacts of hedging activities would be 
materialized in frrm's revenues throughout its output priees. To the best of our knowledge, 
this study gives the first direct evidence of the hedging effects on firm 's output se li ing priees. 
2) Firm's accounting performance as measured by the return on equity and the return on 
asset. We check whether hedgi ng effects translates into hi gher accounting profits. 3) Firm 
risk as measured by its total, idiosyncratic, and systemat ic risk. One would expect that 
hedging should attenuate firm's exposure to the underlying market ri sk factor which leads to 
lower finn ri skiness. In doing so, we verify particularly iffi nns are hedging or speculating by 
using derivatives. 4) Fi rm externat financing. We assess if hedging eases firm ' s access to 
higher debt financing or not. In addition, we check if hedging is va lued by tenders. Do 
hedgers obtain lower loan spread than non-hedgers? Prior literature suggests that hedging 
should lower the probability of left-ta il outcomes which reduces expected costs related to 
financial distress and bankruptcy, and consequently firm's ability to raise externa t funds 
increases (e.g. , Smith and Stulz, 1985, Stulz, 1996). 
Endogeneity of hedging decision is a major concern for any study in corporate risk 
management. To overcome this first source of inconsistency in empirical literature, we 
consider the feedback effects between hedging and other firm ' s financial decisions. We then 
use simultaneous equations setting based on three-stage least squares (3-SLS).45 The 3-SLS 
44These realized selling priees include the monetary effects of hedging act rvrtres, if any. Fortunately, 
COMPUSTAT database gives histori cal data on oil and gas selling pri ees realized by producers on quarterly basis 
from 2002. 
45 Geczy, Minton, and Schrand ( 1997) use a two-stage !east square (2-SLS) fo r currency derivative use and capital 
structure decisions. Graham and Rogers (2002) also use similar approach to link the hedging extent and debt 
ratio. Dionne and Triki (2013) use a minimum distance procedure to estimate a simultaneous system linking 
hedging extent and leverage ratio. 
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estimation has the crucial advantage of considering cross-equation correlation in residuals. 
Therefore, it leads to more efficient estimations. Moreover, the endogeneity problem is 
minimized in our tests because the sample selection bias should be alleviated by selecting 
firms from the same industry; they bear important commodity risk exposures and vastly differ 
in terms oftheir hedging behavior as in Jin and Jorion (2006). 
Prior literature analyzes either binary variables indicating whether a firm uses derivatives, 
or sometimes aggregate hedging positions and percentage of production hedged. We go 
beyond the aggregate feature of the hedging and use detailed information on positions by 
derivative instrument in use (i.e., swap contracts, put options, and costless collars). We then 
link the hedging extent by instrument to the retained measure of firm characteristics. To gain 
further insight, we study the hedging activities of commodities, oïl and gas, separately. ln 
doing so, our study identifies more precise mechanism of how hedging affects finn value and 
ris k. 
Our evidences suggest that gas hedgers earn noticeably higher gas selling priees. Oil 
hedging seems to have no real effects on oil priees. For individual instrument, results indicate 
that costless collars and particularly put options positions are successful hedging strategies. 
For oil hedging, using swap contracts appears to be loser strategy. Surprisingly, results 
suggest that oil and gas producers do not frequently adjust their hedging positions in response 
to their realized priees. More importantly, we find strong evidence that hedging translates 
into higher accounting performance, as measured by the return on asset and the return on 
equity, suggesting that hedging enhances the shareholders wealth . The increase in accounting 
profitability is more attributable to put options. Results show a bi-directional effect signifying 
that oil and gas producers with higher accounting performance increase swap contracts 
positions for gas hedging and reduce their co l lars positions for o il hedging. 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Guay, 1999; Bartram, Brown, and Conrad, 2011), 
we fi nd that hedging reduces fi nn tota l and idiosyncratic risk. This reduct ion is statistically 
and economically significant. The reduction is more attributable to swap contracts for gas 
hedging and to put options for oi l hedging. In addit ion, interest rate hedging partic ipates in 
this reduction with significant negative impact on finn risk. Interestingly, firms with higher 
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riskiness tend to eut their swap and collar pos itions and to increase gas hedging with put 
opt ions. This finding implies that firms with more volatile value tend to engage in risk-
shifting strategies. Perta ining to finn systematic risk, we find that only collars have a 
negative impact on finn market beta, but with a low stati stica l significa nce ( 1 0% leve t). Ali 
the other hedg ing extent measures have no s ignificant effect on finn systematic risk. Overa ll, 
this finding suggests that firms' cost of equity does not increase due to hedg ing as suggested 
by Adam and Fernando (2006), who do not find a pos itive effect of gold hedging on firm 's 
market beta. This finding a lso suggests that any potentia l pos itive effects assoc iated with o il 
and gas hedging should translate into valu e enhancement for shareholders because there is no 
off- setting increase in the required cost of equity. Finns with higher systematic ri sk tend to 
increase their collar positions and to reduce their put option pos itions. 
Regarding firm debt capacity, we find that oil and gas hedging eases the access to debt 
financing. The results are statistica lly and economically significant and consistent w ith the 
hypothesis that hedging redu ces the expected cost of financia l di stress and therefore increases 
finn debt capacity (Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Stu1z, 1996). Interest rate hedgin g 
a lso bas similar positive effects on firm ' s debt leve t. The increase in firm access to debt 
financing should translate into higher finn value throughout the tax-savings related to debt as 
suggested by Le1and (1 998), Ross (1996) and Graham and Rogers (2002). We a lso find 
strong evidence of a positive feedback effect that runs from leverage to hedging extent. 
Pertaining to the cost of debt financ ing, results indicate that oil hedging with collars lowers 
the Joan spread but o il hedging with swaps increases this spread. The net effect of o il hedging 
portfolio is ins ignificant. Surprising ly, the hedging of foreign exchange ri sk noticeably 
reduces Joan spread and interest rate hedging has no real effects. Results further show tha t 
higher Joan spread implies higher hedging extent by swa p contract particularly. 
The remainder of this paper is organ ized as fo llows. Section 2 reviews related li terature. 
Section 3 describes the sample, exp lains the construction of variables, and provides summary 
statistics. Section 4 discusses our univariate and multivariate results. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
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3.2 Real implications of corporate risk management: a review 
3.2.1 Risk management, finn value and risk 
One strand of the corporate hedg ing literature finds no support for the risk reduction 
argument and firm value maximization them·y. Using a sample of 425 large US corporations 
from 1991 to 1993 , Hentschel and Kothari (200 1) find that derivative users dis play 
economically small diffe~ence in their stock return volatility compared with non-u sers, even 
for firms with larger derivatives holdings. Guay and Kothari (2003) study the hedg ing 
practices of 234 large non-financial firms, and find that the magnitude of the derivative 
positions is economically small compared to firm-l evel ri sk exposures and movements in 
equity values. Jin and Jorion (2006) revis it the question ofth e hedging premium for a sample 
of 119 US oil and gas producers from 1998 to 2001. Although they fi nd that o ïl and gas betas 
are negatively re lated to hedging extent, they show that hedging has no discernible effect on 
firm value. Fau ver and Naranjo (20 1 0) study derivative usage by 1, 746 US finns du ring 
1991-2000, and assert that firms with greater agency and monitoring problems exhibit an 
economica lly s ignificant negative assoc iation of 8.4% between firms' Tobin ' s Q and 
derivative usage. 
In contrast, Tufano (1998) studies hedging activities of 48 North American go ld mining 
firms from 1990 through March 1994, and finds that gold finn exposures (i .e., go ld betas) are 
negatively related to the fi rm's hedg ing production. Guay (1 999) looks at a sample of 254 
non-financia l corporations that began using derivatives in the fi sca l year 1991 , and reports 
that new derivative users experience a stati stically and economically significant 5% reduct ion 
in stock return vo latil ity compared to a contro l sample of non-users. Us ing a sample of S&P 
500 non- fi nancia l firms for 1993, A llayannis and Ofek (2001 ) fi nd strong evidence that 
foreign currency hedging reduces firms' exchange-rate exposure. Al layannis and Weston 
(200 1) give the first direct evidence of the positive relation between currency derivative 
usage and finn value (as defi ned by Tob in ' s Q) and show that for a sample of 720 non-
, financia l firms, the market value of foreign currency hedgers is 5% higher on average than 
for non-hedgers . 
-- --- -- ----- - -- ------ - - ---------------------------------
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Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006) investigate jet fuel hedging behavior of firms in the 
US airline industry during 1993-2003 , and find an average hedging premium of 12%-16%. 
Adam and Fernando (2006) examine the outstanding go ld derivative pos itions for a sample of 
92 North American gold mining firms for the period 1989-1999 and obtain that derivatives 
use translates into value gains for shareholder since there is no offsetting increase in firm ' s 
systematic ris k. Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (20 Il) explore the effect of derivative use on 
firm risk and value for a large sample of 6,888 non-financial firms from 47 countries during 
2000-2001. The ir evidence suggests that using derivatives redu ces both total risk and 
systematic risk, and is associated with higher finn value, abnormal returns, and larger profits. 
Recently, Choi, Mao, and Upadhyay (2013) examine the financial and operational 
hedging activities of 73 U.S pharmaceutical and biotech firms during 2001-2006. They fi nd 
that hedging is associated with higher finn value and that this enhancement is larger for firms 
subject to higher information asymmetry and larger growth options. They estimate that the 
hedging premium for the ir sample is about 13 .8%. Perez-Gonza les and Y un (20 13) exploit 
the introduction of weather derivatives in 1997 as a natural experiment for a sample of energy 
ftrms . They find evidence of positive effects of weather derivative use on firm 's value as 
measured by the market to book ratio. 
3 .2.2 Risk management and finn cost of capital 
Mayers and Smith (1982) and Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that hedging should reduce 
financial distress costs by lower ing the probability of left-ta il outcomes, and therefore 
enhance firm value. The association between hedging and debt financing is exam ined in 
many empirical studies. Dolde (1995) and Haushalter (2000) find that leverage ratio increases 
hedging intensity. On the contrary, another strand in the literature finds no support for this 
conjecture (e.g., Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993, Allayannis and Ofek, 2001). Another 
line of theory suggests that corporate risk management increases firm ' s debt capacity. Stulz 
( 1996), Ross (1996), and Leland ( 1998) as sert th at corporate risk management enables firm to 
increase its debt capacity, and therefore firm ' s value increases due to tax-related benefits of 
debt (i.e., interest deduction). 
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To control for potential endogeneity of derivative use and capital structure decisions, 
sorne empirical works examine the association between hedging and leverage in a 
si mu ltaneous equations framework. Gezcy, Minton, and Shrand ( 1997) run a set of 
simultaneous equations and find no evidence of feedback effects between firm 's derivative 
use and debt level. On the contrary, Graham and Rogers (2002) a lso use the same 
simultaneous equations procedure for a different sample and find strong positive mutual 
effects between derivatives use and debt capacity of the finn. They a Iso verify that leverage 
increases due to hedging, which enhances finn value by approximately 1. 1% throughout the 
tax-related savings from debt financing. Dionne and Triki (2013) estimate simultaneous ly the 
derivative use and capital structure decisions for a samp le of North American gold mining 
firms. Their findings provide evidence of a positive impact of leverage ratio on gold hedged 
quantity. However, they find no bi-directional effects because hedging does not increase debt 
capacity oftheir sample firms. 
Lin, Philips, and Smith (2008) examme theoretically and empirica lly the interaction 
between hedging, investment, and financing decisions . From a simu ltaneous equations 
setting, their findings are consistent with the debt capacity argument for hedging. That is, 
there is a sign ificant positive bi-directional effect between firm 's hedging and leverage. 
Regarding the cost of capital, Gay, Lin, and Smith (20 11) investigate the relation between 
derivative use and firm 's cost of equity. From a large sample of non-financial firms during 
the two sub-periods 1992-1996 and 2002-2004, they find that hedgers have lower cost of 
equity than non-hedgers by about 24-78 basis points. This reduction cornes essentially from 
lower market betas for derivative users. Their results are robust to endogeneity concern 
related to derivative use and capital structure decisions. Campel Jo, Lin, Ma, and Zou (20 Il) 
examine a large sample of 2, 718 Joan contracts signed by 1,185 firms and fi nd that hedging 
interest rate and foreign exchange risk noticeably reduces the cost of debt, measured by the 
Joan spread, by about 53 basis points which corresponds to a reduction of28% ofthe average 
Joan spread ( 188 basis points). Recently, Ku mar and Rabinovitch (20 13) fi nd evidence of 
cost of debt reduction due to oïl and gas hedging for a sample of 41 U.S. oil and gas 
producers during 1996-2008. Their estimated reduction in cost of borrowing is about 27.3 
basis points, which translates into an average reduction of 14.26% in Joan spread. 
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3.3 Sample construction and characteristics 
3.3 .1 Data collection 
We begin our sampling by a first list of 413 US oïl and gas producers with the primary 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 1311.46 Next, we retain firms which are covered 
by COMPUSTAT, have at !east five years of historical data on oïl and gas reserves du ring the 
period 1998 to 2010, and have their 10-K and 10-Q reports available from the EDGAR 
website. Our fmal sample consists of 150 firms with an unbalanced panel of 6,326 firm-
quarter observations. 
Data regarding financial characteristics are retrieved from the COMPUST AT quarter! y 
dataset held by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Operational and geographie 
segment data are taken from the SEGMENT files of COMPUST AT. Other items related to 
institutional shareholdings are from the Thomson Reuters dataset maintained by WRDS. Data 
related to oïl and gas production quantities, cash costs, geographical dispersion in production 
activities are taken from Bloomberg's annual dataset and verified and completed by hand-
collecting data directly from 1 0-K an nuai reports. Daily stock return data cornes from the 
CRSP dataset he1d by WRDS and daily c1osing priees of oïl and gas Future contracts are 
from the web site of the Energy Information Administration. We obtain loan contracts data 
for our sample firms from Loan Pricing Corporation's Dealscan database held by WRDS. 
Characteristics on Joan contracts include Joan spread, maturity, s ize, types, and purposes. Our 
final loan sample contains a total of 694 Joan contracts signed by 115 firms. Quarterly data 
about oïl and gas producers ' hedging activities were hand-collected from 1 0-K and 1 0-Q 
reports. 
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics: Firms and loans ' characteristics 
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for firms and loan contracts characteristics in the 
sample. Statistics show that gas hedging and oïl hedging occurred in 49.58% and 41.21% of 
46 The SIC code 1311 , Crude Petro1eum and Natura1 Gas, comprises companies primari1y invo1ved in the 
operation ofproperties for the recovery ofhydrocarbon 1iquids and natura1 gas. 
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the firm-quarters in the sample, respectively. 55.15% of the sample firm-quarters hedge gas 
and/or oil. These proportions are somewhat lower than proportions reported in Jin and Jorion 
(2006), who examine a sample of 119 U.S oil and gas producers from 1998 to 2001 (the ir 
corresponding proportions are 51.12%, 43.33% and 62.42%). In addition, IR and FX risk 
hedging occurred, respectively, in 17.18% and 4.5% of the firm-quarters. 
Table 3.1 also reports summary statistics on firms ' financial characteristics such as firm 
size (market value of assets) and sales. Mean and median values of these characteristics show 
that our sample comprises relatively small firms and a few large producers. On average, 
73.5% of total assets are fixed assets as indicated by the tangibility measure (net PP E sca led 
by total assets) since oil and gas industry is highly capital intensive. This latter percentage is 
somewhat lower than the 83% reported in Kumar and Rabinovitch (2013) for a sample of 41 
U.S oil and gas producers for the period 1996-2008. Sample fu·ms derive, on average, 87% of 
their revenues from oil and gas production, with 35% from oil and 52% from gas production , 
and 87% oftheir sales are in the U.S market. 
-------- ----------------- ---
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics for sample firm s 
Variables Obs Mean Median 1" quartile 3 quartil e Std. Dev 
Varia bles thal proxy for hedg ing acti vity 
GAS_HEDG 6,326 0.496 0 0 0.500 
0 /L_HEDG 6,326 0.4 12 0 0 0.492 
O!UGAS_HEIJG 6,326 0.55 1 1 0 1 0.497 
IR HEDG 6,326 0. 172 0 0 0 0.377 
FX_HEDG 6,326 0.045 0 0 0 0.207 
Va riables that proxy for underin vestment costs 
!NV_OPP 6,006 0.224 0075 0.04 1 0.129 3.6 19 
Variables that proxy for tax advantage 
TLCF 6,066 0. 134 0 0 0.064 0.438 
TAX_SAVE 6,160 0.052 0.048 0.029 0.070 0.05 1 
Variables thal proxy fo r fi nancial constra ints 
DTD 5,686 2.234 2.052 1.323 2.862 1.36 1 
SIGMA_ASSET 5,675 0.492 0.395 0.276 0.5 88 0.34 1 
LEVERAGE 6,063 0.289 0.263 0.095 0.407 0.26 1 
Q_RAT/0 6,069 1.555 0275 0.079 0.850 5.334 
CASH_COST 6,24 1 9.860 7.527 4.684 12.230 8.44 1 
Variables thal proxy fo r in forma tion asymmetry 
%_CS_!NST 6,326 0.372 0.299 0.000 0.742 0.353 
Variables thal proxy for production characteristi cs 
UNCER_OIL 6,058 0.4 16 0.3 13 0.14 1 0.587 0.388 
PQ_GOR_OIL 6,119 0.229 0.455 -0.287 0.723 0.587 
UNCER_GAS 6,078 0.408 0.303 0. 146 0.582 0.359 
PQ_COR_GAS 6,11 2 0.154 0.230 -0.174 0.504 0.419 
HERF_GAS 6,180 0.063 0 0 0 0. 183 
HERF_O!L 6,178 0. 100 0 0 0 0.233 
Variables that proxy for revenues characteristics 
SALES 6,147 1,4 19.332 24.062 3.370 170. 193 7,880.685 
OIL&GAS_REV 6,2 16 0.864 1 0.98 1 1 0.284 
OIL_REV 6,204 0.35 1 0.273 0. 107 0.526 0.350 
GAS_REV 6,204 0.5 19 0.566 0.242 0.785 0.3 11 
US_SALES 6,304 0.870 1 0.926 1 0.279 
O!L_?R!CE 3,0 12 54.658 54.570 33.645 69.225 23.660 
GAS_PRICE 3,000 5.653 5.510 4. 190 6.925 2.253 
Variables that proxy for firm size 
TANGIBILITY 6,033 0.735 0.8 11 0.644 0.879 0.200 
SilE 5,920 9,782.407 480.944 91.262 2,90 1.530 44,54 1.910 
Variables that proxy for finn performance and risk 
BETA MKT 5,097 0.895 0.830 0.272 1.449 1.050 
BETA_OIL 5,097 0.20 1 0. 14 1 -0.045 0.42 1 0.5 10 
BETA_GAS 5,097 0.086 0.063 -0.054 0.2 10 0.338 
RISK TOTAL 5,099 0.577 0.467 0.334 0.682 0.384 
RISK_SPECIFIC 5,099 3.307 2.769 1.990 1.966 2.07 1 
ROE 6,060 0.024 0.023 -0.014 0.054 2.079 
ROA 6,061 -0.002 0.009 -0.007 0.024 0.093 
EBITDA 6,053 0.030 0.040 0.0 14 0.063 0. 100 
Note: 
This table pro vides fi nancial and operational stati stics for the !50 US oi l and gas producers for the period 1998 to 201 O. Ali 
variables' definitions and construction are in Table A.3. 1 (Appendix.) 
-------------------
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The Table shows that oil and gas producers maintain low leverage levels (book value of 
debt in current liabilities plus book value of long term debt scaled by total assets), with a 
mean (median) of 29% (26%), have distance to default with a mean (median) of 2.234 
(2.054), and have asset volatility with a mean (median) of 49% (39%). These latter figures 
are quite similar to th ose reported by Campel Jo et al. (20 Il). Table a Iso reports summary 
statistics on stocks ' market betas, and oil and gas betas, calculated on quarterly basis based 
on three factors market mode! constituted by daily market returns and daily changes in oil 
and gas near-month Future contracts priees. Our sample firms have a systematic risk (market 
beta), oil beta, and gas beta with mean (median) of 0.89 (0 .83), 0.20 (0.14), and 0.08 (0 .06) 
respectively. Our sample has higher systematic risk then corresponding market beta reported 
in Jin and Jorion (2006) and Haushalter, Heron, and Lie (2002). Oil beta estimates are in line 
with those reported in the two previous studies. On average, gas beta is significantly lower 
than oil beta indicating that stock returns are more sensitive to fluctuations in oil priees. 
Pertaining to finn aggregate risk as measured by annualized standard deviations of daily 
returns calcu lated in quarterly basis, statistics indicate a volatility of equity of about 0.58. We 
also follow previous litera ture ( e.g., Hentschel and Kothari , 2001 ; Bartram, Brown, and 
Conrad, 2011) and standardize equity volatility by market index volatility as a measure ofthe 
firm ' s idiosyncratic risk. This measure avoids the potential bias from spurious correlation 
between risk management activities and overall market volatility. Sample firms appear to 
have substantial idiosyncratic risks with an average return volatility which is more than three 
times the market volatility. These two latter figures are relatively similar to those reported in 
Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (20 Il) for the ir international sample. The Table a Iso repot1s 
summary statistics on firm profitability as measured by the return on equity (net income 
scaled by market value of equity) and the return on asset (net income scaled by total assets), 
and other firm operational characteristics such as product ion uncerta inty (coeffic ient of 
variation of da ily production), geographical divers ificat ion in production activ ities and the 
price-quantity correlation. 
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Table 3.2 reports summary statiStics on loan characteristics. The average loan spread, 
based on DealScan 's ali in spread drawn47, is 201 basis points over LIBOR and with a 
median of 162.5 basis points .. Loan size has a mean (median) of $645 million ($275 million) 
and the loan maturity has a mean (median) of 1,246 da ys or about 41.5 months ( 1,275 da ys). 
The average spread loan and maturity is relatively higher than corresponding spreads 
reported in Ku mar and Rabinovitch (20 13 ), who report an average loan spread of 191.67 for a 
sample of 41 U.S oil and gas producers for the period 1996-2008, and the loan maturity is 
quite similar to the maturity reported in this same study. In addition, Table 3.2 reports 
statistics related to loan type and Joan primary purpose ( dummy variable for each type (5 
types) and purpose (6 purposes)). 72.5% of loans in the sample are revolver loans (70.1% are 
revolvers longer than one year and 2.4% revolvers shorter than one year) and 12.8% are term 
loans, whereas the remainder is 364-day facilities and others. Regarding loans' purposes, 
about 41% of loans in the sample are for general c01·porate pUI·poses, 24% are for working 
capital financing, 16% are for project financing, and 10.5% are for debt repayment. 
47 Ali-In Spread Drawn: Describes the amount the borrower pays in basis points over L!BOR for each dollar 
drawn down. This measure adds the spread of the loan with any annual (or facility) fee paid to the bank group 
(Loan Pricing Corporation Deal Scan). 
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Table 3.2 Swnmary stati stics for loan characteristics 
Variables Obs Mean Median l" quartile 3' quartile Std. Dev 
LOANSPREAD 615 200.781 162.500 11 2.500 250 165.566 
(ail-in spread 
drawn) 
LOANSIZE 692 645.662 275 100 600 1,382.889 
($Mill) 
MATURJTY (in 654 1,246 1,275 900 1800 570 
days) 
LOAN TYPES 
REVOLVER(> 1 692 0.704 0 0.456 
year) 
REVOLVER (<1 692 0.021 0 0 0 0. 145 
yem) 
364-DAY 692 0.083 0 0 0 0.277 
FACIL!TY 
TERM LOAN 692 0.128 0 0 0 0.335 
LOAN 
PURPOSES 
CORPORATE 692 0.406 0 0 1 0.49 1 
WORKCAP 692 0.24 1 0 0 0 0.428 
DEBTREPAY 692 0.105 0 0 0 0.307 
PROJECT 692 0.161 0 0 0 0.368 
FINANCE 
BACKUP U NE 692 0.063 0 0 0 0.244 
Variables that proxy for macro controls 
CREDIT SPREAD 6,194 1.065 0.9 1 0.8 1 1. 18 0.494 
TERMSPREAD 6,194 1.370 1.56 0. 14 2.58 1.2 18 
Note: 
This table provides summary statistics on 692 lean contracts in our sample. Ali var iables' definit ions and 
construction are in Table A.3 .1. 
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics: O il and gas hedging activities 
Table 3.3 shows that oil and gas producers report hedging activity for 3,489 finn-
quarters, which represent al most 55% of the whole panel of 6,326 firm-quarters . Gas hedging 
occurs in 3,137 firm-quarters or a lmost 50% of the whole sample and oil hedging takes place 
in 2,607 firm-quarters or almost 41% of the sample. Oil and gas producers report hedging 
activities for bath oil and gas in about 2,255 firm-quarters. Regarding the nature of hedging 
instruments in use, Table 3.4 shows that the most common hedging vehicles are swap 
contracts, with 45.58% (45 .25%) of use in gas (oil) hedging. The second most frequently 
used instrument is the costless collar, with 37.19% (37.11%) for gas (oil) hedging. Next are 
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put options, with 10.55% for gas hedging and 11 .85% for oi1 hedging. The least hedging 
instruments in use are forward or futures contracts, with only 3.25% (2.78%) for gas (oil) 
hedging, and three-way collars, with only 3.42% (3.02%) for gas (oit) hedging. 
Gas hedgers 
Non-gas hedgers 
Total 
Note: 
Table 3.3 Distribution ofhedging decisions by firm-quarter 
Hedging activity: Finn- quarter 
Oil hedgers 
2,255 
352 
2,607 
Non-oi 1 hedgers 
882 
2,837 
3,719 
Total 
3, 137 
3, 189 
6,326 
This table breaks down the total sample of6,326 firm-quarters into observations with and withoul oi l hedging and 
with and without gas hedging. 
Fina.ncial instrument 
Swap contracts 
Put options 
Costless collars 
Forwards or futures 
Three-way coll ars 
Total 
Note: 
Table 3.4 Hedging instruments used by oil and gas producers 
Gas hedging 
Number offirm-
guarters 
2,255 
522 
1,840 
16 1 
169 
4,947 
Percentage of use 
45.58% 
10.55% 
37. 19% 
3.25% 
3.42% 
100% 
Oil hedging 
Number of 
firm- gumters Percentage of use 
1,7 11 
448 
1,403 
105 
114 
3,78 1 
45 .25% 
11.85% 
37. 11 % 
2.78% 
3.02% 
100% 
Thi s table reports the different types of financia l instruments used by the sample tinns that report oi l and gas 
hedging act ivi ties in a given firm-qua1ter observation. The values fo r each instrument indicate the number of 
firm-quarters and the fraction (in percentage) of use. 
Table 3.5 shows descriptive statistics for hedging rat ios by horizon as measured by the 
fraction of production hedged.48 Statist ics on aggregate hedging (aggregate hedging portfolio 
for oil and gas production respectively) ratios by horizon show that firms in Jhe sample hedge 
their commodity exposures for the current fiscal year to five years ahead . The average 
hedging ratio for near-term exposures (i.e., hedging ratio for the remaining time of the current 
fiscal year) is around 51% for gas hedging and 46% for oil hedging. These figures are in tine 
with the corresponding average fraction of production of 46% reported in Kumar and 
Rabinov itch (20 13), who calculate their fractions of production hedged for the current 
48 We fo llow Haushalter (2000) and use national quantities to mea.sure the Fraction of Production Hedged (FPH) 
by hori zon. 
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quarter. Regarding hedging ratios by instrument, we retain observations related to swap 
contracts, costless col lars, and put options because they contr ibute to more than 93% of cases 
for gas hedging activity and 94% for oi l hedging. We observe that swap contracts are 
employed to hedge 38% (37%) on average of gas (o il ) production for the current fisca l year 
(i.e., HR _ 0). For the sa me near-term exposures, we fi nd that oi l and gas producers hedge with 
costless col lars aroulid 31% of their gas and oi l productions respective ly. Put options 
contribute to the hedging of around 28% (32%) of gas (oi l) production during the remaining 
time of the current fiscal year. Descriptive statistics also show that oi l and gas producers 
undertake quite similar hedging ratios by instrument and horizon for both oi l and gas 
production. 
Table A.3 . 1 gives more details on the construction of variab les. 
Table 3.5 SWTimary statistics ofhedging ratios by horizon 
Panel B: Oil hed in 
HR 0 HR 0 HR 1 HR 2 !-IR 3 HR 4 J-/R 5 
Aggregate hedging portfolio 
Mean 0.509 0.376 0.275 0.221 0.180 0.186 0.461 0.3 83 0.308 0.273 0.233 0.218 
Median 0.489 0.309 0.194 0.116 0.076 0.059 0.446 0.360 0.268 0.1 99 0. 147 0.197 
Std Dev 0.300 0.294 0.281 0.272 0.271 0.260 0.279 0.273 0.257 0.258 0.246 0. 183 
Obs 3, 108 2,295 1,225 548 266 127 2,587 1,723 907 431 185 6 1 
Swa contracts 
Mean 0.376 0.294 0.240 0.200 0.164 0.185 0.367 0.302 0.257 0.242 0.204 0.233 
Median 0.313 0.213 0.146 0.101 0.070 0.056 0.335 0.242 0.191 0.173 0. 144 0.192 
Std Dev 0.290 0.269 0.251 0.228 0.233 0.255 0.253 0.245 0.233 0.227 0.188 0.184 
Obs 2, 169 1,571 887 472 246 121 1,657 1,092 579 286 134 40 
Costless co/lars 
Mean 0.311 0.251 0.187 0.153 0.115 0.148 0.309 0.251 0.2 10 0.173 0.122 0.103 
Median 0.251 0.191 0.142 0.134 0.100 0.117 0.262 0.203 0.159 0.1 16 0.065 0.035 
Std Dev 0.244 0.215 0.166 0.126 0.103 0.092 0.231 0.2 11 0. 195 0.160 0.120 0.120 
Obs 1,777 1,218 486 130 41 7 1,298 883 410 182 62 18 
Put o tions 
Mean 0.285 0.241 0.260 0.203 0.240 0. 125 0.322 0.330 0.298 0.328 0.442 
Median 0.193 0.164 0.188 0. 122 0.1 76 0.125 0.236 0.277 0.22 1 0.281 0.537 
Std Dev 0.22 1 0.227 0.257 0.226 0.220 0. 134 0.274 0.264 0.260 0.286 0.3 19 
Obs 492 248 97 28 10 2 411 241 102 30 9 
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3.4 Empirical results 
In this section, we first carry out univariate tests to compare firm-quarters with and 
without oil and/or gas hedging in terms of finn and loan characteristics. We then perform 
more rigorous multivariate tests to examine the effects of hedging on finn performance, ri sk, 
debt capacity, and external financing costs. To account for the potential endogeneity and bi-
directional causa lity between firm 's derivative use and other dec isions, we conduct a li our 
multivariate tests on a simultaneous equat ions setting by the three-stage least squares (3-SLS) 
technique. We also control for the endogeneity problem by examining finns in the same 
industry; they have the same exposure to commodity priee risk and they differ vast ly in terms 
of their hedging behavior. Relative to other empirical studies, we minimize the endogeneity 
which is a real concern for any study dealing with financial decision-making channels ins ide 
firms. 
To gain further insight, we decompose the aggregate o il and gas hedging pos itions and 
investigate the real implications of each hedging instrument separately, namely swap 
contracts, costless col lars, and put options. We then perform pairwise s imultaneous equation 
regressions. In the first equation, each measure of firm performance, ri sk, debt capacity, and 
external financing costs enters as an endogenous variable supplemented by appropriate 
control variab les that have been shawn elsewhere to be assoc iated with the retained measure 
( e.g., Campe llo et al, 2011 ). In the second equation, we inc lude the hedge ratio of the 
aggregate hedging portfolio or by instrument as endogenous variables.49 
As control variables for the hedge ratio equation, we include the leverage, the quick ratio, 
sales (in logarithm), variables related to tax incentives (tax save measure and tax loss carry 
forward), oil and gas spot priees and their vo latilities, variab les related to production 
characteristics (price-quantity correlation, quantity risk, and geographical diversification). Ali 
control variables enter the regressions in lagged values to better alleviate the endogeneity 
problem. Finally, ali regression have firm and time fixed effects by including dummy 
variables for each firm and quarter. 
49 We only consider hedging ratios for the remaining period of the current fiscal year (HR_O). 
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3.4.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 3.6 presents the results comparing the characteristics of firms and loans for finn-
quarters with and without oil and/or gas hedging in place. A Wilcoxon test for difference in 
medians shows considerable differences between firm-quarters with and without hedging. 
Consistent with the previous literature, we find that hedgers are much larger than non-
hedgers, more leveraged, and have higher asset tangibility, as weil as lower asset volatility 
and higher distance-to-default. We also find that hedgers have higher oil and gas selling 
priees and higher accounting performance as measured by the ROE, ROA , and EBITDA. 
Moreover, hedgers exhibit higher stock return sensitivity to the market index return, and 
oil and gas priee fluctuations as measured by their respective betas. One possible explanation 
is that hedgers are much larger in terms of size and sales, and then have higher exposure to 
both market index and commodity priee fluctuations. However, this higher sensitivity to 
market index fluctuations does not translate into higher stock return volatility because 
hedgers have lower stock return volatility and lower idiosyncratic risk. These findings are 
quite similar to those in Hentschel and Kothari (2001), who find that hedgers have higher 
market beta and 1ower idiosyncratic risk. More importantly, hedgers have access to larger 
loans with longer maturities. Comparison of medians further indicates that hedgers pay 
higher spread loan of 25 basis points, which is around 12.5% of the sample mean spread of 
200 basis points. However, this difference in median spreads is not significant at 
conventionallevels. 
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Table 3.6 Univariate tests 
Non-Hedgers Hedgers 
Wilcoxon Wilcoxon 
Varia bl es Obs Median Obs Median Z-score p-Va lue 
S!ZE($Mi/l) 2,505 82.344 3,4 15 1,256.602 -38.373 0.000 
SALES ($Mill) 2,636 3.3 19 3,448 65.623 -38.225 0.000 
TANGIBILITY 2,592 0.684 3,44 1 0.845 -27 .72 1 0.000 
LE VERA GE 2,604 0. 122 3,459 0.328 -30.838 0.000 
DTD 2,303 1.726 3,383 2.256 - 14.7 13 0.000 
SIGMA_ASSET 2,304 0.5 13 3,37 1 0.347 24.203 0 000 
%_CS_!NST 2,837 0.0 13 3,489 0.633 -39.76 1 0.000 
GAS_PRICE($/Mcj) 898 5.305 2, 102 5.6 15 -5.679 0.000 
0 /L_PRICE($/bb/) 93 1 50 .670 2,08 1 56.4 10 -4 .694 0.000 
BETA_MKT 1,825 0.637 3,272 0 .906 -9.454 0.000 
BETA_OIL 1,825 0. 11 5 3,272 0. 157 -3 .474 0.000 
BETA GAS 1,825 0.033 3,272 0.077 -7.368 0.000 
SIG _TOTAL 1,825 0.546 3,274 0.436 11.475 0.000 
SIG_SPECIFIC 1,825 3.922 3,274 2.964 12.665 0.000 
ROE 2,608 0.0 14 3,452 0.028 -7.993 0.000 
ROA 2,602 0.006 3,459 0.0 11 -6.040 0.000 
EBITDA 2,598 0.029 3,455 0.044 - 12.725 0.000 
LOAN SPREAD (a/l-in 126 150 489 175 - 1. 102 0.276 
drawn spread) 
LOAN SIZE($Mill) 153 200 539 300 -2.098 0.036 
MATUR/TY (in daJ!_sJ 140 1,080 5 14 1,350 -2. 108 0.035 
Note : 
Thi s table compares medians of firms and Joan characteri stics fo r hedgers and non-hedgers. Comparison of 
medians is constructed using Wilcoxon rank-sum Z-test. Two-sided p -values are reported. Ali variables ' 
definiti ons and construction are in Table A.3. 1. 
3.4 .2 Risk management and firm performance 
In this sub-section, we ask whether corporate ri sk management have real impact on firm 
operational performance as measured by realized priees of o il and gas, which inc lude the 
monetary effects of hedging activities, and accounting performance as measured by the return 
on equity (ROE) and the return on assets (ROA). 
3 .4 .2.1 O il and gas realized priees 
Table 3.7 reports the results of the 3-SLS estimations where the endogenous variables are 
hedge ratios and rea lized priees of oil and gas. As contro l variables for realized priee 
equation, we include the percentage of sa les in the U.S market, the percentage of revenues 
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from oil (gas) production, quantity of oil (gas) daily production, oil (gas) spot priees and 
volatilities, and oil (gas) production uncertainty. 
Panel A of Table 3.7 shows a significant positive impact of the hedging intensity on gas 
realized priees. Not only is this effect is statistically s ignificant, it is moreover economically 
important. The estimated coefficient (Table 3.7, Column 1) implies that gas hedgers with an 
average hedging intensity earn about 1.6$/Mcf (1 000 cubic feet) more than non-hedgers (= 
3.1 212 x0.51 , ·where 0.51 is the mean intensity for the aggregate hedg ing portfolio for gas 
production reported in Table 3.7). Relative to the average gas realized priee of 5.653$/Mcf, 
this represents an increase of about 28% (=1.6$/5.653$). Regarding hedging intensity by 
instrument, Panel A of Table 3.7 shows that costless collars and put options have a 
statistically and economically significant positive impacts on gas realized priees. The average 
hedging ratio by costless collars contribute to an increase of 1.57$/Mcf(=5.067 x0.31 , where 
0.31 is the mean intensity for costless col lars). The average hedging intens ity of put options 
contribute to an increase of 4.4$/Mcf (=15.685 x0.285, where 0.285 is the mean intensity for 
put options). Relative to the average realized priee for gas, this represents an increase of 
about 28% (=1.57$/5.653$) for costless col lars and 78% (=4.4$/5.653$) for put options. 
,-------------------------------
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Table 3.7 Simultaneous equation analysis ofhedging extent and rea lized sell ing priees 
Panel A: Gas hedgi ng Panel B: Oil hedging 
Hedging Swap Costless Put Hedging Swap Costless Put 
portfolio contracts coll ars options portfolio contracts coll ars opt ions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Equation 1: Gas (oit) rca lizcd priee is the depe nde nt varia ble 
HEDGE RATIO 3.12 12*** 1.7610 5.0670*** 15.6856*** -1 5077 -1 3.649 1* 31.7962** 37.6445 
(0.636) (1.086) (1 052) (4.532) (6.240) (7 815) (15.433) (27.4 12) 
US_SALES -0. 1348 0.0299 -0.2277 0.9045* -0. 1479 -0.7447 1.4297 -0 .9089 
(0.3 16) (0.3 19) (0.274) (0.547) (1 117) (0 .868) (2 .002) (0 .968) 
GAS{OIL)_REV -0.95 14*** -0.8529*** -0.7843** -1 .6267*** -4 .8646** -3.9697** -7.7759*** -3.0073 
(0.299) (0 .287) (0.307) (0.483) ( 1.908) (1.893) (2.420) (2 .309) 
GAS(OIL)_PROD 00000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0 0002 0.0050 0.0004 0.0270* 0.0006 
(0.000) (0 000) (0 .000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.005) (0.0 14) (0.005) 
VOL_GAS(O!L) 0.4057*** 0.3974*** 0.3517* ** 0.4209** 0.88 12*** 0.887 1*** 0.82 12*** 0.9239** * 
(0. 127) (0. 12 1) (0 .1 32) (0 .179) (0. 104) (0.105) (0 . 11 9) (0 .11 7) 
SPOT_ GAS{OIL) 0.5476*** 0.5673*** 0.5304*** 0.6280*** 0.6306*** 0.632 1 ••• 0.6155*** 0.6255*** 
(0.02 1) (0.0 19) (0.023) (0 .033) (0.012) (0.0 11 ) (0 0 14) (0.0 12) 
UNCER_GAS{OIL) 0.0967 0.4415*** -0.0235 -0. 11 94 2.2 169 3.3285** 1.73 19 0.5338 
(0. 170) (0 150) (0 187) (0 .268) ( 1. 594) (1.4 71) (1.393) ( 1.734) 
CONSTANT 1.8708*** 1.4943*** 2.2458*** 0.2226 10. 1957*** 1 0.3343*** 1 0.6866*** 1 1.0354*** 
(0.461) (0.452) (0 .438) (0 774) (2.357) (2 208) (2 995) (2342) 
Obsen>ations 2,880 2,880 2,880 2,880 2,870 2,870 2,870 2,870 
R-squared 0.6562 0.6857 0.6 194 0.3234 0. 8638 0.8593 0.8303 0.8436 
Chi_2 5890.2460 6432.030 1 545 1.4366 2982.99 11 18209.7200 17607.2953 14597.02 19 15774.1048 
p-l'alue 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Equation 2: Hcdge ratio is t he de 11endent variab le 
GAS{OIL}_PRICE -0.0470 0.00 17 0.0088 -0 .0530 -0.0232 -0.0 137 -0.0244 0.0087 
(0.062) (0 .048) (0.048) (0.032) (0.020) (0.0 15) (0 .0 15) (0.0 10) 
TAX_SAVE 0.0064 -0.0526 0.0673 -0.0000 -0.0020 -0.0075 0.0050 0.0050 
(0.070) (0 .053) (0.045) (0.037) (0 .063) (0.035) (0.075) (0.0 14) 
TLCF -0.0366* -0.0005 -0.0246* -0 .0037 -0.0423 -0.0567** 0.0382 0.0 192 
(0.022) (0 0 17) (0.0 14) (0 .0 11 ) (0.037) (0.028) (0.030) (0.017) 
VOL_GAS(O!L) 0.0 137 -0.004 1 0.0044 0.0206 0.0208 0.0 126 0.02 17 -0.0094 
(0.031) (0 .024) (0. 025) (0.0 16) (0.0 17) (0.0 13) (0 .0 13) (0.008) 
SPOT_ GAS{OIL) 0.0264 0.0023 -0.0027 0.0231 0.0 153 0.0088 0.0 156 -0.0054 
(0.033) (0.026) (0.026) (0.0 17) (0 .0 13) (0 .009) (0 .0 10) (0 .006) 
Q_RAT/0 -0.00 17 -0.0007 -0.00 11 -0.0009 -0.00 10 -0.00 11 0.0005 0.0006 
(0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0 .00 1) (0 .00 1) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) 
SALES 0.0665*** 0.0 128 0.0359*** 0.026 1*** 0.0209 -0.0032 0.0278* 0.0082 
(0 017) (0 0 13) (0.0 13) (0 .009) (0.0 19) (0.0 13) (0.0 16) (0.008) 
LEVERAGE 0.1 009*** 0.0939*** -0.0004 -0.0329* 0.040 1 0.06 11 ** -0.0084 -0.0173 
(0.038) (0 .029) (0.026) (0 .020) (0 .037) (0 .027) (0.037) (0.015) 
PQ_COR_GAS{OIL) -0.0795*** -0.08 19*** -0.0048 -0.033 1** 0.0 108 0.0150 -0.06 18** -0.0026 
(0.028) (0.02 1) (0 020) (00 15) (0.029) (0.020) (0 .028) (0 .0 15) 
UNCER_GAS(O!L) 0.0495** -0.034 1* 0.0475** 0.0343*** 0.1742*** 0. 11 68*** 0.053 1 0.0 155 
(0 .025) (0.019) (0 020) (0.0 13) (0.05 1) (0.038) (0.039) (0.026) 
HERF_GAS{OIL) -03 132*** -0. 1308* -0.1899*** -0.0422 -0.2708*** -0.1340*** -0 .0504 0.0 136 
(0 .098) (0.075) (0.073) (0.05 1) (0.078) (0.050) (0.064) (0.02 1) 
CONSTANT -0.3636*** -0.1207** -0.2869*** -0 0379 0.0058 0.1054 0.0531 -0 .1266* 
(0.062) (0048) (0 .047) (0.032) (0. 147) (0 I l 0) (0 11 0) (0 .073) 
Observations 2,880 2,880 2,880 2,880 2,870 2,870 2,870 2,870 
R-squared 0.638 1 0.625 1 0.5097 0.0523 0.20 18 0.2892 -0.7790 0. 1042 
Chi_ 2 5480.4338 4807.6629 2985 .9036 1126.65 18 1569.80 11 1287.8327 826.4356 11 06.3186 
e. -value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0000 0 0000 0.0000 
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Note: 
This tabl e presents the results of 3-SLS simultaneous equations estimation linking hedging extent with oil and gas 
realized priees to account fo r endogeneity between the two vari ables. The dependent variable in Equation 1 is gas 
(oil) realized priees. The dependent vari able in Equation 2 is the hedgi ng extent (for the aggregate hedging 
portfo lio and by instrument). The estimation is done for gas hedging (Panel A) and oil hedging (Panel B), 
separately. Ali independent variabl es enter regressions with lagged values. Ali variables' defi nitions and 
construction are detailed in Table A.3 .1. Ali regressions have fi rm and ti me fixed e tfects (not reported for 
conciseness). The t-statistics are into parentheses. *** Signifi cant at the 1% leve!,** Signifi cant at the 5% leve!,* 
Significant at the 10% leve!. 
Surprising ly, Panel B of Table 3.7 indicates that aggregate hedging portfolio of o ïl 
production has no real effects on o ïl rea lized priees. However, results further show that 
hedging oïl production by swap contacts leads to a significant reduction in o ïl realized priees 
of about 5$/barrel (=-13 .649 x0.367, where 0.367 is the mean intens ity for swap contracts) or 
equivalently a reduction of about 9.14% of the average realized priee of 54.65 8$/barrel. On 
the contrary, costless co llars contribute to an important increase of about 9.856$/barrel in o ïl 
realized priees or 18% of the average o ïl priee. Overa 11 , hedging instruments departing from 
strict linearity ( i.e. , put options and cost1 ess co 11ars) have the highest positive impacts on 
realized priees. These instruments a llow firms to profit from any potentia l upside. Although, 
swap contracts permit firms to fix the ir selling priees, they deprive them from any important 
increase in priees. 
Results a lso indicate no bi-directiona l causality between rea lized pnces and hedging 
intensities. In fact, oïl and gas producers appear to not consider rea lized pnces when 
adjusting their hedging intensities and strategies. Regardi ng control variables in priee 
equations, we fi nd that fi rms deriv ing most of the ir revenues from either oil or gas earn lower 
realized priees. Rea lized priees a lso are s ignificantly positive ly related to spot priees and their 
vo1atilities, and to production uncerta inty. 
3.4.2.2 Account ing performance 
We carry out 3-SLS regress ions where the endogenous variables are hedge ratios and o ne 
of the two measures of finn accounting profit: 1) return on equity (ROE) , and 2) return on 
asset (ROA). We obtain qualitatively similar results. We focus on the ROA results reported in 
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Table 3.8 to save space (results related to the ROE are tabulated in Table A.3.2). As control 
variables for ROA equation, we include the firm size (in logarithm), the leverage ratio, the 
percentage of revenues from oit and gas production, the percentage of sales in the U.S 
market, investment expenditures, production cost per barrel of oit equivalent, and 
institutional shareholding. 
Panel A of Table 3.8 shows a significant positive impact of gas hedging intensity on finn 
ROA. Specifically, the ROA for gas hedgers increases by a significant 4.99 basis points 
(0.0499%) for each 1% increase in the aggregate hedging portfolio of gas production. Given 
the average ratio of 51% for gas hedging portfolio, this translates into a higher ROA of about 
255 basis points or 2.55%, which places the firm in the top quartile in term of ROA. Panel A 
of Table 3.8, for gas hedging, further indicates that 1% increase in hedging intensity by swap 
contracts, collars, and put options leads to an increase in ROA of 8.28, 7.39, and 23.36 basis 
points respectively. Results related to oil hedging reported in Panel B also show a significant 
increase of 9.67 basis points in ROA for each 1% increase in the hedged fraction of oil 
production. The positive impact on ROA from oil hedging comes particularly fi·om costless 
collars and put options with 33.37 and 118.02 basis points respectively. More impo11antly, we 
find that most beneficiai effects come from put options. This corroborates the results with 
realized priees. However the impact of put options is statistically insignificant for oil realized 
priees white it is highly significant for ROA. These findings support the hedging premium 
hypothesis, that is corporate risk management translates into higher finn value and 
performance. 
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Table 3.8 Simultaneous equation analysis ofhedging extent and the return on asset 
Panel A: Gas hedgi ng Panel B: Oil hedgin1l 
Hedging Swap Costless Put Hedging Swap Cost less Put 
portfoli o con tracts coll ars options portfoli o contracts coll ars options 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Eq uation 1 : Rcturn on asset is the depende nt varia ble 
HEDGERAT!O 0.0499*** 0.0828** 0.0739** 0.2336*** 0.0967*** 0.0307 0.3373*** 1.1802*** 
(0.0 14) (0.034) (0.032) (0.086) (0.030) (0 .035) (0.092) (0.455) 
SIZE 0.00 15 0.0025** 0.0026** 0.0025** -0.0002 0.0025* 0.0003 0.0003 
(0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.002) (0 .00 1) (0.002) (0 .00 1) 
O!L&GAS_ REV -0.0005 0.000 1 0.000 1 0.000 1 -0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0004 0.000 1 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
US_SA LES 0.0053 0.0 102** 0.0059 0.0042 0.0040 0.0030 0.0128 0.0052 
(0.004) (0 .005) (0 .005) (0 .006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
!NV_OPP -0.0009** -0.0004 -0.00 12* -0.0013* -0 .00 12* -0.00 15** -0.00 11 -0 .0000 
(0 .000) (0.000) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0 .00 1) (0 00 1) (0 002) 
%_CS_JNST -0.0 128*** -0.0 147*** -0 .0150*** -0.0 126*** -0.0 111 ** -0.0 113*** -0 .0242*** -0.0076 
(0.003) (0.005) (0 .004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
CASH_COST -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0 .00 13*** -0.00 Il*** -0.00 16*** -0.0007*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0000) (0.000) (0.000) (0 .000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE -0.0 197*** -0.0227*** -0.0138*** -0.0 136*** -0 .0 138*** -0.0090* -0.0063 -0 .0 169* 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0 .006) (0.0 10) 
CONSTANT -0.0040 -0.0 169 -0.0095 -0.0 157 0.0 192 -0.0080 0.0 160 0.0006 
(0.0 10) (0.012) (0 .0 12) (0 012) (0.0 15) (0.0 13) (0 0 16) (0 .0 16) 
Obsen >ations 5,248 5,248 5,248 5,248 5,256 5,256 5,256 5,256 
R-squared 0.301 4 0.2638 0.300 1 0.2065 0.2302 0.3524 -0.3815 -3.4052 
Chi_2 2681.3427 2602.7059 2645.0520 2476.6849 2463 .7534 293 1.4679 1395.3654 745.4809 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 00000 
Equation 2: Hedge ratio is the dependent variab le 
ROA 3.4610*** 2.8830*** -0.5095 0.3242 - 1. 8996*** -0 .635 1 -1.9086*** 0.3255 
(0.966) (0.798) (0.585) (0.3 19) (0 563) (0.406) (0.4 1 0) (0.225) 
TAX_SAVE 0.0 169 -0.0380 0.0956** 0.0034 0.035 1 0.028 1 0.0180 -0.00 12 
(0.047) (0.037) (0.042) (0.020) (0.060) (0 043) (0.042) (0.009) 
TLCF -0.0227** -0.0 141 -0.0 112 0.0012 -0.0183 -0.0413*** 0.0 174** 0.00 10 
(0 .0 11 ) (0 .009) (0.0 10) (0.005) (0.0 12) (0.009) (0 .009) (0 .002) 
VOL_GAS{OIL} 0.0558*** 0.0 197 0.036 1 *** 0.0024 -0.0004 0.0022 -0.0064*** 0.0011 
(0.0 18) (00 15) (0 0 11 ) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0 001) 
SPOT_ GAS(O!L) -0.0014 -0.0057* 0.0073*** -0.0031 ** 0.0020*** 0.0008*** 0.00 13*** -0.0001 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0000) (0 .000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q_ RA T/0 -0.00 12** -0.0008* -0.000 1 -0.0002 -0 .0009 -0.0009* 0.0002 0000 1 
(0.00 1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.000) (0.000) 
SALES 0.0431*** 0.0 142*** 0.029 1*** 0.0056** 0.0436*** 0.0 162*** 0.0257*** 0.0030* 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
LEVERAGE 0.2083*** 0.1678*** 0.028 1* 0.0 124 0.0552*** 0.0873*** -0.0 188 0.0 103 
(0.026) (0.022) (0.0 16) (0.009) (0.02 1) (0 015) (0.015) (0.008) 
PQ_ COR_ GAS(O!L) -0.0 172* -0.0144* 0.0028 -0.0094** -0.0030 -0.0037 -0.00 18 0.0000 
(0 009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) 
UNCER _GA S(O 1 L} 0.0736*** 0.0308** 0.0335*** 0.0145** 0.0525*** 0.0422*** 0.0059 0.0006 
(0 015) (0.0 12) (0.013) (0.006) (0.0 14) (0.0 10) (0.010) (0.003) 
HERF_GAS(OIL) -0.1624*** -0.0692** -0.1357*** 0.0509*** -0.0707** -0.0976*** 0.0350 0.0055 
(0.038) (0.029) (0.031) (0 .015) (0.035) (0 025) (0.024) (0 .005) 
CONSTANT -0.4 151*** -0. 1337*** -0.2891 *** -0.0283 -0.4 770*** -0.2185*** -0.2304*** -0.0212 
(0.063) (0.052) (0.039) (0 .021) (0.049) (0.036) (0.036) (0.0 19) 
Observations 5,248 5,248 5,248 5,248 5,256 5,256 5,256 5,256 
R-squared 0.4504 0.353 1 0.4394 0.286 1 0.4937 0.5068 0.1787 0.3964 
Chi_2 6255.2466 4760.0622 4189.0354 2253.7585 5861.9751 5548.0440 2528.5586 3618 .6994 
e-value 0 0000 00000 0 0000 0 0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
~----
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Note: 
This table presents the results of 3-SLS simultaneous equations estimation linking hedging extent with firm ' s 
return on asset (RDA) to account for endogeneity between the two variables. The dependent variable in Equation 1 
is the ROA measured by net income divided by total assets. The dependent variable in Equation 2 is the hedgi ng 
extent (for the aggregate hedging portfolio and by instrument). The estimation is done for gas hedging (Panel A) 
and oil hedging (Panel 8) , separately. Ali independent variables enter regressions with lagged values: Ali 
variables ' definitions and construction are detailed in Table A.3.1. Ali regressions have firm and ti me fixed effects 
(not reported for conciseness). The t-statistics are into parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% leve! , ** Significant 
at the 5% leve!, * Significant at the 10% leve!. 
Results also indicate feedback effects between finn ROA and hedging intensities. Firms 
with higher accounting profitability tend to hedge more their gas production. An increase of 
1% in ROA motivates firms to increase the ir gas aggregate hedging of about 3 .46%. 
Interestingly, this increase is only significant for swap contracts. This testifies that more 
profitable firms are under pressure to maintain their accounting performance. Unpredictably, 
ROA appears to have significant negative impacts on oïl hedging intensities . ln fact, an 
increase of 1% in ROA motivates firms to eut their oïl hedging of about 1.90% . This 
reduction is only significant for costless collars positions . One possible explanation cornes 
from our previous regressions related to oïl and gas priees, where we find that oïl hedging has 
negative but insignificant effects on oïl realized priees. This may motivate manager, who 
believes that oïl hedging is less appealing, to eut oïl hedging to maintain firm performance. 
Pertaining to control variables in ROA equations, we find that larger firms have higher 
performance. ROA appears to be negatively related to the investment expenditures, 
institutional shareholding, production costs, and leverage. 
3.4.3 Risk management and firm risk 
This sub-section provides detailed evidence on the mutual effects between firms ' hedging 
activities and firms risk characteristics. Specifically, we check whether firms use derivatives 
primari ly to hedge their exposures. We would expect higher hedging intensity to be 
associated to lower firm ' s risk. Conversely, if firms use derivative primarily to speculate, we 
would expect higher hedging intensity to be related to higher firm 's risk. We then examine 
real implications of firm's hedging on the two following measures of finn risk:l) finn 
idiosyncratic risk as measured by standardized equity volatility and 2) firm systematic risk as 
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measured by its market beta (Table A.3 .1 gives details on the construction of these 
measures). 
3.4.3.1 Firm idiosyncratic risk 
We perform simultaneous equations regressiOns where the endogenous variables are 
firm's idiosyncratic risk as previously defined and hedge ratios. We make a logarithm 
transformation for the idiosyncratic risk because of its right-skewed distribution and to ease 
interpretation of results. Table 3.9 reports the results and show statistically significant 
estimated coefficients for oil and gas hedging portfolios, with 1% increase in hedging 
portfolio intensity inducing a reduction in firm's idiosyncratic risk of about 0.41% and 0.48% 
for gas and oi1 respectively. However, gas hedging effect has stronger statistical significance. 
Results related to hedging ratios by instrument indicate that swap contracts are effective 
vehicles to reduce firm's idiosyncratic risk: 1% increase in swap intensity implies a reduction 
in idiosyncratic risk of about 1.43% and 1% for gas hedging and oil hedging respectively. 
More importantly, put options appear to provide firms with the highest reduction in 
idiosyncratic risk: with 1% increase in intensity leads to a significant reduction of about 4.8% 
of oil hedging, however with statistical significance at 10% leve!. For gas hedging, put 
options also have important negative effects on idiosyncratic risk of about -1.26%. 
Surprisingly, costless collars appear to be positively associated with firm's risk with an 
estimated positive coefficient of 1.775. Overall, these findings are consistent with one strand 
of the literature which testifies that corporations use derivative to hedge and then reduce 
firm ' s riskiness (e.g. , Stulz, 1996, Bartram, Brown, and Conrad, 2011 , among others). 
Clearly, our results produce evidence that our sample firms do not speculate on commodity 
market movements. 
--- - ---------------------------- --- ---------------- ------------ --- ----------------------- ---------------
181 
Table 3.9 Simultaneous equation analysis ofhedging extent and firm idiosyncratic ri sk 
Panel A : Gas hedgi ng Panel 8 : Oi l hedging 
Hedgi ng Swap Costless Put Hedgi ng Swap Costless Put 
port folio contracts coll ars options port foli o cont racts coll ars opti ons 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 7 (8) 
Equation 1: Firm idiosyncratic risk is the dependent variable 
HEDGERAT/0 -0.4078*** -1 .4265*** -0. 1899 -1.2604** -0.47 15* -0 .998 1* •• 1.775 1* -4 .7 894* 
(0. 152) (0.456) (0.249) (0.567) (0.242) (0.367) ( 1.022) (2.603) 
SIZE -0.0925*** -0.0865** * -0. 1 078* •• -0 .1 136*** -0.0904*** -0.0924*** -0.139 1*** -0.103 1*** 
(00 12) (00 18) (0.0 11 ) (0 009) (0.0 14) (0.0 12) (0.0 18) (0.0 14) 
ROA -0. 1377** -0. 11 03* * -0 .1526** -0. 1247* -0 .111 2** -0. 10 16* -0. 1646** -0.0964 
(0.057) (0.050) (0.060) (0.068) (0.052) (0.055) (0.073) (0. 109) 
0/L&GAS_REV 0.2207*** 0. 1676* *. 0.2402* ** 0.2439*** 0. 1433**. 0.1445*** 0.2324*** 0.1726*** 
(0.045) (004 1) (0.045) (0 047) (0.039) (0.043) (0.056) (0 .049) 
US_SALES 0.0287 -0 .0 197 0.0356 -0 .0125 0.0806** 0.0867** 0.1279** 0.09 15** 
(0.038) (0.053) (0.040) (0.05 1) (0.034) (0.038) (0.055) (0.043) 
%_CS_INST 0.007 1 0.0376 -0.0 147 0.0046 0.0 100 -0 00 10 -0 025 1 -0.0 11 6 
(0.032) (0.048) (0.033) (0.035) (0 030) (0.03 1) (0.048) (0.047) 
IR_HEDG -0.0300** -0.0387 -0.0273* -0.037 1** -0.0422** -0.0440* -0.0466* -0 0409 
(0.0 15) (0.026) (0.0 14) (00 16) (0.0 18) (0.026) (0.027) (0.059) 
FX_HEDG -0 .00 11 0.0 11 4 -0.0054 0.0057 0.0076 0.0 11 0 0.0095 0.0227 
(0.027) (0 027) (0.029) (0.03 1) (0.026) (0.029) (0.037) (0.082) 
Q_IIA110 -0.0037*** -0 .005 1*** -0.0027** -0 .0030** -0.0033* * -0 .0037** -0.00 16 -0.0027 
(0.00 1) (0002) (0.001) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) "(0.00 1) (0.002) (0.002) 
LEVE RAGE 0.4204*** 0.5592* *. 0.3470* ** 0.3683**. 0.3746*** 0.4364*** 0.3333** * 0.4454*** 
(0.045) (0.075) (0.036) (0.040) (0.039) (0.049) (0.042) (0.099) 
CONSTANT 1.5832* •• 1.5802* ** 1.6979* •• 1.7935*** 1.5 138*** 1.5048* •• 1.8976* •• 1.6222*** 
(0.105) (0 159) (0.093) (0 089) (0. 120) (0.111 ) (0. 138) (0 111 ) 
Obsen,ations 4,762 4,762 4,762 4,762 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773 
R-squared 0.6557 0.4635 0.6708 0.6390 0.644 1 0.5809 0.4473 0.0522 
Chi 2 9256.8758 5434.2655 9715.4624 8899. 1446 8864.4590 72 17.6559 61 14.3380 4150.62 13 
p-vOtue 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Equation 2: Hedge rati o is the depend ent va ria ble 
IDIOSYNC _IUSK -0.1709*** -0 .1514*** -0.0488 0.0471* -0.2 192*** -0.0778* -0. 1334*** -0.0085 
(0.057) (0.043) (0.043) (0.024) (0.055) (0.040) (0.038) (0.022) 
TAX_SAVE 0.0 158 -0.0026 0.0677 0.0 137 0.0 177 0.0289 -00 19 1 0.0 166 
(0.055) (0.03 1) (0.044) (0.025) (0.050) (0.037) (0.038) (0.0 17) 
TLCF -0.0688** * -0.0268** -0.0460*** -0.0009 -0 0062 -0 .0 192** 0.0203* * -0 0035 
(0 .01 7) (0.0 11 ) (0.0 13) (0.008) (0.0 11 ) (0.008) (0.009) (0 .004) 
VOL_GAS(OIL) 0.0456** 0.00 19 0.0326*. 0.0 132* 0.0028 0.0029 -0.0009 -0.0002 
(0.0 19) (0.0 15) (0.0 14) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.00 1) 
SPOT_GAS(OIL) 0.0079*** 0.0021 0.007 1* •• -0 .00 13 0.00 1 0* •• 0.0006*** 0.0002 0.0002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q_RAT/0 -0.0027*** -0.0022*** -0.0004 -0 .000 1 -0 0020** -0.00 14** -0 .0006 -0000 1 
(0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.000) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.000) 
SALES 0.0294*** 0.00 16 0.0 176* •• 0.0066*** 0.0 17 1*** 0.0057* 0.008 1*. -0.0005 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
LEVE/lAGE 0.2534*** 0. 1968**. 0.0675**. -0 .0028 0.150 1*** 0.1203*** 0.0402** 0.0247** 
(0.030) (0.024) (0.022) (0.0 13) (0.028) (0.02 1) (0.0 19) (0.0 12) 
PQ_ COR_ GAS(OI L) -0.0253** -0.0286*** 0.0 122 -0.0179*** -0.0000 -0 .0059 0.0 103* -0 .0055 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.0 10) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
UNCER_GAS(OIL) 0.0873*** 0.0438**. 0.0198 0.0332* •• 0.0695*** 0.0587*** -0 .023 1** 0.0137** 
(0 .0 19) (0.0 13) (00 15) (0.008) (0.0 16) (0.0 12) (0.0 11 ) (0.006) 
HERF_GAS(OIL) -0.2 187*** -0 .0663*** -0. 1642*** 0.0582*** -0 .1 066*** -0.0938*** 0.0225 -0 .0113 
(0.04 1) (0.025) (0.032) (0.0 18). (0.029) (0.022) (0.02 1) (0.009) 
CONSTANT -0 .1725 0.0922 -0. 1605** -0 .1 083*. -0.0364 -0.0594 0.0623 0.0024 
(0.106) (0076) (0080) (0.046) (0098) (0.071) (0.068) (0.038) 
Obsen>ations 4,762 4,762 4,762 4,762 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773 
R-squared 0.6213 0.5476 0.4530 0.2800 0.5257 0.5 181 0.3632 0.4167 
Chi_2 8135.3652 6283.1136 3955.9155 2026.8951 5959.9473 5394.5600 3020.7439 3438.9627 
p-va/ue 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 00000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Note: 
This table presents the results of 3-SLS simultaneous equations estimation linking hedgi ng extent with firm 
idiosyncratic ri sk to account for endogeneity between the two variables. The dependent variable in Equation 1 is 
the firm idiosyncratic risk measured by stock return vol atility divided by market return volatility. The dependent 
variable in Equation 2 is the hedging extent (for the aggregate hedging portfolio and by instrument). The 
estimation is done for gas hedging (Panel A) and oil hedging (Panel B), separately. Ail independent vari ables 
enter regressions with lagged values. Ail variables' definitions and construction are detailed in Table A.3.1. Ail 
regressions have firm and time tixed etfects (not reported for conciseness). The t-statistics are into parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1% leve!, ** Significant at the 5% leve!, * Significant at the 10% leve!. 
Surprisingly, results show significant negative effects of idiosyncratic risk on hedging 
intensities. These negative effects are about 17 and 22 basis points for gas and oil hedging 
portfolios, respectively. For individual instruments, we find that firms with higher levels of 
idiosyncratic risks tend to reduce their swap and collar positions particularly: 1% increase in 
firm ' s idiosyncratic risk commits gas hedgers to reduce their swap positions by about 15 
basis points. More importantly, gas hedgers increase their put options positions by about 5 
basis points for each 1% increase in firm's idiosyncratic risk. Similarly, oit hedgers reduce 
their swap positions by about 8 basis points and their collar positions by about 13 basis points 
for each 1% increase in idiosyncratic risk. 
Two plausible explanations, for the intriguing reduction in swap positions and increase in 
put option positions as firm ' s risk increases, come from the risk-shifting the01·y ( e.g., Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). In fact, as the idiosyncratic risk increases, firm 's value 
becomes more volatile (and more leveraged) and the option character of stocks ( e.g., Merton, 
1974) becomes more important. Shareholders, then, have incentives to let firrn value under 
exposure by reducing swap positions to increase firm 's riskiness and to transfer wealth from 
debt holders to equity owners. In addition, as firms' r isk increases, managers tend to enter in 
costly non-linear hedging positions (put options) as risk-shifting behavior. 
Regarding control variables, IR hedging seems to have a significant negative effect on 
firm's idiosyncratic r isk. This find ing reiterates the hypothesis that risk management cou ld 
reduce firm ' s idiosyncratic risk (e.g. , Guay, 1999). Finally, firm ' s idiosyncratic r isk seems to 
be significantly negatively related to firm ' s size, profitability, and liquidity. On the contrary, 
more leveraged firms with lower diversification (industrial and geographical) exhibit higher 
idiosyncratic risk. Finally, we repeat the same regressions with the annualized standard 
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deviations of stock returns (with logarithmic transformation because of its distribution is 
strongly right-skewed). Results are qualitatively the same. 
3.4.3.2 Firm systematic risk 
Univariate tests show higher market betas for oil and gas hedgers. At first glanee, one 
would suspect that derivative use causes firm systematic risk to increase and consequently 
firm cost of equity to be higher. As Adam and Fernando (2006) point out, any positive link 
between hedging and firm's systematic risk implies higher cost of equity implying that the 
potential positive cash flows related to hedging would not translate into higher valu e gains 
for shareholders. Therefore, we inspect in a more rigorous manner the potential effects 
between hedging intensity and firm ' s systematic ri s k. First, we follow previous studies ( e.g., 
Jin and Jorion, 2006) and estimate a market mode! that includes the market index and the 
rates of change in NYMEX near-month Future contracts for oil and gas respectively. The 
mode! is estimated in a quarterly frequency using daily returns of firms' stocks and of market 
index. We use the CRSP NYSE/AMEX!Nasdaq composite value-weighted index as a market 
measure. We use also daily rates of change in near-month contract priees for oil and gas. To 
avoid the non-trading biases related to daily data (Scholes and Williams, 1977), we 
supplement the contemporaneous daily return by one lead and !ag return for the market index, 
oil, and gas returns. 50 Beta for each factor (market, oil, and gas) is obtained by summing the 
estimated coefficients on the contemporaneous, lead, and lagged return. 
Next, we estimate simultaneous equations where the endogenous variables are firm 's 
systematic ri sk (quarterly stock market betas) and hedge ratios to contro l for poss ible 
simultaneity. Results are reported in Table 3 .1 O. Interestingly, estimated coeffici ents for both 
hedging portfolios of oil and gas productions have negative signs but with no statistical 
significance at conventional levels. We find no evidence that oil and gas hedging increases 
systematic risk for our sample firms. Therefore, the positive effects, in tenns of rea lized 
priees and ROA found in the previous section, should translate into va lue gains for 
50 See Dimson (1979) and Fow1er and Rorke ( 1984) for more details. 
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shareholders. More importantly, Panel A of Table 3.10 indicates that hedging gas production 
by costless collars has a sign ificant (at the leve! of 10%) negative impact on firm's systematic 
risk. This finding suggests that hedgi ng gas production by collars would attenuate cost of 
equity for oïl and gas producers. Results further show no evident effects for swap contracts or 
put options. 
Regarding the feedback effects, results reveal that 1% increase in systematic ri sk commits 
firms to increase their collar positions by about 6 bas is points for o ïl hedging and gas hedging 
respectively. This increase in collar intensity should be interpreted in li ght of the prev ious ly 
documented negative effect of col lars on systematic ri sk. Similarly, 1% increase in 
systematic ri sk leads to a reduction of 4 basis poi nts in put option pos itions for oï l hedging. 
One poss ible explanation is that by cutting option positions, managers are trying to attenuate 
the vo1ati1ity effects ofsuch non-linear hedging instruments. 
For control variables in the systematic risk equation, we find that IR hedging reduces 
systematic ri sk which confirms that financial hedging has ri sk reduction virtues as claimed by 
one strand of the related literature (see Panel A, Column 1 and 2). We a lso find that more 
profitable oïl and gas producers bear not iceably lower systemat ic risk. On the contrary, 
systematic risk appears to be significantly positively related to firm size, leverage and more 
noticeably to the percentage of institutional shareholding. These latter findin gs g ive ev idence 
that the higher systematic risk observed for o il and gas hedgers comes essentially form their 
larger size, higher leverage ratio, and more importantly their higher percentage of 
institutional shareholding (see univar iate tests). 
Similarly, we assess wh ether derivative use is positively related to firm 's exposure to oïl 
and gas priee fluctuations . Un ivariate resu lts show that hedgers have significant ly higher 
exposure to oïl and gas priee fluctuations as measured by their respective betas from the 
market mode! estimated previously. That is, iffirms in our sample use derivative to speculate, 
and then to increase their commodity exposures, we should expect a significant positive 
effects of hedging on oi 1 and gas betas. 
---------------
185 
Table 3.10 Simultaneous equation analysis of hedging extent and fir m systematic r isk 
Panel A. Gas hedgi ng Panel B : Oi l hedging 
Hedgi ng Swap Costless Put Hedgi ng Swap Costless Put 
portfolio con tracts coll ars options portfoli o con tracts coll ars opt ions 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Eq uation 1: Firm systematic ri sk is th e depend en t va ri able 
HEDGE RA 'llO -0.3490 -0.72 19 -1 .1071* -0.9299 -0.188 1 -0 .71 11 1. 182 1 3.5 165 
(0.350) (0.828) (0.620) (1.325) (0.589) (0.795) (1.999) (4 .793) 
SIZE 0.0898''' 0.0701'* 0.11 4 1*** 0.1028*'* 0.0765" 0.0809*" 0.0658" 0.0742'" 
(0.028) (0.033) (0.026) (0.02 1) (0.033) (0.025) (0.032) (0.024) 
ROA -0.5 143*" -0.4836*" -0 .5489*" -0.5734*** -0.3939"* -0.3443" -0.285 1*' -0.4452" 
(0.136) (0. 133) (0. 145) (0.146) (0. 138) (0. 136) (0. 136) (0.2 19) 
0/L&GAS_REV 0.13 18 0.0887 0. 1053 0.0944 0.0440 0.0052 0.0268 0.07 18 
(0. 104) (0.096) (0 108) (0 100) (0 102) (0 103) (0. 10 1) (0.111) 
US_SALES 0.0083 -0 .1019 0.0085 0.111 6 -0 .103 1 -0 .1138 -0. 1461 -0.1042 
(0.088) (0.114) (0.095) (0.111) (0.089) (0.09 1) (0.100) (0.096) 
%_CS_INST 0.3181*'* 0.3738*" 0.3 135*" 0.2225*" 0.29 11 *" 0.2782**. 0.2927*** 0.2957*'* 
(0.076) (0.100) (0.080) (0.075) (0.079) (0.076) (0.097) (0.092) 
IR_HEDG -0.0689* -0. 1063" -0 .0256 -0.0 11 0 -0 .0680 -0.0948 -0.0038 -0.0223 
(0.035) (0.053) (0.035) (0.035) (0.047) (0.059) (0.046) (0. 107) 
FX_HEDG 0.0 103 0.0456 0.0 11 6 -0.0069 0.0033 0.0209 -0.03 12 -0 .0386 
(0.064) (0.067) (0.071) (0.065) (0.069) (0.070) (0.065) (0.158) 
Q_RA110 0.003 1 0.0027 0.0034 0.0038 0.0030 0.0025 0.0040 0.0035 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
LEVEI?.AGE 0.1484 0.2095 0. 11 45 0.06 13 0.1733* 0.2434" 0.1482* 0.0677 
(0. 104) (0. 131) (0.089) (0.089) (0 .089) (0 .102) (0.084) (0.159) 
CONSTANT 0.5563* * 0.7600** 0.39 15* 0.4707*' 0.7 158" 0.6664*" 0.9274*** 0.7890"* 
(0.243) (0.298) (0 226) (0 199) (0.296) (0.246) (0.260) (0.200) 
Observai ions 4,673 4,673 4,673 4,673 4,684 4,684 4,684 4,684 
R-squared 0.37 12 0.3557 0.3438 0.3700 0.37 39 0.3605 0.3413 0.2503 
Chi_2 2750.1957 2565. 11 82 2682 .2338 2820 .6 103 278 1.0386 2687 .9323 2523 .1622 2441.6563 
p-value 0.0000 00000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Equati on 2: Hedge ra tio is the dependent va riable 
BETA_MKT -0.0609 -0.0486 0.0649** -0.0387*' -0 .0268 -0 .0255 0.0540* -0 .0 11 5 
(0.040) (0.033) (0.031) (0.0 17) (0.044) (0.034) (0.03 1) (0.0 19) 
TAX_SAVE 0.0 144 -0.0245 0.0776 0.0092 0.0052 0.0 151 -0 .0003 0.00 15 
(0.058) (0045) (0.047) (0.025) (0.058) (0.043) (0.035) (0.025) 
n e F -0.0883*** -0.0492*** -0.0536*** 0.0027 -0 .0 124 -0 .024 1" 0.0 142 0.0052 
(0.01 8) (0.014) (0.0 15) (0008) (0.01 3) (0.0 10) (0.009) (0.006) 
VOL_GAS(OJL) 0.0546** 0.0 133 0.0654**' -0.0 102 0.0087*** 0.0053**' 0.00 13 0.0000 
(0 022) (0.0 18) (0.0 17) (0.009) (0.002) (0 .002) (0.002) (0.00 1) 
SPOT_GAS(O//,) 0.0063 0.00 11 0.0 12 1**' -0 .004 7* •• 0.00 JO** 0.0004 0.0009** 0.0000 
(0.004) (0003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q_RA110 -0 .00 17" -0.0014** -0.0006 -0.000 1 -0 .00 10 -0.00 10 -0.0004 0.000 1 
(0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.001) (0.000) (0.00 1) (0.001) (0.00 1) (0.000) 
SALES 0.043 1"* 0.0 12 1*** 0.0 163**' 0.0063"* 0.03 17* •• 0.0 107*" 0.0 11 4*** 0.0032 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
LEVEJ?.AGE 0.2005*" 0. 1465* •• 0.0442** 0.0 181* 0.0792"* 0.0994"* -0.0 146 0.0 199" 
(0.024) (0.020) (0.0 18) (0.0 10) (0.023) (0.0 18) (0.0 16) (0.0 10) 
I'Q_COR_GAS(OIL) -0 .0127 -0.0 182* 0.0147 -0.0 10 1" 0.0069 0.00 19 0.0000 -0 .0039 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
UNCER_ GAS(OI L} 0.0990"* 0.0649*** 0.0233 0.0260*** 0.0757*'* 0.0565"* 0.0052 0.0045 
(0.018) (0.0 14) (0.0 14) (0.008) (0.015) (00 11) (0.009) (0.006) 
HERF_GAS(OJL) -0.2429*" -0.11 10*** -0 .1723*'* 0.0477*' * -0. 11 89"* -0 .1095*'* 0.0091 0.0 104 
(0.043) (0.033) (0 034) (0.0 18) (0.033) (0.025) (0.020) (0.0 14) 
CONSTA NT -0.3931**' -0.105 1** -0 .2974*** 0.0092 -0.3752*** -0. 1593*** -0 .2008*** -0 .0 125 
(0.059) (0.049) (0 045) (0.025) (0.057) (0044) (0.040) (0025) 
Observations 4,673 4,673 4,673 4,673 4,684 4,684 4,684 4,684 
R-squared 0.6206 0.5620 0.40 10 0.2456 0.5686 0.5296 0.3477 0.4252 
Chi 2 7734.6309 6059.0298 3530.4441 1929.6447 61 78.7115 5290.8280 2890.6784 3490.3474 
p-v;lue 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Note: 
This table presents the results of 3-SLS simultaneous equations estimation linking hedging extent with firm 
systematic ri sk to account for endogeneity between the two variables. The dependent variable in Equation 1 is the 
firm systematic risk measured by stock market beta. The dependent var iable in Equation 2 is the hedging extent 
(for the aggregate hedging portfolio and by instrument). The estimation is done for gas hedging (Panel A) and oil 
hedging (Panel B), separately. Ali independent variables enter regressions with lagged values. Ali variables' 
definitions and construction are detailed in Table A.3. 1. Ali regressions have finn and time fixed effects (not 
reported for conciseness). The t-statistiés are into parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% leve!,** Significant at the 
5% leve!, * Significant at the 10% leve!. 
In unreported results, we repeat the same simultaneous equations estimation with oil and 
gas betas as endogenous variables with hedge ratios . Results reveal insignificant feedback 
effects between oil and gas betas and hedging intensity. Although, these findings are 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that hedging should reduce firm 's exposure to the underlying 
risk ( e.g., Tu fano, 1998, Allayannis and Ofek, 2001, Jin and Jorion, 2006), they do not 
provide evidence of a speculative behavior of our sample firms. 
3.4.4 Risk management and external financing 
In this sub-section, we examine the potential feedback effects between corporate risk 
management and 1) capital structure decisions, and 2) external financing costs. 
3.4.4.1 Firm debt capacity 
In li ne with the existing literature ( e.g., Froot, Stein, and Sharfstein, 1993 , Stulz. 1996, 
Leland, 1998, Graham and Rogers, 2002, Dionne and Triki, 2013 , Bartram, Brown, and 
Fehle, 2009), we investigate jointly commodity hedging and debt level of firms. We, then, 
estimate simu ltaneous regressions where the endogenous variab les are hedge ratio and 
leverage ratio as measured by the book value of long term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
scaled by book value of assets. We supplement the leverage equations by the following 
control variables: finn size (in logarithm), asset volatility, asset tangibility measuring the 
firm's collateral va lue, finn profitability measured by the EBITDA , and dummy variables for 
IR hedging and FX hedging. 
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Interestingly, Table 3.11 shows statistically and economically significant effects of oil 
and gas hedging on firms ' leverage ratios. The estimated coefficients indicate that a 1% 
increase in the aggregate hedging ratio of gas ( oil) production translates into a 13 (25 .5 1) 
basis points in leverage ratio. These figures are larger than the 3 basis points reported in 
BartJ·am, Brown, and Fehle (2009) for commodity hedging, and are relatively smaller than 32 
basis points documented in Graham and Rogers (2002) for IR and FX hedging. For gas 
hedging, a 1% increase in swap contract and put option intensity leads to an increase of about 
28 and 97 basis points in leverage ratio. 
For oil hedging, a 1% increase in swap contract, costless collar, and put option intensity 
allows firms to attain higher leverage ratios of about 29, 62, and 218 basis points. More 
importantly, put options appear to allow firms to access higher levels of external financing. 
One explanation of this finding cou Id be th at put option us ers are often wealthy firms having 
better access to debts. Relative to the average hedging rat io, a finn can attain higher leverage 
levels of about 6.63% (=13 basis points x 51%) and about 12% (=25.51 basis points x 47%) 
for gas hedging and oil hedging respectively. This explains the important gap between 
median leverage of hedgers and non-hedgers (33% versus 12%). 
These documented findings corroborate earlier empirical results and theoretical 
conjectures by Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot, Stein, and Sharfstein (1993), Stulz (1996), 
Ross (1996), Leland (1998), and Graham and Rogers (2002), namely financial hedging 
improves firm 's debt capacity by reducing the probability of left-tail (lower-tail) outcomes 
and expected costs of bankruptcy. In doing so, corporate ri sk management increases firm 
value throughout the following three channels: 1) tax advantages of interest deduction (Ross, 
1996, Leland, 1998, Graham and Rogers, 2002), 2) project financing (Froot, Stein, 
Sharfstein, 1993, Stulz, 1996, Graham and Rogers, 2002), and 3) finn monitoring provided 
by debt financing which commits manager to improve efficiency (Stulz, 1996). 
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Table 3.11 Simultaneous equation analys is ofh edging extent and firm leverage 
Panel A: Gas h ed~in ~ Panel B: O il h ed~i n~ 
Hedging Swap Costless Put Hedging Swap Costless Put 
portfo lio con tracts co !lars o~tion s ~ortfo lio contracts co !lars o~tions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Eq uatio n 1: Leve r age ratio is the de pendent variable 
HEDGE RATIO 0. 130 1** 0.2769** 0. 1457 0.970 1 *** 0.255 1 ** 0.284 7** 0 .6235** 2. 1793** 
(0.063) (0. 138) (0. 132) (0.287) (0.11 4) (0.136) (0.284) (0.872) 
SIZE 0.0 159*** 0.0 175*** 0.0 189*** 0.0 186*** 0.0 166*** 0.0 17 1 *** 0 .0 160*** 0.0 197*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
SIGMA_ASSET -0.0775*** -0.0699*** -0 .0868*** -0.09 17*** -0.0707*** -0.0679*** -0 .0867*** -0.0937*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.0 10) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.0 12) 
TANGIBILITY 0. 1559*** 0.1497*** 0. 1459*** 0. 1497*** 0. 1775*** 0. 1828*** 0 .18 12*** 0.1906*** 
(0.023) (0.028) (0.02 1) (0.02 1) (0.024) (0.026) (0.02 1) (0.032) 
EBITDA -0.2672*** -0.2583*** -0.2853*** -0.33 14*** -0.235 1 *** -0.232 1 *** -0.2894** * -0.32 16*** 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.034) 
IR HEDG 0.0440*** 0.046 1 *** 0.0407*** 0.0474*** 0.0466*** 0.0473*** 0.0397*** 0.0469** 
(0.007) (0.0 10) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.020) 
FX_HEDG -0.0062 -0.0 115 -0.0002 -0.01 15 -0.0049 -0.0086 -0.004 1 -0.0 104 
(0.0 12) (0.0 12) (0.0 12) (0.0 14) (0.0 11 ) (0.0 11 ) (0.0 13) (0.028) 
CONSTANT -0.0035 -0.0 167 -0.0 188 -0.0330 0.0 126 -0.0 105 0.0 15 1 -0.0284 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.05 1) (0.040) (0048) (0.045) 
Observations 5,233 5,233 5,233 5,233 5,2 15 5,2 15 5,2 15 5,2 15 
R-squared 0.6567 0.6362 0.6529 0.5537 0.6 197 0.6305 0.5393 0.08 12 
Chi_2 9940.8560 905 1.6243 9874.4309 7739.2906 7650.2938 9007.0146 6805.6 163 392 1.8942 
e-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Equatio n 2: Hedge ratio is the dependent va ri able 
LE VERA GE 0.5294*** 0.37 14*** 0.240 1 *** -0.08 10*** 0.3660*** 0.4 140*** -0.0038 -0.0523* 
(0.077) (0.063) (0.054) (0.030) (0.07 1) (0.056) (0.048) (0.030) 
TAX SAVE 0.0263 -0.008 1 0.0894** 0.0302 0.0586 0.0420 0.05 19 0.0337* 
(0.054) (0.04 1) (0.041 ) (0.022) (0.042) (0.036) (0.032) (0.0 17) 
TLCF -0.035 1*** -0.0246** -0.0087 0.0052 -0.0 10 1 -0.028 1*** 0.0 173*** 0.0065* 
(0.0 12) (0.0 10) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) 
VOL_GAS(OIL) 0.075 1 *** 0.03 17** 0.0391*** 0.0042 0.0068*** 0.0032** 0.0024* 0.0000 
(0.0 16) (0.0 13) (0.0 11 ) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) 
SPOT_ GAS(OIL) 0 .0 124*** 0.0068*** 0.008 1 *** -0.0029** 0.00 14*** 0.0009*** 0.0004** 0.0001 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.00 1) (0.000) (0.000) (0 .000) (0.000) 
Q_RAT/0 -0.0020*** -0.00 16*** -0.0004 -0.0007** -0 .00 17*** -0.0012** -0.0009** -0.0007*** 
(0.00 1) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00 1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SALES 0 .0398* ** 0.0089 *** 0.0 198*** 0.0069*** 0.0270*** 0.0086*** 0.0 138*** 0.0033** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
PQ_COR_GAS(O!L) -0.0129 -0.0 195** 0.0036 -0.0 147*** -0.00 18 -0.0032 -0 .0005 -0.0043 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
UNCER _ GAS(OIL) 0.0825*** 0.0565*** 0.0232* 0.0279*** 0.0524*** 0.0387*** 0.0 11 9 0.0 111 ** 
(0.0 17) (0.0 13) (0.0 12) (0.007) (0.0 11 ) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) 
HERF_ GAS(O!L) -0.1734*** -0 .0874*** -0.1242*** 0.0502*** -0.1 058*** -0.0924*** -0.0228 -0.0226** 
(0.038) (0.030) (0.029) (0.016) (0.025) (0.02 1) (0.017) (0 .010) 
CONSTANT -0.4580*** -0.1640*** -0.24 19*** -0.04 11 ** -0.3866*** -0.1874*** -0. 1534*** -0.0260 
(0.046) (0.037) (0 .033) (0.018) (0 .041) (0.032) (0.028) (0.018) 
Observations 5,233 5,233 5,233 5,233 5,215 5,215 5,2 15 5,2 15 
R-squared 0.6040 0.545 1 0.4309 0.292 1 0.5482 0.4749 0.3893 0.4 194 
Chi_2 8335.7023 6528.0162 4160.4057 2287.3198 659 1.0687 5228.4476 3347.3579 3862.3846 
e-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Note: 
This table presents the results of 3-SLS simultaneous equations estimation linking hedging extent with firm 
leverage to account for endogeneity between the two var iables. The dependent variable in Equation 1 is the finn 
leverage ratio measured by the book value of long-term debt + debt in current li ab ilities divided by total assets. 
The dependent variable in Equation 2 is the hedging extent (for the aggregate hedging p01tfolio and by 
instrument). The estimation is done for gas hedging (Panel A) and oil hedging (Panel B), separately. Ail 
independent variables enter regressions with lagged values. Ail variables ' definitions and construction are detailed 
in Table A.3.1. Ali regressions have finn and time fixed effects (not reported for conciseness). The t-slatistics are 
into parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% leve!,** Significant at the 5% leve!, * Sign ifi cant at the 10% leve!. 
Results also show statistically and economically significant positive impacts of leverage 
ratio on hedging intensity as suggested by the previous literature and particularly Haushalter 
(2000) for oil and gas industry. As leverage increases, firms tend to intensifY their hedgi ng by 
swap contracts and collars, and to reduce put option intensity. In light of the median leverage 
of 33% for hedgers, these latter findings are consistent with Adam (2002) prediction, namely 
when credit premium is moderately large, firms tend to use linear approximation of their 
hedging strategies. Control variables in leverage equations have predicted signs. Leverage is 
positively related to finn size and collateral value (asset tangibility), and negat ively re lated to 
asset volatility and finn profitability. More importantly, we find that IR hedging has a 
significant positive effect on leverage ratio as predicted (Graham and Rogers, 2002). This 
latter finding reiterates the conjecture that financial hed ging improves firm's debt capacity. 
3.4.4.2 Cost of externat financing 
In the previous sub-section, we find that hedging eases the access to externat funds. We 
now turn our attention to the cost of externat financing. We do this by exp licitly connecting 
hedging and loan spread. It is expected that hedgi ng by reducing the probability of left-tail 
realizations and preventing agency costs related to risk-shifting, should improve loans 
contracting terms. We then estimate simu ltaneous regressions where the endogenous 
variables are hedge ratios and loan spreads. We largely follow the empirical specification 
adopted by Campello et al (2011) and take the logarithm of loan spread to alleviate the 
effects of extreme values in the spread sample. We also control for loan characteristics 
(logarithm of loan size (in Mill$), logarithm of loan maturity (in days), types, and purposes), 
macroeconomie variables (credit and term spreads), and firm specifie characteristics (finn 
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size (in logarithm), firm profitability, leverage, asset tangibility, asset volatility, dummy 
variables for IR hedging and FX hedging). 
Results reported in Panel A of Table 3.12 show insignificant effects of gas hedging on 
Joan spreads. Contrary to our prediction, results in Panel B indicate that Joan spread is 
positively related to swap contract intensity for oil hedging. In fact, average (oil) hedgers 
with swap contracts are charged loan spreads that are 35 .23% higher than those charged to 
non-hedgers (= 0.96 x 0.367, where 0.367 is the mean intensity for swap contracts for oil 
hedging). This finding contradicts the estimated reduction of 28% in Joan spread reported by 
Campello et al (20 11) for average IR/FX hedgers. lt a Iso contradicts spread reduction of 
17.5% documented in Ku mar and Rabinovitch (20 13) for average oil and gas hedgers. 
As predicted, average oil hedgers with costless collars are charged loan spreads that are 
42.87% lower than those charged to non-hedgers. Relative to the average Joan spread of 
about 201 basis points, swap contracts lead to an increase of about 71 basis points in loan 
spread and collars reduce this spread by about 86 basis points. Collar effects corroborate 
Campello et al (20 Il) and Ku mar and Rabinovitch (20 13) findings , with a higher figure. Due 
to these conflicting effects of swap and collars, the aggregate hedging portfolio of oil 
production has a negative but insignificant effect on Joan spread. 
Results further indicate a significant positive effect of loan spread on oil and gas hedging 
ratios: a 1% increase in loan spread implies an increase of about 10 and 17 basis points in the 
aggregate hedging portfolio of gas and oil production, respectively. Concerning hedging 
intensity by instrument, we find that Joan spread have a particular positive impact on the 
extent of swap contracts for both pane ls of gas hedgers and oi l hedgers, and a negati ve effect 
on put options for gas hedgers. Interestingly, these findings are consistent with our prev ious 
results related to leverage effects on hedging instruments that is leverage impacts in a 
positive manner swap contracts and in a negative manner put opt ions. Regarding control 
variables in the Joan spread equation, we fi nd that firms with farther Joan maturities are 
charged higher spread because banks require liquidity premium for long-term debts . The loan 
size has a negative impact on spreads which might reflect economies of sca le in bank lending 
(Campello et al., 2011). 
--------------------------------
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Table 3. 12 Simultaneous equation ana lysis ofhedging extent and Joan spread 
Panel A: Gas hedgi ng Panel B: Oil hedgi ng 
Hedging Swap Costless Put Hedgi ng Swap Cost less Put 
portfoli o con tracts coll ars options portfolio con tracts coll ars options 
( 1 (2) (3) (4 (5) (6) (7 (8) 
Eq uation 1: Loan spread (in log) is the dependent variable 
HEDGE RATIO 0.0024 0.36 10 -0.4071 -0 .9874 -1.1 985 0.960 1* -1 .3829** -2 .680 1 
(0.455) (0383) (0.637) ( 1.1 86) ( 1.102) (0.520) (0.592) (2.592) 
MATURITY 0.0722* 0.07 17* 0.0773** 0.0729** 0.1033* 0.0697** 0.0835** 0.0889 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.054) (0.035) (0.042) (0.056) 
LOANSIZE -0. 11 93*** -0. 1165*** -0. 1227*** -0 . 11 99*** -0. 1463*** -0. 11 32*** -0 .1264*** -0.1267*** 
(0.020) (00 19) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.0 19) (0.022) (0045) 
CRED!T_SPREAD -0.0705 -0.0827 -0.0611 -0 .0546 -0.0665 -0 .0641 -0.0595 -0.0426 
(0. 120) (0 126) (0. 173) (0. 136) (0. 158) (0. 113) (0.150) (0.2 12) 
TERM_SPREAD 0.0924 0.09 17 0.0748 0.0744 0.080 1 0.09 12 0.0780 0.0660 
(0. 145) (0. 146) (0.179) (0.158) (0.208) (0 138) (0.157) (03 12) 
SIZE -0.0516 -0 .0528 -0 .0489 -0 .047 1 -0.0 193 -0.0573 -0 .050 1 -0.0278 
(0.054) (0.042) (0.038) (0.043) (0.074) (0.037) (0 .04 1) (0.10 1) 
EBI7DA 0.0606 0.0560 0.0869 0.1072 03584 0.0955 0.1710 0.2582 
(03 17) (0307) (0332) (03 14) (0.506) (0304) (0348) (0395) 
TANGIBILITY 0.161 1 0.140 1 0.11 71 0.0363 0.1260 0. 11 49 0.2032 0.0344 
(03 14) (0.254) (0 .224) (0.277) (0.484) (0.2 10) (0.240) (0.528) 
LEVEI?ACE 0.9767*** 0.9433*** 1.0255* * * 1.0404*** 1.3803*** 0.7802*** 1.05 16*** 1.3 125*** 
(0. 18 1) (0. 142) (0. 16 1) (0. 145) (0.420) (0. 172) (0. 168) (0.450) 
SIGMA_ ASSET 0.2650* 0.2782* * 0.2555* 0.234 1* 0.2739 0.2236* 0.2646* 0.2283 
(0.137) (0. 141) (0. 136) (0. 137) (0. 193) (0 127) (0. 145) (0.272) 
IR_HEDC -0.0156 -0.0137 -0 .01 13 -0 .0 11 3 -0.0030 -0 .01 10 -0 .0 105 0.0005 
(0.04 1) (0.040) (0.043) (0.039) (0.054) (0.039) (0.043) (0 Ill ) 
FX_HEDC -0.2069** -0 .1912** -0 .1969** -0. 1792** -0.2 329** -0. 1782** -0. 1940** -0.209 1* 
(009 1) (0 086) (0.086) (0.082) (0. 107) (0.082) (0 089) (0 122) 
CONSTANT 5.2432*** 5. 1720*** 5. 1791*** 5.180 1* ** 4.8489*** 5.1269**. 5.0058*** 4.73 16*** 
(0687) (0.509) (0.544) (0.675) (1.097) (0.5 10) (0.57 1) ( 1.623) 
Observations 541 541 54 1 54 1 534 534 534 534 
R-squared 0.8494 0.844 1 0.8399 0.8406 0.7055 0.8 107 0.768 1 0.6975 
Chi_2 3047.9566 30 11 .8708 28723926 2905.34 16 1181.2056 25 19.4797 2033.2960 1339.3020 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Equ ation 2: Hedge ratio is the dependent variable 
LOANSPREAD 0.1044** 0.07 18* 0.0409 -0 .03 11* 0. 17 12*** 0.067 1 * 0.0408 0.0 154 
(0.044) (0 .037) (0.032) (0.0 18) (0.052) (0.037) (0.032) (0.026) 
LEVEI?ACE 0.1986** 0.0555 0.0948 0.0860** 0.1169 0.1295* -0 .009 1 0.1 058*. 
(0 090) (0.076) (0.066) (0.036) (0. 107) (0.076) (0066) (0.053) 
1AX_SAVE 0.3760 -0.1202 0.8059** -0.0992 0.5504 -0 .1226 O. 7335** * 0.0629 
(0.426) (0354) (0314) (0.163) (0.401) (03 0 1) (0.2 77) (0. 187) 
TLCF -0 .3438*** -0 .3322*** 0.0134 -0 .0405 -0.0330 -0 .06 15 0.087 1 -0.0289 
(0. 111 ) (0.093) (0.081) (0.042) (0. 103) (0.079) (0.069) (0.05 1) 
VOL_CAS(O!L) 0.0635 0.039 1 -0 .029 1 0.0328 0.0177 0.0 11 6 -0 .0009 -0 .0039 
(0.052) (0.044) (0.038) (0.02 1) (0.0 15) (0.0 11 ) (0.009) (0.008) 
SPOT_ GAS(O!L) 0.02 15** 0.002 1 0.02 10** * -0 .00 14 0.00 19 0.0022**. 0.0006 0.0003 
(0.0 10) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.001) (0.00 1) 
Q_RA710 -0 .003 2 -0 .0030 0.0004 -0 .0004 0.0049 -0.004 1 0.0023 0.0033 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
SALES 0.0303 -0.0137 0.0307** 0.0047 0.0666*** -0.0070 0.0270* * 0.02 15** 
(0.0 19) (0.0 16) (0.0 14) (0.008) (0.0 19) (0.0 14) (0.0 12) (0.009) 
PQ_COR_CAS(O!L) 0.0465 0.022 1 0.0390 -0.0043 -0 .0699** -0.04 16 -0 .0092 -0 .0 195 
(0.048) (0.040) (0.035) (0.0 18) (0.035) (0.025) (0.02 1) (0.0 15) 
UNCER_ CAS(OJL) -0 .0251 -0.1263** 0.0 129 0.06 17** 0.1594*** -0 .0690* 0.0987*** 0.0458* 
(0.073) (0.061 ) (0.053) (0.028) (0.058) (0.04 1) (0.036) (0.024) 
HERF_CAS(OJL) -0. 17 14 -0.0225 -0.2496** 0. 1397* * 0.2155* -0.2045** 0.2473*** 0. 11 70** 
(0.151 ) (0. 125) (0. 111 ) (0.059) (0.121) (0.093) (0.082) (0.059) 
CONSTANT -0.7495*** -0 .0690 -0.4682** -0 .0622 -1.4643*** -0 .0667 -0.6226*** -0 .3800* * 
(0291) (0246) (02 14) (0. 11 6) (0337) (024 1) (02 11 ) (0. 164) 
Observations 54 1 54 1 541 54 1 534 534 534 534 
R-squared 0.7027 0.6844 0.6288 0.5313 0.598 1 0.6 135 0.5887 0.5630 
Ch i_2 1280.2745 11 81.184 1 914.8622 620.2128 807.5248 863.8695 76 1.5915 700.2860 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 00000 0.0000 
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Note: 
This tabl e presents the results of 3-SLS simultaneous equations estimation Iinking hedging extent with Joan spread 
to account for endogeneity between the two variables. The dependent variable in Equation 1 is the Joan spread (in 
Iogarithm). The dependent variable in Equation 2 is the hedging extent (for the aggregate hedging portfolio and by 
instrument). The estimation is done for gas hedging (Panel A) and oil hedgi ng (Panel B), separately. Ali 
independent variables enter regressions with lagged values. Ail variables' definitions and construction are detailed 
in Table A.3.1. Ali regressions have firm and time fi xed effects (not reported for conciseness). The t-statistics are 
into parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% leve! , ** Significant at the 5% leve! , * Significant at the 10% leve!. 
In addition, more leveraged firms with higher asset volatility are charged higher Joan 
spread to account for the incrementai credit risk related to newly issued loans. More 
importantly, firms with FX hedging are charged lower Joan spreads. The reduction due to FX 
hedging ranges from 18 to 23 basis points, which implies a reduction of about 9% to 11.5% 
of the average Joan spread (201 basis points). Surprisingly, IR hedging has negative but 
insignificant estimated coefficients. These latter findings are consistent with findings in 
Campe llo et al (20 11) for IR/FX hedging, however the se au thors do not cons id er 1 R hedging 
and FX hedging separately in their mode!. These findings also could explain the divergence 
of our results from th ose in Ku mar and Rabinovitch (20 13), who do not control for lR and/or 
FX hedging in their regressions. 
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3.5 Concluding Remarks 
Many empirical studies on corporate risk management explore the question of whether 
derivatives have value and risk implication on firms. Results have been largely controversial. 
Using a new dataset of detailed information on the hedging activities of 150 U.S. oil and gas 
producers during the period from 1998 to 2010, this papers revisits the hedging premium 
question . We use simultaneous equation regressions to control for the endogeneity feature of 
derivative use decision. This study examines the links between oil and gas hedging and 
multiple measures of finn performance, risk and debt characteristics. Furthermore, we go 
beyond the aggregate feature of hedging activity and examine the real implications by 
derivative instrument used by our sample firms. 
On the whole, we provide novel evidence of the real impact of hedging on finn' output 
realized selling priees, and show that hedging significantly increases gas realized priees. ln 
addition, we find that higher realized priees are more related to costless collars and put 
options. Hedging a Iso appears to be positively associated with firm 's accounting 
performance. Our results also show that oil and gas hedging is significantly negatively related 
to total and idiosyncratic risk suggesting that our sample firms hedge and not speculate with 
derivatives. We further find insignificant effects of hedging on systematic risk suggesting that 
hedging does not increase the cost of equity for hedgers. lnterestingly, we find that oil and 
gas hedging facilitates the access to more debt financing but not at a lower cost. ln fact, we 
find a significant positive association between hedging and debt but there are no real impacts 
on loan spread. Finally, the welfare effects of hedging on realized priees, accounting 
performance, risk, and debt capacity of firms should translate into value gains for 
shareholders. 
APPENDIX 3.1 
VARIABLES ' DEFINITIONS, CONSTRUCTION AND DATA SOURCES 
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Table A.3.1 Variables' definitions, construction and sources 
Variable 
definition 
Variable name 
Variabl es that proxy for hedging activi ty 
Hedging dummy GAS_HEDG, 
OIL_HEDG 
IR_HEDG, 
FX_HEDG 
0/UGAS_HEDG 
Construction 
For Commodity Risk, FX, and IR hedging activities for a specified fi scal 
quarter. This variable is coded as follows: 0 (no hedging), 1 (hedging). 
Equals one if firm engages in oi t and/or gas hedging and 0 otherwise 
Data source 
10-Kandi O-
Q reports 
10-K and 10-
Q report s 
Variables that proxy for tax advantage of hedging 
Tax Joss carry TLCF Book valu e of the TLCF scaled by the book va lue of total assets Compustat 
forwards 
Tax save TAX SA VE 
Variables that proxy for fi nancial di stress 
Leverage LE V 
Distance to DTD 
default 
Asset volatili ty 
Cash cost 
Quick ratio 
SIGMA_ASSET 
CASJ-I_COST 
Q_RAT/0 
Tax liability saving ari sing from a reduction of5% of taxabl e income (Graham Ma nuall y 
and Smith, 1999). constructed 
Book value ofl ong-tenn debt in current liabili ties and long-term debt scaled 
by the book value of total assets. 
Market-based measure of default risk based on Merton's (1974) approach and 
d . V - D 1 . d fi used by Moo y' s KMV. The DTD rs equal to -'-' - , w 1ere D rs e rn ed as 
V(l a-(, 
long-term debt in current liabilities plus one-halfof long-tenn debts, V, is the 
market va lue ofassets, and cr a is one-year asset volatili ty. The quantities 1~, 
and Œa are unobservable and are ap proximated from Merton' s ( 1974) mode! 
by using the market value and vo latility of equity, the three-month Treasury 
bill rate, and de bts (D). See Crosbie and Bohn (2003) fo r more detail s on the 
construction of the DTD. 
Defin ed as in the ca lculation of di stance-tot-default 
Production cost of a BOE 
Cash and cash equival ents scaled by CLtrrent liab ilities. 
Compu stat 
Ma nuall y 
constructed 
Bloomberg 
and 10-K 
reports 
Compu stat 
Variables that proxy for underin vestment costs 
lnvestment 
opportunities 
(lOs) 
INV_OPP Total costs incurred in oit and gas property acq uisition, exploration, and Bloomberg 
development, scaled by net property, plant , and equipment at the beginning of and 1 0-K 
the quarter. reports 
Variables that proxy for revenues characteristi cs 
Sales SALES The logarithm of firm ' s total revenues Compu stat 
Compustat Sales in U.S 
markets 
US_SALES 
Fraction of 0 /L&GAS REV 
revenues from oi1 
and gas 
production 
Fraction of 0 /L REV 
revenues fro m oi l 
production 
Fraction of GAS_ REV 
revenues from 
gas production 
Fraction of sales in U.S markets di vided by fi rm' s total sales 
Oil and gas revenues divided by the firm ' s total revenues. Bloomberg 
and 10-K 
reports 
Equals the fraction of oil production (i.e., oil daily production in BOEs, Bloomberg 
div ided by dail y oit and gas production in BOEs) multiplied by the fraction of and 1 0-K 
oit and gas revenues (0/L&GAS_REV). reports 
Equals the fraction of gas production (i.e., gas daily production in BOEs, Bloomberg 
divided by daily oil and gas production in BOEs) multiplied by the traction of and 10-K 
oit and gas revenues (0 /L &GAS_REV ). reports 
Variabl es that proxy for production character isti cs 
Herfindahl index HERF 0/L ( )' 
(o it production) Equals 1-t ~ , where q, is the da ily oil production in region_ i (Afri ca , 
Latin Ameri ca, North America, Europe, and the Middle East) and q is total 
dai1 y oit production. 
Bloomberg 
and 10-K 
reports 
Continued 
Variable 
definiti on 
Herfindahl index 
(gas production) 
Oil production 
uncertainty 
Gas production 
uncertainty 
Price-quanti ty 
correlation ( oil ) 
Price-quantity 
correlation (gas) 
Gas dai! y 
production 
Oil daily 
produ ction 
Variabl e name 
HERF_GAS 
UNCER 0 /L 
UNCER_GAS 
PQ_COR_O!L 
PQ_COR_GAS 
GAS_PROD 
0 /L_PROD 
Variables thal proxy for finn size 
Firm size SIZE 
Tangibility TANGIBILITY 
Profitability EBITDA 
Table A.3.I -Continued 
Construction 
Equals 1- f (!b_)' , where g, is the dail y gas production in 
1=1 g 
region i (Africa, Latin Ameri ca, North America, Europe, and 
the Middle East) and g, is total da ily gas production. 
Coefficient of variation ofdaily oil production. This 
coeffic ient is calculated for each finn by using ali the 
observations of da il y oil production un ti l the current quarter. 
Coefficient of variation of daily gas production. This 
coefficient is calculated for each finn by using ali the 
observations of daily gas production until the current quarter. 
Correlation coefficient between dail y oil productions and oil 
spot priees. 
Correlation coefficient between dail y gas produ cti ons and 
gas spot pr iees. 
Measured in mill ions of cu bic feet. The observations are 
given on an annual bas is. We repeat the annual observations 
for each quarter of the same fi scal year 
Measured ln thousa nds of barrels. The observations are given 
on an an nuai basis. We repeat the annual observations fo r 
each quarter of the sa me fi scal yea r 
The logarithm of(number of common shares out standing * 
end-of-quarter per share pri ee)+ book va lu e ofasset - book 
value of equity. 
Net property, plant, and equipment scaled by book va lue of 
as set. 
Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amorti zation 
scaled by book value of total asset. 
Variabl es thal proxy for information asymmetry 
% l nstitutions 
shareholding 
%CS !NST 
Variables that proxy for market conditions 
Oil spot priee 
Gas spot priee 
Oil priee 
vo latility 
Gas pri ee 
vo latili ty 
SPOT_OIL 
SPOT GAS 
VOL_OIL 
VOL_GAS 
Firm's stock return characteristics 
Stock market 
beta, oil beta, and 
gas beta 
Total vo latility 
ldiosyncrat ic risk 
BETA_MKT, 
BETA_OIL, 
BETA_GAS 
SIG_TOTAL 
S!G_SPECIFIC 
Percentage of institutions' common shares held. 
Oil spot priee represented by the WTI in the NYMEX. 
Constructed as an average index establi shed from principal 
locations' indices in the United States (G ul f Coast, Henry 
Hub, etc.) 
Historica l volatility (standard deviation) using the spot pr iee 
of the previous 60 day s. 
Historical volati li ty (standard deviation) using the spot priee 
of the prev ious 60 days. 
Calculated from the market mode! supplemented by changes 
in near-month NYMEX future contracts for gas and oil. The 
mode! is estimated on quarterly basis usi ng dai ly return of 
firm 's stock and market index as measured by the CRSP 
va lue weighted index. 
Standa rd deviation of dail y stock return calculated on 
quarterly basis 
Equals the ratio of stock return volati lity divided by market 
index volatility calculated from dai ly returns and on quarter! y 
frequency. 
Data source 
Bloomberg and 1 O-
K report s 
Bloomberg and 10-
K reports 
Bloomberg and 1 O-
K report s 
Bloomberg and 1 O-
K reports 
Bloomberg and 1 O-
K reports 
Bloomberg and 1 O-
K reports 
Bloomberg and 1 O-
K reports 
Compustat 
Compustat 
Compu stat 
Thomson Reuters 
Bloomberg 
Bloomberg 
Bloomberg 
Bloomberg 
CRSPand US 
energy information 
adm inistration 
CRSP 
CRSP 
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Continuel/ 
Variable definition 
Loan characteristics 
Loan spread 
Loan size 
Loan maturity 
Loan types dummies 
Loan purposes dummies 
economie control variables 
Term spread 
Credit spread 
Table A.3.1-Continued 
Variable 
na me 
LOAN 
SPREAD 
LOAN S!ZE 
MATUR!TY 
TERM 
SPREAD 
CREDIT 
SPREAD 
Construction 
Ail -in spread drawn over the LI BOR charged by the 
bank for the drawn fraction of the fa cil ity. 
The logarithm ofloan size, measured in $ million 
The logarithm oflean maturity, measured in days 
Dummy variable for each loan type: including revolver 
greater !han one year, revolver less than one year, term 
loan, and 364-day facility 
Dummy variable for each loan purpose, including 
general corporate purposes, debt repayment, project 
financing, and back-up li ne for commercial pa pers 
The difference between 1 0-year Treasury bonds and 1-
year Treasury bonds 
The difference between the yields on BAA corporate 
bond and AAA corporate bond 
Data 
source 
DealScan 
DealScan 
DealScan 
DealScan 
DealScan 
Federal 
Reserve 
Federal 
Reserve 
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Table A3.2 Simultaneous equation analysis of hedging extent and the return on equity 
Panel A: Gas hedsi ns Panel B: Oi l hed!lins 
Hedgi ng Swap Cost less Put Hedgi ng Swap Costl ess Put 
port foli o con tracts coll ars opti ons portfolio contracts col lars options 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Equation 1: Retum on equi ty is the dependent variable 
HEDGERAT/0 0.1287** 0. 1511 0.2389** 0.6130* 0. 1732* -0 .1195 1. 1 123* •• 3.5196** 
(0.056) (0. 135) (0. 115) (0333) (0. 101) (0 133) (0326) ( 1.369) 
SIZE 0.00 19 0.0073 0.0007 0.0026 -0.003 1 0.0049 -0 .0037 -0 .0014 
(0.004) (0 005) (0004) (0 004) (0 005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
0/L&GAS_REV 0.0168 0.0 166 0.0290** 0.0252** 0.0306** 0.0285** 0.0447*** 0.0291** 
(0.0 11 ) (0.0 10) (0.012) (0 .012) (0.0 12) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) 
US SALh-:> 0.0255 0.0529**. 0.0284 0.02 15 0.0364* 0.0345* 0.0679** 0.0329 
(0.0 17) (0.020) (0020) (0.027) (0.0 19) (00 19) (0.029) (0.022) 
INV_OPP 0.0024 0.0023 0.0008 0.0008 -0 .0006 -0 .000 1 0.00 17 0.0006 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0 .004) (0.002) 
%_CS_INST -0 .0359*** -0.048 1*** -0 0266* -0 .0228 -0.0225 -0.0289* -0 .0741*** -0 .0180 
(0.013) (0.0 16) (0.0 16) (0.015) (0.0 15) (0.015) (0.024) (0.019) 
CASH_COST -0 .0018*** -0.0014*** -0.00 19*** -0 .0020*** -0 .0027*** -0 .0021*** -0 .0041*** -0.0012* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.00 1) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00 1) (0.00 1) 
LE VERA GE -0 .0340* -0.0332 -0.0232 -0 .02 12 -0 .0060 0.0167 0.0035 -0 0155 
(0.018) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.0 16) (0.0 19) (0.020) (0.027) 
CONSTANT -0 .0332 -0.0979* -0.028 1 -0 .0556 -0 .005 1 -0.0867* 0.02 13 -0 .032 1 
(004 1) (0.050) (0.043) (0.044) (0.051) (0.046) (0.057) (005 1) 
Obsen1ations 5,237 5,237 5,237 5,237 5,243 5,243 5,243 5,243 
R-squared 0.1439 0. 1432 0.1237 0.0990 0.1483 0.1563 -0.5663 -2 .8136 
Chi_2 1074 .4 425 1065.2208 1050.0986 1049 0043 1078.8284 1069.5052 601.7645 405.3583 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0 0000 0.0000 0 0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Equation 2: Hedge ratio is the dependent variable 
ROE 0.7946*** 0.7271*** -0.0613 0.1230 -0 .6089*** -0 .1689 -0 .6758*** 0.1090 
(0.285) (0.238) (0. 184) (0.102) (0.2 19) (0. 152) (0. 171) (0.084) 
TAX_SAVE 0.0254 -0.0442 0.1009** 0.0049 0.0566 0.0302 0.04 18 0.0024 
(0.05 1) (0.041) (0.04 1) (0.021) (0.060) (0.041 ) (0.048) (0.011) 
JLCF -0.0259** -0 .0189** -0 .0077 -0 .0007 -0.0244** -0 .0428*** 0.0250** 0.0022 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.0 12) (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) 
VOL_ GAS(OIL) 0.0523*** 0.0 158 0.0360*** 0.00 11 0.0043 0.0041** -0 .0027 0.0006 
(0.0 18) (0.0 15) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0 002) (0.00 1) 
SPOT_ GAS(OIL) -0.00 15 -0.0063* 0.0069* •• -0.0033** 0.00 19**. 0.0008* •• 0.00 13**. -0.000 1 
(0.004) (0003) (0.003) (000 1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Q_RA710 -0 .00 15** -0.001 1** -0.000 1 -0.0002 -0.0010 -0 .0009* 0.0002 0.0001 
(0.00 1) (0.00 1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00 1) (0000) (0.00 1) (0.000) 
SALES 0.047 1* •• 0.0 166*** 0.0268** * 0.0040* 0.0366*** 0.0119*** 0.0232**. 0.0029 
(0006) (0005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0 004) (0.004) (0.002) 
LE VERA GE 0.1606* •• 0.1285* •• 0.03 15*. 0.0107 0.0626* •• 0.0859**. 0.0005 0.0047 
(0.022) (0.019) (0.0 14) (0.008) (0.02 1) (0.0 14) (0.0 16) (0.008) 
PQ_COR_GAS(OIL) -0 .0133 -0.0145* 0.0052 -0 .0084** -0.0003 -0 .0035 0.00 10 0.0001 
(0.0 10) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) 
UNCER _ GAS(OI L) 0.0815* •• 0.0381*** 0.0358** * 0.0146** 0.0433*** 0.0373*** -0.0 100 -0.0035 
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (00 14) (0.0 10) (0.0 11 ) (0.003) 
HERF_GAS(OIL) -0.1938*** -0.0966*** -0.1402* •• 0.0537* •• -0.0893** -0 .1 068*** 0.0447 0.0085 
(0.040) (0.032) (0.03 1) (0.016) (0.036) (0.025) (0 .028) (0.007) 
CONSTANT -0.4248*** -0 .1340*** -0 .2753* •• -0 .0160 -0.4538* •• -0. 1972*** -0 .2352*** -0 .0163 
(0.060) (0050) (0.039) (0.02 1) (0.053) (0.037) (0.04 1) (0.020) 
Observations 5,237 5,237 5,237 5,237 5,243 5,243 5,243 5,243 
R-squared 0.5002 0.3687 0.4472 0.2802 0.4473 0.4962 0.0099 0.4060 
Chi_2 71 19.2985 5188.35 19 4236.8553 2279.4582 5446.2599 5464 .6774 2066.6 122 3863. 1885 
e -value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 00000 
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Note: 
This table presents the results of 3-SLS simultaneous equations estimation linking hedging extent with firm's 
return on equity (ROE) to account for endogeneity between the two variables. The dependent variable in Equation 
1 is the ROE measured by net income divided by book value of equity. The dependent variable in Equation 2 is 
the hedging extent (for the aggregate hedging portfolio and by instrument). The estimation is done for gas hedging 
(Panel A) and oi l hedging (Panel B), separately. Ali independent variables enter regressions with lagged values. 
Ali variables' definitions and construction are detai led in Table A.3. 1. Ali regressions have firm and time fixed 
effects (not reported for conciseness). The t-statistics are into parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% leve!, ** 
Significant at the 5% leve!, * Significant at the 10% leve!. 
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CONCLUSION 
Malgré son impertinence dans le monde parfait de Modigliani et Miller ( 1958), la gestion 
des risques financiers est devenue une pratique usuelle dans un grand nombre d'entreprises 
non-financières (Bartram, Brown, et Fehle, 2009). La littérature a bien amélioré notre 
compréhension des motivations de la gestion des risques et de ses vertus potentielles en 
termes de création de la valeur pour l'entreprise et, par conséquent, pour les actionnaires. 
Toutefois, il importe de remarquer que cette littérature, surtout celle empirique, nous éclaire 
peu sur les déterminants du choix de la stratégie de couverture à adopter par les entreprises. 
De surcroit, cette littérature ne dit presque rien sur la manière de choisir les maturités des 
positions de couverture et leur évolution dans le temps. À ce niveau, le manque de modèle 
théorique a été comblé par Fehle et Tsyplakov (2005). Finalement, les résultats empiriques 
relatifs aux implications et retombées de la gestion des ri sques sur l'entreprise restent 
largement controversés et non-concluants. 
Parmi les raisons déjà avancées par Aretz et Bartram (20 1 0) pour exp! iquer ces 
controverses, on trouve les difficultés à déterminer avec préc is ion l'étendue de la couverture 
vu que les entreprises utilisent des portefeuilles complexes incorporant une multitude 
d' instruments qui différent en termes des coûts d' initiation, profil de gain (payojj), maturité, 
comptabilisation, etc. Grâce aux données très détaillées, collectées manuellement, sur les 
positions de couverture d' un échantillon de 150 compagnies pétrolières américaines, le but de 
cette thèse est de contribuer à la littérature en préconisant des réponses surtout au regard des 
déterminants du choix de la stratégie et de la maturité de la couverture. Vu le manqu e 
d' évidences empiriques portant sur ces deux aspects, nous croyons qu'il n'est pas inutile 
d'apporter une nouvelle contribution à la littérature dans ce sujet. Encore, nous croyons que , 
revisiter la question de la prime liée à la gestion des risques est toujours indispensable, 
surtout à la lumière des différentes critiques méthodologiques et les limitations au niveau des 
données qui restreignent la pertinence des résu ltats empiriques obtenus. 
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Dans le premier chapitre, nous avons examiné la validité emptnque de certaines 
prédictions émanant des travaux théoriques en rappott avec les déterminants du choix des 
stratégies de couverture. Un défi d'ordre méthodologique s'est posé vu la persistance dans le 
choix des stratégies. Cette persistance a motivé le recours à une modélisation économétriqu e 
dynamique appliquée aux modèles aux choix discrets. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats obtenus 
montrent que les entreprises qui font face à plus de dépenses d' invest issement utili sent plus 
les stratégies non-linéaires. Toutefois, une corrélation positive entre ces dépenses 
d' investissement et les flux monétaires générés à l' interne incite davantage l' utilisation des 
stratégies linéaires. Les stratégies non-linéaires sont aussi positivement corrélées avec la 
diversification géographique et l' incertitude dans la production . Cependant, une corrélation 
positive entre les prix de vente et les quantités produites motive le déploiement des stratégies 
linéaires pour stabiliser les flux monétaires. 
Les résultats donnent aussi une première év idence empirique de l' impact du prob lème de 
surinvestissement qui favorise l' utilisation des stratég ies linéaires. La fonction d' utilité du 
gestionnaire averse au risque joue un rôle important dans la détermination de la stratégie de 
couverture. Si sa fonction d' utilité est concave (plus d 'actions), le gest ionnaire choisirait les 
stratégies linéaires. Si sa fonction d ' utilité est convexe (plus d 'options d 'achat), il aurait 
tendance à préférer les stratégies ayant un payoff convexe. Les entreprises les plus endettées, 
mais pas encore en détresse financière, cherchent à stabiliser leurs flux monétaires avec 
particulièrement les contrats swap. Les entreprises en détresse financière font plutôt du 
transfert de risque avec les options de vente. 
Le deuxième chapitre investigue particulièrement la valid ité empirique des prédictions 
théoriques émanant du modèle de Feh le et Tsyplakov (2005) ainsi que d'autres hypothèses 
liées au programme d 'investissement de l' entreprise, à la maturité de ses actifs et ses dettes, 
aux taxes, et à l' aversion au risque du gestionnaire. Le constat le plus important révélé par les 
résultats est celui de la relation non-monotone qui existe entre la maturité de la couverture et 
la probabilité de la détresse financière. Cette non-monotonicité existe aussi entre la maturité 
et les prix au comptant du pétrole et du gaz. Les résultats montrent aussi que la maturité de la 
couverture est positivement corrélée à l'incertitude dans la production, à la corrélation entre 
les prix de vente et les quantités produites, et à la volatilité des prix au comptant. 
- --- ---- -----~----------, 
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Les entreprises ayant de grandes dépenses d'investissement privilégient les couvertures 
avec de longues maturités pour aboutir à une meilleure coordination des dépenses en capital 
et du financement. Toutefois, une corrélation positive entre les dépenses d'investissement et 
les flux monétaires, incite les entreprises à utiliser des couvertures plus courtes. Les résultats 
montrent encore que les entreprises alignent la maturité de leurs positions de couverture avec 
celles de leurs actifs et leurs dettes. Enfin, une première investigation empirique des effets de 
la maturité de la couverture sur la valeur et le risque de l'entreprise, démontre que les 
positions de couverture avec des échéances plus lointaines assurent une meilleure réduction 
de la sensibilité des rendements de l' action aux fluctuations des prix du pétrole et du gaz. 
Dans le troisième chapitre, nous réexaminons l'hypothèse de la prime liée à la gestion des 
risques financiers. Pour pallier aux critiques adressées aux résultats déjà obtenus dans la 
littérature, nous prenons en compte particulièrement le problème d' endogénéité de la décision 
de couverture avec d'autres aspects de la politique financière de l'entreprise via une 
estimation en équations simultanées par la méthode des triples moindres carrés. Nous avons 
aussi contrôlé pour l'existence d 'autres couvertures telles que celles relatives aux taux 
d'intérêt et aux taux de change, et aussi l'existence d'a utres types de couverture 
opérationnelle sous forme de diversification géographique, par exemple. 
Les résultats révèlent que la gestion des risques a des effets positifs particulièrement sur 
les prix de vente du gaz. Ces effets positifs se répercutent favorablement sur la performance 
comptable de l'entreprise. De plus, la couverture permet de réduire significativement la 
volatilité des rendements des actions de l' entreprise ainsi que son risque résiduel. La 
couverture n'est pas associée à une augmentation du risque systématique. Cela signifie que la 
présence de la gestion des risques financiers n' incite pas les investisseurs à demander un taux 
de rendement plus élevé pour détenir l' action de l' entreprise. De surcroît, la gestion des 
risques augmente la capacité de l' entreprise à contracter des dettes mais sans effets directs 
(positif ou négatif) sur le coût de cet endettement. 
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